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ABSTRACT
GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORTS:
THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FORCES THAT DRIVE
UNSUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM POLICY
by John Francis Hays
May 2010
Agricultural tariffs and price supports are the last bastion of US and European
protectionism. While all other areas of commerce have embraced change and welcomed
open-market international commerce, agriculture has remained the lone holdout.
The small farmers for whom these support programs were designed no longer
exist. Yet governments appropriate billions of dollars annually for the continued support
of these outdated programs.
The fact that these governmental agencies resist change, even in an age of
economic crises, record national debt, and one of the highest negative trade balances in
history, is testimony to American civic indifference.
Public apathy precludes timely reform. While most of the population is unaware
of the scope of agricultural price-support spending, or of the trickledown effect it has on
consumer pricing, the small groups that benefit from it spend millions annually in their
effort to continue to receive billions in aid payments.
This dissertation posits that agricultural price supports are no longer necessary,
and that they promote overproduction of certain crops, create artificially high retail costs,
and may actually hinder economic progress in some less-developed agrarian societies.
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If progress is to be made in the arena of international agricultural open-market
economics, the organizational dynamics of the developed nations must first be replaced
with institutional oversight through organizations such as the World Trade Organization.
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INTRODUCTION
Current agricultural price supports in the United States (US), the member states of
the European Union (EU), and most of the other developed nations of the world were
initially formulated during the period following World War II (WWII). They were
originally designed with the dual purpose of resupplying the war-devastated globe with
food and guaranteeing small farmers a profit in an effort to protect the large farm
populations of the United States and the states of Western Europe.
These price supports were implemented to help the small farms of the world
retrench after six years of war, difficult times, and farm neglect. They were to be shortterm interim programs with predetermined life spans that would expire as each nation‘s
economy and agricultural production improved. But in many instances they are still in
place, and in the case of cotton, grain, and sugar, they are far greater and larger than their
founders ever planned.
These funds continue to be distributed, although their original purpose and focus
has long passed. The result is overproduction of specialty crops that eventually find their
way to less fortunate nations in the form of foreign aid. Although distributing food to
poor countries has its benefits, more often subsidized agricultural overproduction is
actually being sold to developing and underdeveloped nations at prices lower than those
at which these nations can grow and sell their own crops. While these subsidies may help
feed some of the poor in developing countries, they also prevent agrarian populations
from expanding their own agricultural resources. Some believe that the inability of local
farmers to sell their products at a profit stifles economic progress and promotes long-term
poverty.
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The overall result is that the programs no longer benefit those for whom they were
originally designed, are hugely expensive to the developed countries‘ consumers, and are
causing havoc among some of the world‘s poor countries that depend on agriculture for a
large part of their economic development and growth.
Giant agribusiness corporations that receive the bulk of today‘s farm subsidies
have replaced small farmers in both the United States and the member states of the EU.
Some believe that the power these multinational corporations possess is so great that they
control the legislation and multilateral agreements that would eliminate these wasteful
programs.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has taken a strong position on the
elimination of trade barriers, and has been very successful in every area of world trade,
with the exception of agriculture. The WTO has been relentless in its efforts to promote
open markets and the elimination of agricultural-protectionist policies. It promotes
multilateral agricultural agreements, which its leaders see as the last remaining barrier to
the eventual solution of world poverty.
This dissertation will address the problems that exist, explain why they continue,
and explore solutions that will benefit both producers and consumers of these protected
products.
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HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Agricultural price support programs were introduced in both the
United States and Europe during the Great Depression and again after WWII to subsidize
small farm income. Small farmers at that time were not earning enough to support their
families or to maintain their farms. Existing evidence suggests that these programs
became redundant as the number of small farmers declined to roughly 10 percent of the
original group, and the personal incomes of those that remained rose to the level of the
national average. Agricultural support programs are no longer beneficial to the small
farmer.
The suspension of agricultural programs for small farmers in the United States and the
EU will not adversely affect their incomes.
Null Hypothesis: If agricultural price supports are suspended, the vast majority of
small farmers will no longer be able to stay in the industry.
Hypothesis 2: Today‘s agricultural price supports have little to do with local
agrarian needs, and remain in place due to large corporate influence, and public apathy.
Change and reform are unnecessarily protracted and lengthy as a result of the personal
self-indulgence of politicians and industry giants.
Agricultural price supports have little to do with small farmers, and remain in place due
to political factors rather than economic necessity.
Null Hypothesis 2: Agricultural price supports have remained in force because of
agrarian need.
Hypothesis 3: The dumping of agricultural products, by subsidized nations, on the
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markets of less developed countries, at prices lower than these products can be locally
grown, is detrimental to the farmers of those nations and inhibits their economic growth.
Null Hypothesis: The dumping of agricultural products on the market of less
developed countries, at prices lower than these products can be locally grown, is not
detrimental to the farmers of these nations.
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CHAPTER I
LITERATURE REVIEW
The United States
Price supports in the United States for certain agricultural products were initially
formulated and implemented during the Great Depression. They were originally designed
to help farmers sell their crops at a profit in order to support their families and maintain
the small-farm lifestyle that was typical of rural America. After World War II (WWII),
these price supports and import and export tariffs were put in place again in an effort to
help US farmers retrench after six years of neglect and difficult times. Those postwar
farm-support agendas were designed as interim programs that would eventually be
discarded as the economy improved. But in many instances they are still in place, and in
the case of cotton, sugar, and grain, they are far greater and larger than their founders
ever planned.
The general consensus is that these programs are outdated and no longer serve
their original purpose. To the contrary, those for whom the programs were originally
designed no longer exist, as the number of American farmers has declined from 70
percent of the workforce to less than five percent of the US working population today.
The programs are hugely expensive to the American consumer, and are causing havoc
among some of the world‘s poor countries that depend on agriculture for a large part of
their economic development and growth.
A brief history of these programs will be given before explaining past and present
US policy and the relevant scholarly literature associated with it. This critique will
compare the benefits and the drawbacks of these subsidies and their effect on the
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American consumer, the American farmer, and farmers from developing countries. This
study will contribute to the existing literature as it examines the important aspects of
political and economic factors that have accompanied the evolution of these support
programs. While most studies have focused on the importance of continuing to provide
for small farmers, this dissertation will provide insight on the underlying reasons why
these programs are self-perpetuating, and how they affect farmers differently in dissimilar
areas of the world. This study will investigate the involvement of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in its role in international price control and the effect of these
controls on Less Developed Nations (LDCs). It will question the WTO‘s price control
attitude and how its efforts are changing the positions of both the United States and the
international community on international trade. The literature review will examine the
United States‘ official policy on agricultural price supports, particularly sugar cotton and
grain and then review the effect of the 1996, 2002, and 2007 US Congress‘ farm bills as
well as the EU‘s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The contention of this dissertation is that current agricultural price-support
programs no longer benefit the small farmers for whom they were designed, and that the
bulk of these funds are distributed by large agribusiness conglomerates that have little
need for price-support protection. The popular argument is that these price supports
continue to burden US consumers while remaining important to political interest groups
and well-paid lobbyists. The pros and cons of farm subsidies today focus primarily on
both the cost of these subsidies and on the distribution of the money as less and less
reaches the small farmers and more and more goes to large corporate farming interests.
While those against wasteful government spending are critical of the continued
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spending of billions that go to support large agribusiness, the farm lobby maintains that
without subsidies, the structure of small farms would face destructive cultural and
economic consequences. Nathan Ketsdever, a professor at Catholic University in
Washington D.C., proposes that both sides of the argument have some merit in four
contexts. First, he argues that any government intervention in the floating market price is
contradictory to the US. Policy on free trade, and are in violation of the US international
agreements with the WTO and the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). He
then counters his own argument by saying that price supports may be necessary in order
to create a stable market that will prevent price fluctuations that could, under
extraordinary circumstances, push farmers in developed nations into bankruptcy.
Second, subsidies are outdated, expensive, and a burden to the rest of the nonfarming
American consumer. The backside of this argument is that, without support programs,
prices would occasionally spike, creating uncertainty in the consumer‘s ability to
purchase certain products. Third, overproduction due to price supports results in the
dumping of crops on LDCs, which, in turn, prevents local farmers from selling locally
grown products perpetuating rural poverty and accelerating migration from the farm to
the cities. The counter argument here is that crop dumping is not the cause of poverty in
these LDC countries. The poverty in many of these countries would actually increase if
the inexpensive food products were not available. Fourth, when countries can no longer
sell what they produce, they begin to rely on imports of products that were previously
produced locally. This often results in internal economic growth stagnation and increased
poverty. Those who advocate the continuation of price supports argue that less expensive
food products for the LDC countries will free up both and labor and capital that can be
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used in other more productive endeavors. Fifth, continued subsidies and agricultural
products on the market at prices below the cost to grow actually interfere with LDC small
farmer‘s right to a livelihood. Agribusiness in the United States and the EU accounts for
only about 1.5 percent of their respective economies. When they ship under priced
produce to a country where 50-80 percent of its economy is based on agriculture, it has
the potential to derail that country‘s entire economic structure. Those who advocate the
continuation of these programs argue that the products that are exported to these
countries are staples that will insure that the poor population in the countries will have
access to a complete diet heretofore unavailable.1
While the arguments for both sides are strongly opinionated, Brian Riedl‘s
position on the elimination of price supports is strong and direct. He points out that, all
other issues aside, the small farmer is gone and those who receive these payments in 2005
reported and average income of over $200,000 and a net worth of over $2 million.
These subsidies cost the American consumer billions each year in higher taxes and food
costs, and no longer serve the original goal of helping the small farmers.2 Bradley
Doucet in his paper, ―Why on Earth---Should Agriculture be Subsidized at All,‖3 claims
that subsidies not only are no longer needed by the small farmers, but actually encourage
inefficiency in production practices as farmers attempt to grow subsidized crops on land
not well suited for them which in turn raises the cost to the consumer. While much has
been written on the subject of agricultural price support programs, most of it supports the
abolition of a large part of the programs that are currently in effect. The exception comes
from those who support the cotton and sugar industry, big agribusiness interests that work
1

Ketsdever, Nathan. 2007.
Riedl, Brian M. 2008.
3
Doucet. 2009.
2

9
through government lobbyists and a growing coalition of organizations who fear that the
elimination of supports may cause a reduction of excess grain products that now go to
indigent countries. While some, such as Alexander Werth, a consultant for the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,4 fear a freefall into permanent
poverty if these programs are discontinued, others such as Kevin Watkins, who is head of
research for Oxfam, claim that the base cause of poverty is the actual dumping of excess
products.5
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is very much involved in the global
attempt to unravel both the cause and the solution to the effect of agricultural support
programs on the world and in particular the LDC countries. Its original focus was on the
elimination of all agricultural price supports. As more information has come to light
during the Doha round of negotiations, the WTO has changed directions and now
supports programs that apply separately to each individual LDC country. The three
agricultural areas that are the primary focus of this dissertation are cotton, sugar, and
grain crops. These three are most essential to the economic success of poor and
developing countries and are, ironically, also the most subsidized worldwide.
History of Sugar, Cotton, and Grain Supports
In the 1930s, there was a case to be made for protective agricultural programs,
which were established to see American farmers through the Great Depression. Over a
period of years, the US economy slowly recovered, and local and international markets
began to prosper under the precursor of market economic theory. However, the subsidy
programs designed to implement that recovery remained, and actually continued to grow.

4
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Werth, 2006
Watkins, 2006.
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Although less than 30 percent of the farmers remained, the majority of those who
continued grew large, wealthy, and powerful, in part as a result of the subsidies. With
profits subsidized by American taxpayers dollars, they can afford to be extremely
generous to the representatives they send to Washington. Representatives and lobbyists
from big farm states work overtime to keep these programs in place.6
Although the original motivation for these programs has ceased to exist, the basic
structure of farm-subsidy programs has changed little in the past seventy-five years.
Agricultural policy has tended to grow and mature, to be revised and increased as
agricultural co-ops and large corporate farmers grow stronger.
US Policy on Subsidies
Since the 1930s, the US government has encouraged overproduction by sugar
producers with an arcane price-support system, while the manufacturers of sugarintensive products such as candy, cookies, and cereals are subject to the give-and-take of
the free market. Each year, the US government distributes farm subsidies in the form of
so-called loans to the co-ops that refine sugar. The actual amount of each loan is based on
a guaranteed price per pound on the sugar they expect to produce. For example, in 2002
the per-pound prices of 18 cents for raw sugar and 22.9 cents for refined beet sugar had
no connection to the real-world marketplace. In addition, the US government also
restricts sugar imports in an effort to keep the price per pound inflated within the United
States.7
The US government pays these farmers subsidies of billions of dollars annually to
overproduce; the producers in turn dump their excess product on the international market

6
7

Chastain, 2002,
Ibid.
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at below-market prices, often with the result that farmers in smaller, less developed
countries (LDCs) are not able to sell their products at a profit. The backside of this is that
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) then sends aid to these
same countries to keep them from starving. The US taxpayers lose on both ends. For
example, US aid to Mali in 2002 amounted to $37.7 million, compared with that state‘s
foreign exchange losses of $43 million due in part to US cotton, sugar, and grain
subsidies.8
At any given time, sugar sells for about five cents a pound on the world market. In
the United States, sugar costs 17 to 22 cents a pound as the result of a governmentimposed price floor. The total cost to American consumers from the higher sugar price is
about $1.2 billion each year, according to Tom Schatz of the Council for Citizens Against
Government Waste.9 Such price supports are a ―sweet deal‖ for sugar farmers. If large
agribusinesses produce more than they can sell, the US government simply takes the
sugar in exchange for the money it loaned the farmer to grow it. In 2001, in exchange for
a promise from these co-ops to not produce any more sugar, the Bush administration gave
them the old sugar back to resell. Previously, the Clinton administration had agreed to
purchase 132,000 tons of sugar, which cost taxpayers nearly $55 million. At the time, the
administration admitted that although the government would almost certainly spend $140
million on sugar for the fiscal year, it would probably not strengthen sugar prices. This
simply encouraged farmers to produce as much as possible each year, with the knowledge

8
9

Oxfam, 2002.
Citizens Against Government Waste, n.d.
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that they would be paid based on the previous year‘s production. Between the years 2000
and 2005 the sugar program is estimated to have cost US taxpayers at least $1 billion.10
The sugar program created by the 1981 Farm Bill consisted of a domestic
commodity loan program that set a support price (loan rate) for sugar and established an
import-quota system that restricted foreign competition and ensured a high domestic
price for sugar. Instead of creating a more stable sugar economy, as was the bill‘s
purported intent, the result was higher prices for everything that contained sugar. In
addition to the Farm Bill, there was also the tariff rate quota (TRQ), which regulated the
amount of sugar that could be imported into the United States. If the TRQ was more than
1.5 million tons, US sugar processors were eligible for nonrecourse loans, which did not
have to be repaid. But if the TRQ is 1.5 million tons or less, the loans become recourse,
and had to be paid back. This has become such a pork-barrel issue that the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has issued a fictional quota, and at the same time a
real TRQ of 1.25 million tons that would actually be enforced. The fictional TRQ was
just over 1.5 million tons, just enough to give sugar processors the right not to repay their
loans. Coincidentally, it just so happens that 1.25 million tons is the US minimum import
obligation under the WTO. The result is that the American taxpayer ends up not only
paying a higher price for anything that contains sugar but also paying for the loans.11
Cotton is another subsidy that has far exceeded its intended life. The market price
for cotton in February 2005 was about 35 cents per pound, but the price controls were set
at 52 cents per pound. Thus, cotton farmers were paid 17 cents over and above market
price for each pound of cotton they produced. A bale of cotton weighs about 500 pounds,

10
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Carnell, 1999.
Sugar Program, n.d.
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which computes to $85 in subsidies per bale. A large cotton operation that produces
3,500 bales could easily receive $300,000 in governmental subsidies for doing absolutely
nothing. Furthermore, no consumer or taxpayer will receive any benefit whatsoever in
return. Since most cotton operations are now large agri-conglomerates, such as J.G.
Boswell Co., which farms over 200,000 acres and has a net worth of over $1 billion,
benefit and the rest lose. In addition, these subsidies increase the prices for food products,
limit foreign markets, reduce competition, and increase the overall cost of living in the
United States.12
Cotton support measures account for only a part of the decline in cotton prices, as
a large share of domestic cotton is exported. In the past, when the world market price for
cotton was $.85 per kilo, the US minimum price was $1.56 per kilo, which means that US
taxpayers made up the difference between $.85 and $1.56. The taxpayers are paying a
subsidy that was originally designed to protect small US cotton growers; however, the
richest 10 percent of cotton farmers now receive more than 73 percent of these subsidies,
and 25 percent goes to the richest one percent.13
When President George W. Bush signed the 2002 and the follow-up 2008 Farm Bills,
governmental support programs for farmers were actually increased, and are estimated to
cost $190 billion by the year 2018. That is $83 billion more than the cost of the pre-2000
program had it been extended. Many Republicans who understand the overall
consequences of this continued support urged the president to veto the bill. The new
Farm Bill actually raises payment rates to growers of cotton, among other commodities.

12
13

Lora, 2005.
WTO, 2003.
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It perpetuates the safety net that provides federal aid to farmers when crop prices drop
lower than pre-established numbers.14
The 2002 Farm Bill
Income support for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, and oilseeds is
provided through three programs: direct payments, countercyclical payments, and
marketing loans.
Direct payment is provided to farmers who participated in the wheat, corn, barley,
grain sorghum, oats, upland cotton, and rice programs in any one of the years 1991
through 1995. Farmers could enter into a seven-year production flexibility contract (PFC)
for 1996 through 2002 during a one-time enrollment period. An eligible farm‘s so-called
payment quantity for a given contract commodity was equal to 85 percent of its contract
acreage times its program yield for that commodity. A per-unit payment rate (e.g., per
bushel or bale) for each contract commodity was determined annually by dividing the
total annual contract payment level for each commodity by the total of program payment
quantities for all contract farms.15 The annual payment rate for a contract commodity was
then multiplied by each farm‘s payment quantity for that commodity, and the sum of such
payments across contract commodities on the farm was that farm‘s annual payment,
subject to any payment limits. For example, the payment for an individual corn farmer is
―direct payment (DP) corn = payment rate (target price higher of commodity price or loan
rate) corn = ([Base acres]corn

0.85)

(payment yield) corn

(payment rate).‖16 All of

this may look complicated beyond comprehension to the casual observer, but the farmers
14

Grow, 2002.
2002 Farm Bill, 2002.
16
Young, 2008.
15
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who benefit from this formula understand it completely. To receive payments on covered
crops (wheat, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, rice, upland cotton, soybeans, and other
oilseeds), a producer must have entered into an annual agreement for crop years 2002
through 2007. 17
Farmers were given two options to choose from when deciding which program
was best for them: ― l) choose base acres equal to contract acreage for the commodity that
would otherwise have been used for 2002 PFC payments plus average plantings in crop
years (CY) 1998–2001, so long as base acres did not exceed available cropland; or 2)
update base acres to reflect the four-year average of acres planted, plus those ―prevented
from planting‖ because of weather conditions, during CY 1998–2001.‖18
For a farmer to be a part of the farm support program, he was required to select
one of the two options that would then be applied to all agricultural products for both
direct payments and countercyclical payments Farmers were given almost complete
flexibility in deciding which crops to plant. This was not a particularly difficult decision
to make: they began growing those crops that had higher price supports. Planting was no
longer based on market demand, but on which crops had the most advantageous
guarantees. Participating producers were permitted to plant all cropland acreage on the
farm to any crop, except for some limitations on planting fruits and vegetables, which
were not desirable crops for the farmers anyway, because they had no subsidies attached.
It was required that the land be kept in agricultural uses, which includes fallow unplanted

17
18

2008 Farm Bill, 2008
Young, 2008.
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acres, and farmers were required to comply with certain conservation and wetland
provisions.19
For year 2002, payments were made immediately after the passage of the Farm
Act. The date for distribution of funds for the years 2002 through 2007 was set at October
1, or shortly after harvest, however, advance payments in the amount of 50% of the
previous year‘s crops could be made in December of the same year.20 The payment limit
on direct payments was to be $40,000 per person, per crop year, and the three-entity rule
was retained. The three-entity rule specified that farmers would be paid full payment for
one parcel on request, and additional payments of 50 percent for two additional farms. In
reply to complaints that some farmers would be overpaid, the rule also stated that farms
that had average incomes of over $2.5 million over a three year period could not
participate unless at least 75 percent of their income was from farming.
These rules were easily subverted, as many farmers simply placed common
owned farms in the names of family members. The payment rates have varied over each
year but were spelled out in the 2002 Farm Act (see Table 1). Farm payments under the
2002 Farm Act were not directed toward any particular crop, the amount of land farmed
or to the final market price. This gave farmers some leeway as to which crops to plant,
and some confusion when applying for the funds. In some cases farmers were growing
soybeans and requesting money for raising corn. Farmers were actually playing the
market with government money.

19
20

The 2002 Farm Bill, 2002.
Ibid
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The economic impacts are similar to those for PFC payments under the 1996
Farm Act. PFC payments increased farmers‘ wealth, facilitated additional investment,
and probably led to slightly higher crop production.21
Under this new program, countercyclical payments (CCPs) are available for
certain crops whenever the actual market price is less than the target price. According to
the formula, the payment amount is equal to the product of the payment rate, the payment
acres (85 percent of base acres), and the payment yield.22 Countercyclical payments for
wheat, grains, cotton, and rice are covered by market loss assistance (MLA) payments,
which are authorized by supplemental legislation. Payment levels were $2.857 billion in
CY 1998, $5.5 billion in CY 1999, $5.465 billion in CY 2000, and $4.6 billion in CY
200123 (see Table 2 and Table 3). For example, the payment for an individual corn farmer
is determined as follows: ―Payment rate corn = (target price) corn – (direct payment rate)
corn – (higher of commodity price or loan rate) corn. CCP corn = ([Base acres]corn ×
0.85) × (payment yield) corn × (payment rate) corn. To receive payments on crops
covered by the program, a producer must have entered into annual agreements for CY
2002–2007.‖24
The payout for this program was to be at the rate of 35 percent in October of the
harvest year with a second payment of 35 percent to be made the following February and
the final payment to be made sometime in the spring prior to planting. This program had
a cap of $65,000.00 per farmer per year, and the three entity rule remained in place along
with the exclusion of farmers who had a $2.5 million income average over a three year
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period. Many farmers realized early on that the rules could be bent by simply adding
family members to the equation with the result of reducing income, and splitting
ownership of farms among relatives.
Table 1
Payment Rates Specified in the 2002 Farm Act
Price per unit
(in US dollars)

Crop
Wheat (bu)

.52

Corn (bu)

.28

Oats (bu)

.24

Cotton (lb)

.67

Rice (cwt)

2.35

Soybeans (bu)

.44

Note. bu = bushel; cwt = hundredweight; lb = pound. Compiled from
2002 USDA Economic Research Service.

Marketing assistance loans and loan deficiency payments (LDPs) are available to
minimize potential loan forfeitures and the subsequent governmental accumulation of
excess stocks.
Nonrecourse commodity loans with marketing loan provisions were extended in
the 2002 Farm Bill. Any production of a contract commodity by a producer who entered
into a PFC was eligible for loans. The formulas for establishing loan rates for wheat, feed
grains, and upland cotton were retained, subject to specified maximums, as well as
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continued marketing loan provisions that allowed repayment of loans at less than full
principal plus interest when prices were below loan rates.25
Table 2
Yearly Fixed Total Payment Levels, 1996–2001

Year

Payment level
(in billions of US dollars)

1996

5.57

1997

5.38

1998

5.80

1999

5.60

2000

5.13

2001

4.13

Note. Compiled from 2002 US Farm Bill and US Program Payments.

The Farm Service Agency (FSA) administers commodity loan programs with
marketing loan provisions for wheat, rice, corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, cotton, and
soybeans through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). These commodity loan
programs allow growers of these crops to receive a loan from the government at a
commodity-specific loan rate by pledging their crops as loan collateral. These commodity
loans were designed to give the farmer several options for repayment: 1) at the original
loan rate plus interest, usually one percent above what the CCC could borrow from US
Treasury, 2) the farmer cold simply give the crop back to the CCC at the maturity of the

25
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loan, or 3) could repay the loan at some alternative loan rate to be determined at a later
date.
Table 3
Target Prices for Countercyclical Payments
Price per unit
(in US dollars)
Crop

2002–2003

2004–2007

Wheat (bu)

3.86

3.92

Corn (bu)

2.60

2.63

Oats (bu)

1.40

1.44

Cotton (lb)

.72

.72

Rice (cwt)

10.50

10.50

5.80

5.80

Soybeans (bu)

Note. bu = bushel; cwt = hundredweight; lb = pound. Compiled from USDA
Economic Research Service, 2002.

According to the 2002 Farm Bill, marketing loan repayment rates are based on
local, posted county prices (PCP) for wheat, feed grains, and oilseeds, or on the
prevailing world-market prices for rice and cotton. PCPs are calculated by the
government each day the federal government is open. Prevailing world-market prices for
rice and upland cotton are also calculated on a weekly basis. When a farmer repays the
loan at a lower PCP or prevailing world-market price, the difference between the loan
rate and the loan repayment rate, called a marketing loan gain, represents a program
benefit to producers. In addition, any accrued interest on the loan is waived. When a
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marketing loan gain is received on a given collateralized quantity, that quantity is not
eligible for further loan benefits.26 Alternatively, according to the USDA, some farmers
may also choose to apply for direct loans through LDPs when market prices are lower
than commodity loan rates. The advantage of this option is that it allows the farmer to
receive the benefits of the marketing loan program without the obligation of having to
repay a commodity loan. The LDP rate is the amount by which the loan rate exceeds the
PCP price, and therefore is equivalent to the marketing loan repayment.27
Loan rates are not governed by a US agency that can alter them at will, but are
instead fixed by legislation. Commodity loans mature in nine months except for upland
cotton and extra-long staple (ELS) cotton loans, which mature in 10 months (see Table
4).28 In their original format, Step 2 payments had a cap of $701 million total over the
period of 1996 to 2002. Under farm lobby pressure, that cap was removed by the 2002
Appropriations Act. 29 That same act also introduced provisions for ELS cotton supports
when the world market prices, over a period of four weeks, dropped below US prices or
when competing ELS cotton was 134 percent of the ELS loan rate.30 Farmers were also
eligible for special government-backed credit programs under the 2002 Farm Bill. FSA
farm-loan eligibility rules were relaxed to allow additional farmers to be eligible for
federal farm credit assistance. The focus was on new farmers and ranchers who had little
experience and no borrowing power. The rules for these loans were streamlined to insure
a quick turnaround from application to closing.

26

2002 Farm Bill.
USDA ERS, 2002, p. 42.
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Table 4
Fixed Loan Rates
Price per unit
(in US dollars)
Crop

2002–2003

2004–2007

Wheat (bu)

2.80

2.75

Corn (bu)

1.98

1.95

Oats (bu)

1.35

1.33

Cotton (lb)

0.52

0.52

Rice (cwt)

6.50

6.50

Soybeans (bu)

5.00

5.00

Note. bu = bushel; cwt = hundredweight; lb = pound. Compiled from USDA
Economic Research Service, 2002, p. 42.

The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 (ARPA) provided an additional $8.2
billion for insurance premium subsidies for FY 2001–2005. The 2002 Farm Bill
continued the crop-insurance and disaster-assistance program. There were no changes to
the basic program. ARPA raised insurance participation and encouraged the use of higher
coverage levels.
Although US sugar policy remains at the top of the international irritant list, the
subsidy program for sugar is quite different from those for other agricultural products.
The two main elements of US sugar policy are the price-support loan program and the
TRQ import system.31 The loan program for sugar processors supports the US price of
sugar. Unlike most other commodity programs, sugar loans are made to processors and
31
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not directly to producers. This is because sugarcane and sugar beets, which are bulky and
very perishable, must be processed into sugar before they can be traded and stored. To
qualify for loans, processors must agree to provide a part of the loan payment to
producers, in proportion to the amount of the loan value accounted for by the sugar beets
and sugarcane the producers deliver.
The stated purpose of the TRQ system is to ensure an adequate supply of sugar at
reasonable prices for both consumers and producers. The way that they accomplish this is
that on June 1 of every year, the USDA and the US trade representative attempt to
calculate who actually used, or did not use their segment of the TRQ quota and then
reallocate the quotas for the coming year. Although the US is not the largest producer of
sugar it is one of the largest exporters of it and is therefore one of the biggest players in
the TRQ negotiations. US sugar is highly subsidized and therefore would not be
competitive on the world market without additional programs in the form of export
subsidies such as the Refined Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products RE-Export.32
Among the other key program provisions are the following. First, the 2002 Farm
Act continued the rate for loans to processors of domestically grown sugarcane at 18
cents per pound and the rate for loans to processors of domestically grown sugar beets at
22.9 cents per pound for refined sugar. Processors may obtain loans for so-called inprocess sugar and syrups at 80 percent of the loan rate. As an additional safety measure,
the processor cannot be required to notify USDA of the intention to forfeit the sugar
under loan.33
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Trade programs are designed to develop and expand commercial outlets for US
commodities and to provide international food assistance; therefore, all trade programs
were reauthorized through 2007. In addition to the guarantees, there is also the Export
Enhancement Program (EEP), which provides financial support for exporters, and was
designed to enable them to sell excess products on the international market at competitive
prices. Total EEP support payments were to be capped at $350 million in 1996, $250
million in 1997, $500 million in 1998, $550 million in 1999, $579 million in 2000, and
$478 million in 2001 and 2002. These funds were extended through 2007 at a funding
level of $478 million per year.34
The debate over equity became heated when Congress enacted payment limits on
agricultural subsidies for the first time in the 1970 Farm Bill. Until that time, these
programs had reached entitlement status, and farmers were both surprised and outraged at
the idea that many of these programs might be unfair to the consumer and to US
taxpayers. Although the farm population had compacted from 20 percent to roughly five
percent of the population at this time, the farm lobby was stronger than ever, and the farm
vote in the Midwest had organized into an effective block. Recently, in light of greater
transparency of the subsidies received by individuals and against the backdrop of the
WTO Doha Development Round of negotiations, concerns about equity in farm subsidies
reemerged as a major policy issue.
With additional transparency, and history as a teacher, it has become easier to
discover who receives and benefits from agricultural subsidies, and to define the fairness
of farm policy. To this end, economists typically examine the distribution of subsidies in
two ways. The first, most obvious way is to examine who actually receives the subsidies.
34
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This course of examination is called the statutory incidence, which refers to an
individual‘s legal right to receive the subsidy. The second method of distribution analysis
examines the changes caused by the subsidy. This course of examination is more
academic in scope in that it measures a markets response to a subsidy, assuming that
prices adjust and resources are reallocated in relation to the amount of subsidies
available. This goes beyond the subsidy to the farmer, and measures the effect that the
subsidy has on the consumer. This type of examination is referred to as economic
incidence.35
The larger farms obviously receive more subsidies. This is not surprising, since
US farm policy subsidizes land and production, not individual farms per se. Meanwhile, a
majority of US farms (57 percent)36 do not grow subsidized crops or farm subsidized
land. These farms grow crops that are not covered by subsidies, receive no farm
payments at all, and rely on the open market to set a competitive price.
Most individuals in nonfarm communities have little interest in agriculture, and
are seldom aware of the amount of money that is involved in agricultural price supports.
However, reports of individual farmers receiving as much as $4 million in 1968 raised
public ire and piqued the interest of both individuals and lawmakers. The evidence of
subsidy concentration during the 1960s prompted Congress to enact payment limits for
the first time in the 1970 Farm Bill. Thirty-seven years later, the 2006 Economic Report
of the President (EROP), in its chapter on the US agricultural sector, reported as one of
its two major findings that ―most farmers do not benefit from commodity subsidies.‖37 In
fact, Bonnen reported that the top five percent of farms, by size, received about 30
35
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percent of subsidies.38 In comparison, the 2006 EROP reported, ―The largest of the
commercial family farms received 27 percent of payments even though they account for
5.5 percent of farms receiving payments.‖39 Not only is the EROP finding not new, but
the distribution seems to have changed little over the intervening 37 years40 (see Table 5).
EROP‘s reporting of distribution is important in that it points out that, although those
who are advocates of agriculture price supports claim to have placed caps on spending,
the distribution of funds has changed little in the past forty years. 41
As each farm-subsidy period comes to a close and the next appears on the
threshold, the same story unfolds. The equity debate often focuses on the well-being of
farm households, specifically subsidized farm households, relative to the general
population. One of the arguments of the agriculture lobby is that, historically, farm
incomes have been far below those of the general population. However, data from the
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), a detailed survey of a
representative cross-section of farmers, reveal that the income distribution among farmers
now closely resembles the overall income distribution in the United States. Before
receiving subsidies, the median farm-household income from both farm and nonfarm
sources in 2003 was $45,118, while the median US income in 2003 was $43,300.42
Payment caps and revenue restrictions are designed to correct existing inequities
in government support payments. During the initial dialogue on the 2002 Farm Bill, Sen.
38
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Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) echoed the remark of Paul Findley (former Republican
Representative from Illinois) from three decades earlier: ―How long will the American
people put up with programs that send out billions of dollars to the biggest farm entities?
All this does is damage our ability to help people we originally intended to help—the
small and medium-sized producers.‖43 Sen. Grassley has been an open advocate of tighter
payment limits, and suggested to the Bush administration in 2005, that this might be an
effective way to reduce spending.
Although small farmers as well as large agribusiness have come to rely on these
payments and are against reductions and caps, little is known about how these caps would
actually affect the existing farm structure. Schnittker, in his 1968 report to Congress,
stated, ―One of the serious administrative problems sure to arise would result from
proposed division of farms into smaller units if a limitation were imposed, in order to
evade the limit.‖44 Anticipating the potential effects of payment limits before their 1970
adoption, Schnittker, in his 1968 report to Congress, stated, ―One of the serious
administrative problems sure to arise would result from proposed division of farms into
smaller units if a limitation were imposed, in order to evade the limit.‖45 Thirty-six years
later, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) echoed that concern: ―Some farming
operation may reorganize to overcome payment limits to maximize their farm program
benefits.‖46 Stories flourish regarding the lengths some farmers go to in order to avoid
payment limits. The 2004 GAO report titled ―USDA Needs to Strengthen Regulations
and Oversight to Better Ensure Recipients Do Not Circumvent Payment Limitation‖
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documented several specific cases of farms organized to maximize subsidy receipts and
avoid payment limits. Although farm lobbies make a great deal of noise when caps are
suggested by congress, there is little evidence that it goes much further in the way of
organized resistance.47
The 2002 US Farm Bill made few changes, and none that would substantially
reduce farm subsidies. In the 1930s and 40s agricultural productivity was low and the
average income among six million farmers was less than one-half the national average.48
Once Congress began to increase farm subsidies annually, the political effort to turn the
extra payments made during the period from 1998 to 2001 into a permanent support
entitlement under the new Farm Bill was vigorously marketed by the House Agriculture
Committee as the great equalizer in farm income. The committee was still under
Republican control, and was chaired by Larry Combest (R-Texas); Senator Combest
represented a farm state and therefore was in opposition to the decoupling of payments in
the Federal Agriculture Improvement Reform (FAIR) Act. Under Republican chairman
Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), the Senate Agriculture Committee attempted to delay the
rewriting of the Farm Bill in an effort to not raise support levels. 49
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Table 5
Top Twenty Subsidy Recipients for 2005

Ran
k

Recipienta

Location

Commodity
subsidy
(in US dollars)

1

Riceland Foods Inc

Stuttgart, AR 72160

15,977,233

2

Producers Rice Mill Inca

Stuttgart, AR 72160

14,336,238

3

American Peanut Marketing Assoc.

Leary, GA 39862

6,716,431

4

Farmers Rice Coop

Sacramento, CA 95851

5,171,362

5

Harvest States Cooperatives

Saint Paul, MN 55164

4,878,983

6

Peanut Loan Processing Center

Gorman, TX 76454

3,881,721

7

Balmoral Farming Partnership a

Newellton, LA 71357

3,440,505

8

Kelley Enterprisesa

Burlison, TN 38015

3,300,126

9

Due Westa

Glendora, MS 38928

3,300,070

10

River Rock Farms a

Camilla, GA 31730

2,887,041

11

King Ranch Inc

Kingsville, TX 78364

2,591,408

12

Gila River Farmsa

Sacaton, AZ 85247

2,535,267

13

Dublin Farmsa

Corcoran, CA 93212

2,526,821

14

Perthshire Farmsa

Gunnison, MS 38746

2,526,684

15

Walker Placea

Danville, IL 61832

2,516,904

16

Starrh & Starrh Ctn Growersa

Shafter, CA 93263

2,362,419

17

Soudan Farming Coa

Marianna, AR 72360

2,337,815

18

Ak-chin Farmsa

Maricopa, AZ 85239

2,292,596

19

S J R Farminga

Los Banos, CA 93635

2,282,692

20

Pitts Farmsa

Indianola, MS 38751

2,276,031

Note. Compiled from USDA Economic Research Service data. a USDA data are not totally ―transparent.‖
Recipients of payments made through most cooperatives have not been made public.
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The agricultural lobby prevailed in April 2001 when it successfully included in a
congressional budget resolution a reserve fund of an additional $5.5 billion for that year
and $73.5 billion over the next ten years (2002–2011) to enhance farm subsidies beyond
the levels built into the extension of existing law.50 This increased by three-fourths the
baseline spending of nearly $100 billion on agriculture anticipated from continuation of
the FAIR Act and allowed the 1996 law to be rewritten one year before it was scheduled
to expire perpetuating multimillion dollar payments to a select few wealthy mega-farmers
(see Table 6).
With total disregard for the effect of wasteful spending on the nation and the
world, the House Agriculture Committee passed a new ten-year Farm Bill in July 2001.
Under the committee bill, most of the $50 billion newly available money went to
commodity support. The Senate did not look favorably on these higher levels of farm
support and challenged it on four fronts in the Senate committee and floor debates. The
questions were: how can we justify this while the country is in the midst of budget
constraints, US international commitments on agriculture in the WTO, pressure to
substitute conservation issues for farm support payments, and increasing questions about
the purpose and national benefit of farm subsidies.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, altered the political dynamics in the
United States and could easily have derailed this legislation. In the midst of congressional
farm support debates, terrorism took over as the defining issue of congressional focus.
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Table 6
Recipients of Farm Subsidies between 1995 and 2006

Percentage of
recipients

Percentage of
payments

Number of
recipients

Total payments
(US dollars)

Payment
per recipient
(US dollars)

Top 1%

24

32,705

42,424,109,175

1,297,175

Top 2%

35

65,411

62,826,500,911

960,488

Top 3%

44

98,117

77,931,913,054

794,275

Top 4%

51

130,823

89,874,851,936

686,996

Top 5%

56

163,529

99,654,261,196

609,398

Top 6%

61

196,234

107,837,539,768

549,535

Top 7%

65

228,940

114,792,430,008

501,408

Top 8%

68

261,646

120,779,059,199

461,612

Top 9%

71

294,352

125,989,069,639

428,022

Top 10%

74

327,058

130,558,342,890

399,190

Top 11%

76

359,764

134,590,492,963

374,108

Top 12%

78

392,469

138,168,367,065

352,049

Top 13%

80

425,175

141,362,679,101

332,481

Top 14%

81

457,881

144,228,474,471

314,991

Top 15%

83

490,587

146,811,765,109

299,257

Top 16%

84

523,293

149,146,892,240

285,016

Top 17%

85

555,998

151,266,386,133

272,063

Top 18%

86

588,704

153,194,922,428

260,224

Top 19%

87

621,410

154,953,640,989

249,358

Top 20%

88

654,116

156,563,257,533

239,351

Remaining
80%

12

2,616,466

21,026,085,442

8,036

Note. Compiled from USDA Economic Research Service data.
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With the understanding that priorities were quickly changing, the House pushed
the floor debate on the Farm Bill, which was scheduled to begin September 12. It was
delayed for just 21 days. By early October 2001, the House passed its version of an
expensive new Farm Bill with strong bipartisan backing. This was an extraordinary
demonstration of the power of the farm lobby. The Farm Bill was the first legislation not
related to the terrorist crisis that was taken up for full House floor debate after the
September 11 attacks.
The Senate took a longer look at the bill, and did not pass the Farm Bill in 2001.
When it subsequently approved a five-year bill in February 2002, the Senate outdid the
House as it authorized new expenditures of $73.5 billion if its bill could be extended over
a full ten-year period. When the Senate bill was eventually passed in February 2002, the
projected cost of its increased spending was nearly $38 billion during the period 2002–
2006, compared with $30 billion under the House bill.51
The US Farm Bill of 2002 provided for an increase in US government support to
agriculture amounting to approximately $180 billion over ten years. This amounted to a
70 percent, or about $83 billion, increase in the level of farm support. The five basic
commodities identified for support were corn, wheat, cotton, rice, and sugar.52 Arguably,
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 reversed the policy shift
toward greater market liberalization that was a distinct feature of the FAIR Act of 1996,
commonly referred to as the Freedom to Farm Bill. The final 2002 FSRIA negotiated
between the House and Senate was signed into law by the president on May 13, 2002.
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Ordinarily the format for legislation specifies that it remain in effect for 10 ten years,
however, the new law specified only six years, and would come up for review in 2007.
The trend of declining governmental intervention in US agriculture that began with the
1985 Farm Bill began to unravel with the changes brought by the US commodity
programs of 2002. After 1985, the trend continued with the 1990 Farm Bill, which gave
producers planting flexibility on their base acres. The 1996 Farm Bill replaced the
coupled deficiency-payment program with declining decoupled direct payments and
eliminated acreage set-asides. Many hoped that the Uruguay Round Agreement that
formed the WTO, together with the 1996 Farm Bill, might signal the beginning of the end
to US support of agriculture. But this was not to be. Lower prices from 1998 to 2001
motivated farm supporters in Congress to give farmers emergency supplemental
payments (MLA payments), thereby giving Congress the initiative to change direction
with the 2002 Farm Bill.53
The 2002 US Farm Bill has been justifiably criticized for increasing subsidies that
will cost local consumers, be potentially detrimental to agricultural producers abroad and
undermine US negotiations with world leaders at the WTO negotiations. For example, in
July 2002, the United States brought before the WTO a proposal on agriculture that
called for significant multilateral restraint on subsidies and protection, none of which was
undertaken on a unilateral basis in the new Farm Bill. This divergence frustrated
proponents of further agricultural trade liberalization, who would have preferred sharp
unilateral reform action by the United States in 2002 as an example for similar reforms
abroad.
53

Babcock, 2002.

34

The 2007/2008 Farm Bill
Was this a measure to win political support for the president and members of
Congress in important farm states? Some think so. President George W. Bush proclaimed
the farm program operated within limits set by the WTO. He said, ―The success of
America‘s farmers is necessary for the success of the American economy.‖54 For some,
that statement translates to more farm subsidies, while others might interpret it to mean
that the success of Big Business is necessary for the success of the American economy.
Cotton farmers fall into both categories: more subsidies, and big business. Cotton has its
own cartel protection system, in which strong and expensive lobbyists keep the support
money flowing. The Texas Cotton Association was founded in 1911 and represents
thousands of cotton growers in Texas and Oklahoma. The association warehouses,
markets, and ships cotton to mills around the world. It is also a major lobbyist for the
cotton industry. Among the items that the members of the organization champion are the
following: 1) a waiver of carrying charges. They recommend that current USDA policies
on charges for accrued interest and storage be reimbursed if the Adjusted World Price
(AWP) is below the loan value. 2) That the crop insurance program be completely
revised to provide 100 percent yield protection for producers, to encourage all producers
to maximize cotton production; and 3) farm bargaining. They have recommended that
legislation designed to regulate the prices of agricultural sales transactions, or to permit
collective bargaining between producer and processor for the purpose of establishing
prices or expanding marketing orders, would adversely affect the marketing and
processing of cotton. ―Any legislation of this kind must exclude cotton. Cotton producers
54
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must enjoy the security and freedom of choice to market their cotton through the CCC
loan, cooperatives, cotton gins, shippers and mill buyers. The dynamic US cotton
marketing system provides producers with competitive bidding for their product, and the
pricing mechanism advocated in farm bargaining legislation is not suitable to the cotton
industry.‖55
Cotton emphasizes all of the contradictions maintained in world trade as defined
by the WTO after the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Some nations have simply
interpreted the term ―free market‖ to mean those ways of conducting business that are
most beneficial to them. When it comes to cotton, the United States is the chief culprit.
Although the United States is not the world‘s biggest producer, it is the world‘s biggest
exporter. A list of the world‘s main cotton producers and exporters is compiled by the
USDA (see Table 7). Defying the laws of supply and demand by means of enormous
subsidies, the United States has been expanding both the amount of acreage planted and
total production, despite the fact that it may be creating a severe world price depression.
The result is that US subsidies over the past twenty years have forced world cotton prices
to dip to Great Depression levels.56
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Table 7
World’s Main Cotton Producers, Exporters, and Importers, 2007

Country

Millions of bales

Percentage of
global share

Production
China

32.5

28

India

23

19.8

USA

17.3

14.9

Imports
China

16

38.9

Turkey

3.5

8.5

Bangladesh

2.4

5.9

Exports
United States

16.7

41.2

Uzbekistan

4.7

11.6

India

3.6

8.9

Brazil

2.9

7.1

Australia

1.2

2.9

Note. Compiled from USDA Economic Research Service data.

US cotton farmers receive more subsidies per capita and per acre than any other
producer group in America. Although the United States may be the largest offender, it is
certainly not the only one. It has been estimated that support policies and border
protection of the wealthy countries, worth hundreds of billions of dollars each year, may
cause devastating harm to agriculture programs among developing countries. These are
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the same policies that continue to include price guarantees for specific agricultural
products, income-support measures that guarantee farmers an annual income regardless
of market fluxuations, and crop-insurance subsidies that eliminate business risk. They
maintain tariffs and TRQs that restrict market access and provide export subsidies that
move excess farm products into world markets at below production prices. The support
and border-protection policies of the developed countries at times are nothing more than
special and differential treatment for the rich at the expense of the poor. Cotton, sugar,
and grain are merely the tools of commerce.
The WTO is very much aware of the disparity in bargaining power between the
rich and the poor nations. In its efforts to even the playing field, the WTO‘s stated farm
policy objectives fall into two categories: those concerned with the incomes of farm
households, and those designed to address other societal concerns such as the
environment, the provision of rural amenities, land and water management, and food
safety and food security. In each case, governments justify their current policies on the
grounds that private markets alone may not lead to local achievement of these goals. In
plain words, everyone wants the better side of an uneven agreement. Yet the majority of
these individual policies are unsuccessful in correcting their market failures, or in
improving the plight of their farmers.
With respect to household incomes, the Organization of Economic Co-operation
and Development‘s (OECD) work has shown two things very clearly. First, there is no
evidence that farm households have systematically lower incomes than other households;
therefore, policies to support incomes across the whole sector may be unfounded.
Second, when support is linked to output, the distribution of that support is heavily
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skewed toward larger and richer farmers.57 Both findings lead to the logical conclusion
that not only do these support policies no longer help the average American farmers, but
there is the backside of price-support policies, which is the high price of their products to
local consumers, and the potential harm done to cotton- and sugar-dependent countries.
Is progress being made with reference to US agricultural policy? On paper, it
appears that some headway is being made. In December of 2005 the Office of the US
Trade Representative (USTR) issued a fact sheet on agricultural trade issues, just prior to
the WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. Among the US proposals were the
following:
Stage 1: Substantial reductions of trade-distorting support measures and tariffs,
along with the elimination of export subsidies, to be phased–in over a five-year period.
Stage 2: An additional five-year phase-in period that delivers the elimination of
remaining trade-distorting subsidies and tariffs in agriculture.58
The proposals call for progressive tariff reductions delivering deeper cuts to
higher tariffs.59 These suggestions are a long way from a permanent solution; however,
they appeared to be a starting point from which the United States could move forward
toward more potent objectives.
With the introduction of the 2007/2008 Farm Bill, the US Congress was presented
with the opportunity to reveal past inconsistency and correct former fiscal mistakes with
the legitimate defense of a declining economy, and the increasing national debt. Both the
nation‘s populace and Congress faced increased pressure to eliminate wasteful spending.
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The international community and the WTO had just completed its lengthy Doha round of
negotiations, and looked forward to positive change.60 The US Congress voted a new
Farm Bill into law on May 22, 2008, with little change. The legislation was greeted with
disbelief and incredulity in Geneva, where the WTO has its headquarters. The reaction of
the WTO echoed that of President Bush, who vetoed the legislation, saying, ―the Farm
Bill will impede a conclusion to negotiations on the Doha Agenda at the WTO.‖61
Neither the House nor the Senate faced major resistance in finding the two-thirdsmajority vote necessary to overturn the veto.
The opportunity to correct a serious flaw in the economic redistribution of tax
assets was missed. The 2008 Farm Bill, overall, will spend even more money than its
predecessor. Then presidential contender John McCain voted against the bill, President
Barack Obama voted for it.
During a time of record profits for big agriculture and high food prices for
struggling taxpayers, this Farm Bill.
actually increases existing subsidies for commodities like soybeans and
wheat;
establishes new subsidies for crops like dry peas, lentils, and chickpeas;
removes payment caps for the most trade-distorting subsidies, such as
loan-deficiency payments; and
misses an important opportunity to adequately reform food aid in order to
meet the needs of the current crisis.62
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The call for reform was too loud to ignore outright; therefore, Congress was
forced to make some incremental improvements to subsidies and food aid. This Farm Bill
reduces the incomes of producers who qualify to receive subsidies, from $2.5 million to
$750,000. It also:
requires that individual recipients, not paper ―entities,‖ collect subsidies
establishes a pilot program that creates a safety net for farmers based on
their revenue and not their production.
creates a pilot program that allows for the local purchase of some food
saving the time and money often wasted on transporting commodities
from the United States.63
The latest Farm Bill, also known as the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of
2008, set US farm policy for the next five years and authorized spending of up to $307
billion over that period beginning October 1, 2008. The new Farm Bill also provides
some extra benefits. For example, spending on commodities has been reduced from 23
percent in the 2002 program to roughly 10 percent in the 2008 bill. Crop insurance has
been reduced to $23 billion over five years, and the total projected spending for
commodities, conservation, and trade has been reduced from $95 billion over a five-year
period in the 2002 bill to $73 billion in the 2008 Farm Bill.64
The real cost of the 2008 Farm Bill is unpredictable, because the amount actually
paid out varies with average annual market prices and crop yields. The USDA in 2008
reported that if crop prices were to fall from the projected highs to their normal selling
price over the next five years, farm payments could swell to all time new highs. For
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example, if corn prices return to $3.25 a bushel from their 2008 price of $6.00, farmers
could receive $10 billion a year in support payments.65 The price of corn on the exchange
on December 10, 2008, was $3.14 a bushel, well on its way to the $10 billion mark.66 If
bean prices were to fall to their norm, farmers would receive $4 billion. Thus, if farm
prices stay high, consumers will pay more for farm commodities at retail, and farmers
will realize a high profit for their products. On the other hand, if farm prices fall,
taxpayers must pay the difference, while farmers will realize the same amount of profit.
Sugar producers are also insulated from the economic downturn, receiving the difference
between the world price of sugar, which was $12 per pound at the time of the signing,
and the guaranteed price of about $21 per pound. The New York Times reported that sugar
was selling for $11.20 on December 10, 2008. If sugar remains at that price, the subsidy
would then make up the difference of roughly 75 percent of the payment to the farmers.67
As an added protection to the farm community, the funding mechanism is such
that if spending is less than forecast, Congress is not at liberty to allocate the savings to
fund other legislation. The funds must be retained for future use in the agricultural sector.
On the other hand, if market conditions push governmental expenditures above the
forecast level, Congress can approve a ―supplemental‖ appropriation without having to
rewrite the Farm Bill. For example, Congress approved ―emergency payments‖ when the
economic projections that accompanied the 1996 Farm Bill failed to allow for the 30 to
40 percent price fall in program crops from 1997 through 2001.68 This ensured that
farmers would continue to be paid the same in good times or bad. One can only speculate
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on what this program will actually cost the American taxpayer in light of the recent
economic downturn.
Presidents do not have a strong record of imposing their will over the Farm Bill or
the amount that Congress can spend on these programs. The process is firmly controlled
by Congress, which is influenced to some degree by farm lobbyists and constituencies
who are directly involved in these programs. Two groups negotiate trade-offs within the
Farm Bill: the largely rural legislators who campaign for commodities support, and the
urban legislators who champion the domestic and overseas humanitarian food-aid
programs. Each side has its lobbyists, and they share few common interests. However,
both understand that each side needs the other to secure the desired outcomes for their
specific programs. This means, for example, that spending for government-supported
school lunch programs, backed by the food lobby made up of supporters such as IOM,
Sara Lee, USDA, Pepsi, Campbell‘s and ConAgra, are secured by providing increased
direct payment support for US sugar processors, sponsored by the American Crystal
Sugar Company lobby, or by guaranteeing that crop-insurance funds will not be reduced.
These trade-offs explain why final legislation usually includes a solid majority of acrossthe-aisle Republican and Democrat congressional representatives. The system has support
from both political parties, and from rural and urban legislators, albeit for all the wrong
reasons.69
The 2008 Farm Bill confirms that the fundamental structure of US support for
agriculture has changed little in the last 30 years. At first blush, the commodities prices
projected during the life of the Farm Bill (2008–2012) appear to have been designed to
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conform to the WTO‘s model of domestic support disciplines in the short term. Yet, the
fact that these programs are still in effect makes it impossible to predict the outcome if
one includes the current economic environment, higher oil and fertilizer prices, the new
administration, and mounting land and water shortages. Nothing in the 2008 legislation
changes the basic structure of US support, which will rise and fall in reaction to world
prices. Little progress has been made in either the long or short term. For example, direct
payment rates, base and actual production levels, national payment amounts, and
payments per planted acre are primarily for the same products: corn, soybeans, wheat,
cotton, and rice. These five crops account for approximately 95 percent of all direct
payments. For these crops, payments total $4.94 billion per year. Thus direct payments
for the 2002 through the 2007 crop years totaled $19.76 billion.70 Direct payments rates
were held fixed from 2002 to 2007. Producers were given the option to update their direct
payment base acres to the average level planted.
The Countercyclical Program
Payments under this program come into play whenever the average price, as
measured by NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service), is less than the target price.
Effective target prices are the difference between target prices and direct payment rates.
The maximum payment rate is achieved when the season average price falls below the
loan rate for each crop. The amount of payment equals 85 percent of the product of the
payment rate, a farm‘s program yield, and a farm‘s program acreage. Thus the CCP
provides farmers with a free put option on the season average price on a fixed amount of
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production, with a cap on the amount that can be paid out. Farmers receive this put option
regardless of what they plant.
Marketing Loan Programs
There is a maximum limit of $75,000 on marketing loan gains or LDPs. But a
producer can circumvent this limit through the use of marketing certificates. From 2002
to 2005, programs for corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice paid out about $44 billion:
$19.8 billion in direct payments, $10.8 billion in countercyclical payments, and $13.4
billion from the marketing loan program. There was little change from the 2002 Farm
Bill even though the bill as it is written perpetuates the old subsidies for agriculture at a
time when the prices farmers receive for grain crops such as corn, soybeans, are at their
pinnacle and net farm income was up 50 percent from the previous year in 2007 71
According to Michael Pollan, this means that over the next five years American farmers
will receive federal support of US $286 billion, irrespective of the volatility of the global
markets.72
The European Union
The European Union (EU) and the United States share a common attitude toward
farming and its role in society; therefore, their policies have developed in a similar
fashion, with parallel results. The differing rationales behind the policy instruments used
in US and EU agriculture merely reflect the dissimilarities of geography, history,
traditions, and mentalities between them. These differences have led to different
approaches and policy decisions, but ultimately, the outcome in relation to agriculture has
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been very similar. Over time there have been strong disagreements over implementation
procedures and the extent to which government should be involved in agriculture
regulation, but these transatlantic trade irritants should not overshadow the fact that the
United States and the EU share the same historical and somewhat outdated methods, and
commitment to maintaining and developing agriculture in rural communities, and that
both continue to promote the indefensible need for support of agriculture, in similar
fashion.73 The EU and United States do in fact share a common attitude toward farming,
and, as the research has shown, their policies converge into a similar group of outdated
programs.
The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was introduced in 1962, with
the European Community offering to buy farm products when the market price fell below
an agreed-on target level. Although the program helped reduce Europe‘s reliance on
imported food and enabled distressed farmers to stay on the farm, it eventually led to
overproduction, and to the creation of a huge surplus of agricultural products.74
Over the years, the CAP has been the subject of much debate, both domestic and
international. It was established by the Treaty of Rome and was designed to preserve the
status quos between the French and the Germans, both of whom were unwavering in their
determination to make certain that their domestic producers, both industrial and
agricultural, maintained the same advantages under the new program that they had
enjoyed under their previous national programs prior to the formation of the EC.75 As
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Hans von der Groeben summarizes them, the multiple and conflicting objectives of the
CAP were to ―increase agricultural productivity, to increase the individual earnings of
persons working in agriculture, to stabilize markets, to safeguard supplies, and to ensure
that supplies reach the consumer at reasonable prices.‖76 Attempts to maintain all these
objectives simultaneously resulted in a complicated system of border measures and
subsidies that led to virtually uncontrollable overproduction and financially irresponsible
import restrictions.
The European Community also increased the taxes on imports, and from the
1970s onward subsidized agricultural exports. These policies have been damaging for
both foreign and new EU-member farmers, and have made Europe‘s food prices some of
the highest in the world. European leaders gradually became aware of the high cost of the
CAP as early as 1967; however, political pressure interfered with logical change, and
therefore radical reform did not enter into the picture until the late 1980s and mid-1990s.
The proposed reform was designed to decouple the connection between subsidies
and production, to diversify the rural economy from dependence on subsidized crops to
market demand crops, to respond to consumer demands for less expensive food products,
to shrink the overproduction that resulted in export support payments, and to be more
aware of the importance of environmental protection.77
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Price supports in Europe began at about the same time that US price supports
appeared. Beginning in the 1930s, industrialized countries began looking for ways to
stabilize agricultural market prices, and many devised some form of agricultural pricesupport policies to control the radical price swing of farm products and to increase, or at
least stabilize, farm income. The major food-exporting countries of the time, such as the
United States and France, introduced subsidies that were designed primarily to increase
farm production, by stabilizing the long-term level of agricultural prices and by providing
direct payments to farmers based on production. This eventually resulted in
overproduction, and a surplus of farm products that were eventually sold to developing
nations at below-market prices. For some of these countries this has had a devastating
effect on the ability of their farmers to sell their own products. The continuation of these
subsidies has become an obstacle to international efforts to help these poor nations to rise
up from poverty.78
The balance of this chapter will be devoted to the development of the CAP, its
evolution from inception to the present time, how the beneficiaries have changed in both
size and number, and how the EU member countries have attempted to deal with out of
control costs and resistance to change.
Development of the Common Agricultural Policy
The European Economic Community‘s (EEC‘s) CAP was established
immediately after World War II (WWII), when tulip bulbs and brussel sprouts were the
major ingredients of the diets of many Europeans. The policy planners of the early 1950s
were concerned not with the surpluses of today, but with ensuring that the people of
Europe had enough food to live on, and that they would never go hungry again. The farm
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industry in most of Europe had been destroyed by the war, and many nations were totally
dependent on the West for food. The exception was France, where highly US-subsidized
agriculture had made a rapid recovery after 1945, and which was seeking new markets
for its expanding farm production. The ensuing system was threefold: it combined
internal market support to protect the declining farm population, a program that would
ensure ample food production for Europe, and a system designed to subsidize exports
through the official buying and storage of surplus to even out seasonal fluctuations in
production.79
As in the United States, rural life in Europe has always been a traditional part of
the fabric of the country. It is an area in each nation‘s cultural heritage that is as much a
part of the country as are the great landmarks and cathedrals. Traditionally, farming was
about land ownership, a prized possession granted during the fall of feudalism, and selfsufficient communities that produced food for themselves and for those who lived in the
cities. Therefore, it should be no surprise that European agricultural policy is concerned
with maintaining the longevity and economic and social health of these rural areas. It is
also concerned with preventing the flight of populations from the land. This is still true of
many developing areas of the world today, where agrarian populations live on a shifting
boundary between subsistence and starvation. This was also true in Europe in the period
after WWII, when hundreds of thousands went hungry on a continent devastated by
internal strife and exhausted after the long siege of two world wars. It was in this context
that the EU‘s CAP was conceived.80
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Given this background, one can conclude that the EU and the United States firmly
believed that farming required a specific set of policies tailored to their unique roles in
the community. It may have been right for its time; however, this perspective is not
shared by the majority of states around the world today, nor by all partners in the World
Trade Organization (WTO), who believe that modern farming should be treated like any
other form of economic activity.81
The CAP is regarded by some as one of the EU‘s most successful policies, and by
others as a scandalous waste of money. In fact, it was well conceived and served its
purpose well. Its failure may lie in its inability to recognize its current lack of relevance.
Unfortunately, it is still used as a successful bargaining tool, as evidenced in negotiations
on the creation of a Common Market when France insisted on a continued system of
agricultural subsidies as its price for agreeing to free trade in industrial goods.82
What is the Common Agricultural Policy?
The CAP‘s objectives are to:
increase productivity
ensure fair living standards for the agricultural community
stabilize agricultural markets
ensure availability of food for Europe
provide food at reasonable prices.83
The three fundamental principles of CAP are (1) the creation and maintenance of
a single market, (2) respect for the idea of community preference, and (3) a commitment
to common financing.84
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The CAP was established in the 1960s, as the agricultural arm of the EEC (the
original title of the EU) to secure Europe‘s food supply and to stabilize prices to the
benefit of both producers and consumers. In the 1950s food was scarce and expensive;
choice and quality were poor. The CAP is dedicated to preventing the reoccurrence of
that situation, by encouraging a constant supply of home-produced food while providing
farm price supports and farm incentives.85 The CAP was the necessary first step in
building the so-called Common Market. Without this agreement, different food prices in
each member state would have resulted in different labor costs, and the removal of
internal trade barriers would have been impossible. The CAP was and remains the single
biggest common policy in the EU.86 In addition to standardized prices, consumers benefit
through international food-price equity and by being assured of quality food that is
produced according to standardized food safety and oversight regulations.
Between 1960 and 1992, farm product prices were supported through ―price and
market‖ support procedures that included the removal of surplus products from the
market and the restricting of imports from outside the EU. The first CAP Reform in 1992,
coupled with the inclusion of agriculture for the first time in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), forced a major change in the thinking about European farm
support systems.87 The agreement evolved into a set of rules for the support of
agricultural markets, and for the establishment of an import threshold that would allow
imports of grain and other foods to be regulated in relation to the level of domestic
production. The unwritten goal was to isolate the EU from the rest of the world in terms
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of food dependence, production, and supply. Though never vocalized as such, it was the
EU version of agricultural autarky, similar to that of Germany‘s protectionism,
established during the First Reich and continued through National Socialist dictator
Adolph Hitler‘s reign.88 While the subsequently developed support structures contributed
to creating a stable domestic food source, they have come under considerable criticism
today as the world has become more integrated, because they distort both domestic and
international systems to what some believe are unsustainable levels.
Originally, the EC-6 (the original six members of the EU) common price levels
were aligned with those of the most efficient member producer, which was France. In the
period from 1960 to 1972, this price policy was abandoned; however, the goal of
improving the efficiency of farmers in the other parts of the Community to the level of
the French farmers was retained.89 Naturally, there were many small farmers who were
less efficient, and who therefore suffered under the rule. In order to continue the program,
it was determined that if the surplus labor were to be moved from the farm to the city, it
would help these small farms become more prosperous. This progressive idea
contradicted the original proposition of keeping the people on the farm. It was anticipated
that those farms that were left would be the basis for the term ―average farm‖ that would
later be used in the CAP definition of 1992. The main objective of the CAP at that time
was to support farmers through the market rather than by direct subsidization. However,
government incentives proved to be extremely effective, and by 1970 the EC-6 farmers
were producing more crops than they could collectively consume, and were looking to
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the export markets to dispose of the surplus. It was at that point that England, Ireland, and
Denmark joined the EEC, creating the potential for even more surplus production.90
The price-support mechanism worked well until 1993. The 30 billion European
Currency Unit (ECU) annual farm support went to directly buying surplus commodities
at minimum official prices. In addition, the government paid subsidies to traders (export
subsidies) to sell surpluses on the international markets. The farmers were not paid a
premium, but were able to sell all of their products at minimum market prices.
Each year the Council of Agricultural Ministers established minimum prices for
all grains and some other products just as the DOA did in the United States. These were
the prices at which the EU was committed to buy these products. If markets fell below
this pre-established number, then farmers could sell to the government instead of on the
open market. If the market was more than the minimum, then the farmers could sell on
the open market.91 Farmers, being intelligent individuals, had begun growing only those
products that the government was placing minimum prices on. This created a shortage of
non-government-supported crops, which in turn created higher prices for those products
that were in demand, but not available. In addition to farmers growing only favored
products, small farmers were beginning to disappear. As in the United States, agriculture
had become a high-tech industry in the previous forty years. During that time, as the high
profits to be earned from agribusiness increased, the consolidation of small and mediumsized farms into large megafarms also increased, while the number of small farms began
to decrease.
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This is where the real advantage of CAP policies came into play. By fixing a
relatively high price for each commodity, the CAP assured the remaining farming
families a level of income comparable with other sectors of the economy. The downside
of this policy was that consumer prices for these same products were not relevant to the
real-world pricing in the real-world market. Therefore, if EU farmers are to sell abroad
today, the gap between high internal prices and lower world prices must be bridged. In
the past this was achieved through export rebates, also called export subsidies. These
export subsidies create their own special problems, as they distort world trade and retard
development. Hence, ever since the WTO Uruguay Round of negotiations and the first
major CAP reform in 1992, the EU has slowly reduced the level of support prices to
farmers, which in turn reduced the level of production and export rebates needed. Farm
subsidies have by no means been eliminated, however; as the EU has actually increased
direct payments to farmers in some areas to compensate them for the reduction of other
types of market support. The elusive goal of the EU and the United States is to detach
farm-support payments from production by increasing farm payments in other areas.
During this transition, the farmers will continue to receive annual payments under the
EU‘s Agenda 2000 program; however, these payments will be earmarked for areas such
as product diversification, environmental protection, and rural development instead of
specific product production.
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CHAPTER II
ARGUMENTS AND METHODS
Chapter II discusses the methodology, line of reasoning and arguments engaged in
during this dissertation research. Due to the complexity of the subject, the chapter is
broken down into separate sections in an effort to promote a better understanding of the
issues. Following the introduction will be sections on the methodology used to test the
hypothesis, case study form of investigation, application of the methodology to the
hypothesis, and a rationalization of the variables used.
This dissertation deals primarily with the qualitative method of research. Strauss
and Corbin‘s, ―Grounded Theory Methodology‖, defines qualitative research as any kind
of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or
other means of quantification.92 This being true, qualitative methodology lends itself
well to this subject in that it tells one not only that agricultural support programs may be
outdated and resistant to change, but more importantly, provides the background that
explains why it is opposed to change, a phenomenon that would be difficult to quantify in
quantitative terms. The research closely follows Trochim‘s, ―Research Methods
Knowledge Base‖ in that it relies on his ―grounded theory‖ 93 by following the
evolutionary process of agricultural price supports in the United States and the EU not as
a historical piece, but as it is happening in present time. The theory adapts itself well to
the three case studies, the United States and the EU, WTO, and Developing Nations, all
of which are moving targets and subject to continuous manipulation by outside forces.
The relatively subjective nature of qualitative research, compared with quantitative
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research, lends itself competently to the observation of this phenomenon and permits the
research to not only records the sequence of events, but to also ask the question ―why‖ it
is happening. In the words of Berg, ―Qualitative Research Methods‖94, it allows the
person doing the research to participate in the process of determining why the
quantitative numbers are the way they are. As a general rule, qualitative research
identifies why people act the way they do, believe what they believe and think the way
they think. It is descriptive and mainly concerned with the process more than the
outcome. The qualitative method is particularly important in this research as it repeatedly
asks why these agricultural support programs continue in light of the wealth of evidence
against their effectiveness in today‘s world. This research takes the position that the
motive for this behavior is just as important as the result, findings that can best be
quantified by the qualitative research process.
After having completed a comprehensive review of the literature on the subject,
the decision was made to test the hypotheses through the use of the case study method.
Case study research was determined to be the most effective in that its focus is to enable
the researcher to capture various nuances, patterns, and more latent elements that other
research approaches might overlook. A review of the current literature on the subject of
agricultural price supports, suggested that these programs were outdated, redundant and
harmful to many of the poorer nations. That conclusion, in itself, created a new dilemma.
If they are in fact redundant and harmful, then why are they still in existence? In order to
answer this qualitative question, ―why‖, three case studies were chosen; the United States
and the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Less Developed Countries
(LDCs).
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The impetus of the case studies was to compare the two developed economies,
United States to the EU, as they struggle to come to grips with one of the most expensive
programs in their history, to better understand the intrinsic aspects of the WTO as a non
government organization (NGO) attempting to bring its member nations to agreement on
agricultural price supports, and to study the effect of agricultural price supports on LDCs
that appear similar from a distance, but are actually quite different internally.
The case studies on the United States and the EU, and the WTO presented an
excellent stage for the qualitative research format in that it provided insight into the
complexity of an issue originally thought to have a simple answer. Not only did it ask the
question, ―why‖, but it presented the question to the two most important trade
organizations in the world as well as the 183 WTO member countries. As often happens
in case study research, the two case studies that originally focused on agricultural price
supports eventually progressed to an understanding of the importance of related research
issues. In the case of the United States and the EU, and the WTO, both became of
secondary importance in that they served only a supportive role while the actual research
interests played out. The validity of the agricultural policies of the United States and the
EU became secondary to political influence that controlled their direction, while the
WTO also became subordinate as the research began to detail external theoretical
questions and localized internal problems. As the case study advanced, the real issue of
protection of national interest began to evolve. This gave support to Silverman‘s theory
that qualitative research produces a deeper understanding of social phenomena because of
its ability to delve deeper into the subject and the dynamic nature of qualitative research
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design.95 A byproduct of this case study was the revelation that although the member
nations of the WTO had a common interest in establishing an open market for their
agricultural produce, they did not have the power to reach an agreement on how it should
be done. The strength of organization and the impetus to continue to move forward
remained with the WTO, reaffirming Keohane and Nye‘s theory of neo-liberal
institutionalism, which supports the idea that institutions and nonstate actors are the true
unit of analysis and power.96
The case study on the effect of dumping excess agricultural products on LDCs
can best be defined as a systematic gathering of information from individual members of
a community. Although this community of nations resemble one another in rate of
growth, agricultural production and annual income, this research created an awareness
that many of these countries are quite different economically. To simply add up the
numbers and chart the results quantitatively would give us some interesting averages for
the group, but would tell us little about the individual. The real advantage of case study
methodology is that it allows the researchers to study several cases (countries in this
research) in depth and use that study to access their position in relation to one another.
The use of cross-case, cross- country comparisons with qualitative research often reveals
the true differences in similar countries. In this research in particular, phenomenological
cross-country comparisons of LDCs revealed that multilateral agreements on agricultural
tariffs and dumping of excess crops simply will not work for all nations. Qualitative
research revealed that these nations differences are much more involved than simple
economics. To quote North ―Understanding the Process of Economic Change‖, he said
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that economic change is not simply a result of more investment or more production, but
includes changes in the quantity and quality of human beings; in the stock of human
knowledge; and in the institutional framework that defines the deliberate incentive
structure of society.97 What that means to this research is that to universally change
international rules on agricultural supports, or to cease all crop dumping is not the answer
and will not solve the problem. The answer is somewhere in the phenomenon of
emergence or lack thereof of the people skills and success incentive in each individual
nation. Eva Paus in her book ―Can Costa Rica become Ireland?‖ provided insight into the
fallacy of grouping countries into neat categories.98 Paus‘ belief that foreign direct
investment is the precursor to economic growth did not pan out when applied across the
board. The findings of this qualitative case study is that data produced from one country
usually does not generalize. Each country requires that its phenomenon be determined by
its own data set. There can be little doubt that case study theory and qualitative analysis
are best suited for this dissertation so long as it is understood that there are some
limitations involved. There are areas of weakness in qualitative research that must be
added to the formula. One such weakness that was revealed during this research is the
inability to predict the actions of other countries based on neighboring country research.
Keohane and Nye‘s contention that it is impossible to predict the actions of nation-states
as the nation-states do not know the motives of their peers and therefore do not always
act rationally.99
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International Agricultural Support Programs
The first question asked is: Are they necessary? The literature review includes a
summery of the history of Agricultural Support Programs in the developed nations, and
reaches the conclusion that on inception these programs were both necessary and
beneficial. They came at a time when a large portion of the population in the United
States and Europe were totally dependent on farming for their livelihood. The world
depression followed by WWII placed the farmers in this group in a position where they
were no longer able to survive by working the land. This research does not question the
importance of these programs, or the motives of those responsible for them. The impetus
here is to explore the viability of these programs in today‘s world by comparing the
number of small farmers today with those who were the beneficiaries of the original plan,
the economic needs of the two groups, and the legitimacy of the amount of money spent
on the programs at their inception versus what is being spent today.
Long term agricultural price supports are primarily the environs of developed
nations, therefore the research will generally be directed toward these countries, the
exception being when these supports directly affect other nations, as in crop dumping and
import or export tariffs which influence the economies of developing nations..
The arguments presented in the form of hypotheses are:
1.

Agricultural price support programs were introduced in both the United States
and Europe during the Great Depression and again after WWII to subsidize
small farm income. Small farmers at that time were not earning enough to
support their families or to maintain their farms. Existing evidence suggests
that these programs became redundant as the number of small farmers
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declined to roughly 10 percent of the original group, and the personal incomes
of those that remained rose to the level of the national average. The original
agricultural support programs are no longer relevant to today‘s small farmer.
That evidence makes it clear that if these programs were suspended today, the
vast majority of the remaining small farmers in these developed countries
would not be harmed.
2.

Today‘s agricultural price supports have little to do with local agrarian needs,
and remain in place due to large corporate influence, and public apathy.
Change and reform are unnecessarily protracted and lengthy as a result of the
personal self indulgence of politicians and industry giants. The benefits of
modern day price supports no longer flow to small farmers as originally
intended, but to the large agribusiness community which would continue to
prosper in their absence.

3.

The continued dumping of excess agricultural products on the markets of less
developed countries, at prices below what these products can be grown locally
is detrimental to the farmers of these nations, inhibits their economic growth
and perpetuates poverty in many LDCs.
Variables
Hypotheses one suggests that small farmers of the developed world no longer

require agricultural price supports in order to stay in business. If these programs are
suspended, the vast majority of small farmers in the United States and Europe will not
be harmed.
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The description of a ―small farmer‖ or even ―farm‖ is somewhat elusive and has
changed with the times over the past eighty years as it has become necessary to more
clearly define who exactly the beneficiaries of these farm support programs are.
A farm is now defined as a place that produces, or normally would produce,
$1,000 in farm commodities. That amounts to roughly 250 bushels of wheat (less than 2
acres production) or one cow. This accounted for 31.2% of all farms in 2007. To count
these farms in the total number is somewhat deceiving in that many of those who have
small farms do very little farming and make most of their income away from the farm.
For some, these farms are nothing more than large country homes that produce just
enough to draw subsidies, or grow enough crops to feed their horses. (see Table 8)
Table 8
Gross Cash Farm Income ($1,000)
Mean
household
income

Farm
earnings

Offfarm
earnings

Median
household
earnings

Farm
earnings

Offfarm
earnings

1,000–9,999

73410

-7116

80526

47812

-3695

55000

10,000–49,999

79247

-6394

85641

48852

-1822

51750

50,000–99,999

100634

5101

95533

53789

12030

43500

100,000–
249,000

82971

23389

59581

68214

27850

32500

250,000–
499,999

123924

74026

49898

108791

72153

27500

500,000–
999,999

166015

125224

40790

155900

122050

23719

1,000,000 or
more

567237

519984

47253

318600

274200

23725

Farm sales class
(2007 $)

Note. From Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS).
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From 1982 to 2007, the number of farms in the U.S. fell from 2.24 million to 2.20
million, however, the number of small farms in the $10,000 to $250,000 range declined
by 40% in that same period while the number of large farms grew by 242%. Production
has been steadily shifting from small farms to very large farms, however, many of the
larger farms are still owned by family controlled corporations as opposed to off site
entrepreneurs.100 The overall number of farms remained constant during that period of
time due to an increased number of farms with less than $1000 in sales.101 (see Table 9)
Table 9
Changes in the Size Distribution of U.S. Farm Production, 1982–2007

2007 Census

Farm sales
class (2007$)
-1000

Sales
2007$
(millions)

1982 Census

(%)

Sales
2007$
(millions)

(%)

1982–2007
sales change
(%)

84

0.0

86

0.0

-3.3%

1,000–9,999

2621

0.9

3282

1.7

-20.1%

10,000–49,999

9,441

3.1

14,640

7.7

-35.5%

50,000–99,999

8,961

3.0

18,256

9.7

-50.9%

100,000–
249,000

24,213

8.1

44,326

23.4

-45.4%

250,000–
499,999

33,410

11.2

33,431

17.7

-0.1%

500,000–
999,999

42,691

14.4

23,308

12.3

83.1%

1,000,000 or
more

175,800

59.2

51,822

27.4

239.2%

All farms

297,220

100.0

189,151

100.0

57.1%

Note. From Census of agriculture, as adjusted by ERS for changes in agricultural prices using the Producer
Price Index for Farm Products.
100
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At the inception of the support programs, mega farms did not exist therefore all
farms fell into the category of land that was cultivated by small family farmers. The term
―small farm‖ was not actually defined until Congress passed the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1977 at which time they identified it as a farm with sales under $20,000.102 At that
time, the description characterized 70% of the farms in the country.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables that will be manipulated by change will be measured by
the increase or decrease in the number of small farmers over the period being
examined, and the value of the subsidies in relation to small farmers‘ overall income
during that period. These dependent variables will also measure the increase or
decrease of the small farmers‘ dependence on these subsidy programs.
The direction of movement in the number of small farms will measure the value
of continuing these programs, but more importantly will give an indication as to
whether they continue to promote the expansion of small farms in developed nations
or are the direct motivation for their demise. If we use the date of implementation of
these programs as a starting point on a continuum, the data created by these
dependent variables will create movement in a positive or negative direction
indicating the degree of present day importance of these agricultural support
programs.
Hypothesis two and three are similar to one another in that they question the
validity of current agricultural policy in reference to that policies‘ original goals, and
seek to explain that the same dependent variables are responsible for the life or death
of these programs.
102
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Independent Variables
This inquiry incorporates four independent variables into the analysis: (1)
urbanization, (2) modernization of the farm industry, (3) corporate farming. (4)
income re-distribution. Two of these variables, urbanization and income redistribution, fall under the category of, natural evolution of well being, that occurs as
a country progresses from recession/depression to a robust economy. These are easily
tracked as they have both historical and contemporary significance.
1. Urbanization: At the inception of farm subsidies, the small farm population made
up well over 50% of the US and EU labor market. Today, small family farming in
many areas is a thing of the past. Traditionally, sons followed their fathers on the
family farm. Today, most small farmers are past middle age, and their sons have
left for more attractive careers and better paying jobs in the city. As this urban
transformation takes place, the number of small farms shrinks and the need for
farm subsidies becomes redundant. The digression of the number of small farms
is easily tracked through various government and private agencies such as the
GAO, The Economic Reports to the President and The Farm Bureau.
2. Modernization of the farm industry: Today‘s farming hardly resembles that of the
1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Where small farms of the past required vast amounts of
manual labor, today‘s farms are more akin to modern factories that are
mechanized and efficient. While earlier farms were historically dependent on
family, relatives and hired labor for their success, modern farming techniques
produce vastly more product with relatively little manual labor. With less labor
expense, and more production, the requirement for subsidies has declined. Farm
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output and farm labor statistics are readily available and have been collected from
various agencies such as the USDA Economic Research Service and the Farm
Bills of 2002 and 2008.
3. Corporate farming: As farming becomes more profitable, large corporate farms
become more desirable to entrepreneurs and corporate investors. While these
megafarms proliferate, small farmers decline in number reducing the need for
farm subsidies. The continuous increase of this corporate presence is easily
tracked through various government agencies such as the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Congressional Record.
4. Income re-distribution: Farm subsidies often focus on the well-being of farm
households, specifically subsidized farm households relative to the general
population. As farm incomes rise to the level of the general population, the need
for subsidies will decline. Data for this variable is readily available from various
government agencies such as the Government Accounting Office (GAO), and the
Organization of Economic Co-Operation (OECD).
Extraneous Variable
As this research progresses, it will become apparent early on that these programs
are outdated, no longer serve their original purpose and that the original beneficiaries,
for the most part, no longer exist. This finding contaminates the results in that it
questions its own credibility by raising the question: how can this be so if the
governments of these developed countries continue to support the programs? The
reservation suggests the possible existence of a confounding variable that is
influencing the research in a way that is contradictory to a logical result. For the
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purpose of this dissertation, this extraneous variable is labeled as political
interference. It will appear throughout the document as a negative influence on the
dependent variables, preventing them from taking their rational course. The protocol
has been designed to control this variable to insure that it has no influence on the
internal validity of the outcome of this study. Although it does appear, at times, to
interfere with the process, the subject is presented in a manner that its effect on the
dependent variables can be judged accurately.
Qualitative Methodology
Although three hypotheses were established prior to beginning the research, this
dissertation will be primarily qualitative in nature; therefore, the hypotheses may change
in character, but not in focus, as the research progresses.
The literature review has elaborated on the varied positions in an attempt to
influence the conclusions. This research will disclose whether these conclusions are
defendable or not, a goal that can be best achieved through qualitative research, as the
research continually asks the question ―why‖ the data is the way it is. The application of
Trochim‘s grounded theory103 will allow for the development of an evolutionary picture
of the development of agricultural price supports from inception to the present day.
Although quantitative research would explain what has happened, this dissertation wants
to know why things are the way they are today, and qualitative methods are best suited to
answering this question. The research is concerned with the process as much as with the
outcome. The primary sources will include internet research of scholarly works, prior
research comparing case studies, government statistics and documents from WTO
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proceedings, while secondary sources will consist of news media, as well as personal
commentary and editorial articles from contemporary authors.
The data will be compared with existing conclusions and statistics produced by
previous research to determine whether they are compatible. The conclusions will then be
based on a mix of the two. This may require some data to be transferred to a quantitative
format in order to develop a matrix for cross-referencing the two to determine whether
there are any obvious variations; however, this is my only planned venture into
quantitative analysis.
To Miller and Salkind‘s question ―Does it have relevance to society and the
academic world?‖104 The answer is yes. This research addresses three issues prominent in
the minds of much of the world‘s population today: 1) how to discontinue unnecessary
government spending on outdated redundant programs, 2) what are the causes of
continuing world poverty and how can it be alleviated, and 3) are institutionalist
organizations having a negative effect on the world economy?
Protocol Design
The design and objective of this project is to continue research in an area that is
extremely beneficial to those who have an interest in government overspending on pet
projects that continue into perpetuity. The research subject is one that has value to the
academic and intellectual community in that it questions a system resistant to policy
change where change is both logical and inevitable. The questions that are posed are
narrow in scope, yet, broad enough to be significant to those who have similar interests
that go beyond agricultural supports. The research will proceed in the following
sequence:
104
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1) It will discuss the history of US support programs, why they were
implemented, how they have evolved over time, where the money is spent today,
and why these programs continue to exist. It will examine and compare data for
and against these U.S. support programs in an effort to reach a conclusion as to
their continued viability as well as their affect on today‘s small farmers.
2) It will discuss the history of EU support programs, why they were
implemented, how they have evolved over time, where the money is spent today,
and why these programs continue to exist. It will examine and compare data for
and against these EU support programs in an effort to reach a conclusion as to
their continued viability as well as their affect on today‘s small farmers.
3) It will identify similarities and differences between these two programs,
comparing the number of farmers who were covered under the original program
with the number of those who are covered today; compare where and how the
money is spent; and determine why the programs are still in effect if they no
longer benefit those for whom they were designed.
4) It will discuss the position of the WTO and its recent Doha Round of
negotiations on efforts to eliminate agricultural price supports through multilateral
agreements; and identify obstacles to developing, implementing, and enforcing
these agreements.
5) It will identify the less developed countries (LDCs) that receive aid in
the form of low-priced or free agricultural products; research the percentage of the
population in these countries who depend on agriculture for their livelihood;
determine whether their income has increased or decreased during the period of
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crop dumping; and identify what percentage of their locally grown crops is
available to be sold on the open market.
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CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
This chapter is a cross case comparison of the United States and the European
Union‘s (EU‘s) agricultural support programs. It will discuss the history of each and the
evolution from the programs inception to the present day. Beginning with the question;
where does the money go, the chapter will progress through how these price supports
affect consumers in the United States and the EU, discuss the small farm fallacy, and
attempt to explain why these programs still exist. It will also ask the questions; who are
the winners and the losers, and is it possible to eventually reduce or eliminate the
programs entirely?
Where Does the Money Go?
In the United States these programs, for the most part, no longer benefit the small
farmer. First, the small farmer as, Americans know him or her, a person who farms a
small farm as their only source of income, and whose income is at the national average,
has nearly become extinct. Therefore, only the large conglomerates profit from price
supports. For example, the current sugar program operates as a feeder to a cartel made up
of ―sugar kings‖ (the largest landowners) that decides who has the right to produce sugar
and how much. It is one acre, one vote; thus the farmer with 50 acres becomes
subservient to the 5,000-acre conglomerate.105 American cotton subsidies are hardly any
better, as they are also highly targeted to benefit the largest farming operations. The
target of the original subsidy program was the farmer who was facing poverty. Today, the
largest 10 percent of American cotton agro-business received three-quarters of the total
subsidies. The recipients of cotton subsidies are similar to those who receive subsidies for
105
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sugar and grain. Nearly fifty percent of cotton subsidies (around $1 billion annually) goes
to a few thousand megafarmers who cultivate over 1,000 acres of cotton. These farmers
are well above the poverty threshold. The reverse applies to those farmers in LDCs where
US surplus crops are dumped. The millions of farmers in those countries average five
acres of cotton and live on less than $1 per day106 When these figures were brought to the
attention of The Washington Post, the newspaper wanted to know who these preferred
farmers were. It demanded to know who was paying for the lobbyists and who was
receiving the billions back in subsidy payments. When the paper requested the
information from the USDA, the request was denied on the grounds that it was privileged
information and would violate the recipients‘ right to privacy. The Washington Post then
brought suit against the USDA and won under the Freedom of Information Act.107 Table
8 lists the top ten companies that received cotton subsidy payments between 1995 and
2004. Given that these huge farm conglomerates consume enormous amounts of
taxpayer money and inflate retail prices to American consumers, it should be obvious that
changes must be made in the name of progress. The question becomes, what is the
driving force that prevents the demise of these wasteful programs, and champions their
continued use? The cotton cartels have maintained that farm subsidies for cotton have
historically focused on guaranteeing the farmer a fair price for their cotton. Most
economists would argue that a fair price is the market price driven by supply and
demand; however, the United States has been underwriting subsidies for cotton since the
Great Depression with little regard to market dynamics. These subsidies have varied in
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form and amount over the years, but have focused almost exclusively on guaranteeing the
farmer a price substantially above the market for their cotton.
Table 10
Top Ten Companies Receiving Cotton Subsidy Payments, 1995–2004

Company

Location

Subsidy
(US dollars)

Allenberg Cotton Co

Cordova, TN

186,054,814

Dunavant Enterprises Inc

Fresno, CA & Memphis, TN

166,959,725

Cargill Cotton, Div of Cargill

Cordova, TN

154,915,538

Parkdale America, LLC

Gastonia, NC & Charlotte, NC

135,421,863

Calcot Ltd.

Bakersfield, CA

113,591,332

Avondale Mills Inc

Sylacauga, AL

92,228,281

National Textiles LLC

Winston-Salem, NC

90,259,530

Ecom USA Inc

Dallas, TX

73,394,029

Union Underwear Company LLC

Bowling Green, KY

72,933,449

Paul Reinhart Inc

Richardson, TX

70,985,393

Note. The top 10 recipients received 48 percent of the total. Compiled from USDA Economic Research
Service data.

The objective of the grower, therefore, was to generate as much production as
possible since the price is guaranteed. The ―Freedom to Farm‖ legislation removed all
acreage restrictions and allowed the farmer to make all planting and marketing decisions,
and also provides a safety net for prices. This is the equivalent of telling Ford Motor
Company to run its plant at full production and not to worry about unsold product or
pricing. The American government would then loan them the money to build cars. If Ford
produced more cars than it could sell, this same government would purchase the surplus.
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If foreign manufacturers sold their cars for less, there would be some provision to make
up the difference between the price of a Ford and the price of a Honda.
In addition, there is federally funded crop insurance. This costs the government
$250 million annually, and guarantees the farmer up to 65 percent of the previous year‘s
production. In comparison, if Ford has a fire, the insurance would pay to rebuild the
factory. Any losses sustained as a result of lack of availability of salable product would
fall back on Ford. At the time of this writing during the 2009 global economic crisis, the
government has become the auto manufacturers‘ insurer, providing both cash flow, and
supervised bankruptcy protection for both General Motors and Chrysler when they were
failing. For farmers, the government goes one step farther. If the farmer‘s house burns,
and his fields flood, his insurance pays for the house, and the crop insurance pays for the
loss of crops. The federally funded crop insurance pays for 65 percent of the loss, and the
farmer pays the rest. The farm co-ops believe this is unfair and are pushing Congress to
increase the coverage to 100 percent.108
Congressional Position
A January 26, 1999, Congressional Declaration of Policy proclaimed:
It has long been found to be in the public interest to have, or endeavor to have, a
reasonable balance between the supply of and demand for cotton grown in this
country. To serve this public interest the Congress has provided for the
comprehensive exercise of regulatory authority in regulating the handling of such
cotton or regulatory authority in regulating the handling of such cotton
supplemented by price support programs with the objective of adjusting supply to
demand in the interest of benefiting producers and all others concerned with the
production and handling of cotton as well as the general economy of the country.
In order for the objective of such programs to be effectuated to the fullest degree,
it is necessary that the existing regulation of marketing be supplemented
providing as part of the overall governmental program for effectuating this
objective means of increasing the demand for cotton with the view of eventually
reducing or eliminating the need for limiting marketing and supporting price of
108
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cotton. It is therefore declared to be the policy of the Congress and the purpose of
this chapter that it is essential in the public interest through the exercise of the
powers provided herein, to authorize and enable the establishment of an orderly
procedure for the development, financing through adequate assessments on all
cotton marketed in the United States and on imports of cotton, and carrying out an
effective and continuous coordinate program of research and promotion designed
to strengthen cotton‘s competitive position and to maintain and expand domestic
and foreign markets and uses for United States cotton.109
In essence, Congress has said that it is in the country‘s best interest to regulate
cotton in a way that will create a balance between supply and demand by supporting a
thousand big cotton farmers. This may have been sound advice 60 years ago when cotton
farmers were small farms on the verge of failure during the Great Depression, but it
sounds very much out of place in today‘s open-market society. It should be obvious by
now that those same protective measures have little meaning or effect on the complexion
of today‘s farm community, and no longer serve the purpose for which they were
designed.
The EU is no better. In 1993 Andrew Morvacsik came up with the theory of
national preference formation, drawn from liberal theories of state-society relations.
Morvcsik called this theoretical framework ―liberal intergovernmentalism.‖ He
concluded that all the major decisions made by the EU have taken place in a two-stage
process. First, national preferences were established by long-standing restrictions and
opportunities arose through interdependence with neighboring countries. Second, the
outcomes of negotiations between these countries were determined largely by the relative
bargaining power of these countries and the resistance of each nation to change its
domestic agendas during the negotiations.110 The preeminent question is, during these

109
110

Congressional Declaration of Policy, 1998.
Moravcsik, 1991.

75

negotiations why did local agricultural policy hamstring negotiations in ways that other
industries have not? Why should the European farmer be treated any differently from
those in other industries? An important premise on which many arguments follow is that
farming is different from other sectors of the economy. It has always been different from
other activities, particularly manufacturing, and requires additional protective measures
that other industries do not.111
Productivity in agriculture in the six countries that originally formed the EU
increased by close to six percent a year in the first two decades (after the Rome Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community in March 1957), far outstripping the
manufacturing industry. With this kind of growth, why does the agricultural sector need
to be protected? In the first 30 years, the farm labor force in the original EC-6 declined by
more than 60 percent. At the same time, the number of tractors increased by over 70
percent.112 This equates to fewer farmers to support, more efficient farm practices, and
increased production. If this is true, then it follows that there should also be less
agricultural support. This is where Andrew Morvacsik‘s second rule comes into play.
France, for example, is by far the biggest recipient of CAP funds. It received 22 percent
of the total in 2004, and steadfastly refuses to take less. Spain, Germany, and Italy each
received between 12 percent and 15 percent. In each case, their share of subsidies was
roughly equivalent to their share of EU agricultural output. Ireland and Greece, on the
other hand, received a share of subsidies that was much larger than their share of EU
agricultural output—twice as large, in Ireland‘s case. The subsidies they received

111
112

Richardson, 2000.
Gardner, 1996.

76

amounted to about 1.5 percent of gross national income, compared to an EU average of
0.5 percent. The new member states began receiving CAP subsidies in 2004, but at only
25 percent of the rate that is paid to the older member states. However, new member
states are slowly rising and are scheduled to reach equity in 2013. At that time, Poland,
with 2.5 million farmers, is likely then to be a significant recipient of these funds.113 In
the meantime, those countries with the strongest bargaining power continue to prevail.
The EU is little different from the United States when it comes to per-farm
distribution. It has been calculated that 80 percent of the funds go to just 20 percent of
EU farmers, while at the other end of the scale, 40 percent of farmers share just eight
percent of the funds.114 Recent OECD statistics indicate that every European full-time
farmer (one who earns more than 50% of his income from farming) received, on average,
a subsidy of 11,500 euros, which accounted for 62 percent of his total gross farm receipts.
These subsidies were largely producer-oriented and, as a result, contributed to higher
prices and overproduction. According to the Nominal Assistance Coefficient (NAC),
which indicates the extent to which gross farm receipts are higher than they would have
been in the absence of subsidies, the gross farm receipts of European producers were 62
percent higher than they would have been without subsidies. In fact, the EU continues to
allocate one out of every two euros from its common budget to agricultural protection.115
Writing in a new book on the CAP, former UK Agriculture Minister Nick Brown
insisted that ―despite three reform rounds, the CAP remains economically and politically
unsustainable,‖ which should have been obvious to all years ago. He claimed that
113
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consumers, including small farmers, are still paying more than they should for their food,
while large farmers continue to take the lion‘s share of support payments. He added that
export subsidies also continue to harm developing countries, while farm support based on
historic precedence simply reinforces an inefficient distribution of scarce resources.116
The Small Farm Fallacy (The Myth)
Many feel that when the government gets involved, the cost of living goes up,
driving up prices. Yet many Americans still believe that it is the free market that causes
higher prices and that it is the US government, through antitrust regulation and industry
support mechanisms that saves them from greedy monopolies and unfair foreign-trade
practices.117 The American government is very much involved in specific areas of
agriculture, and its partners are the big agricultural interests that exploit farm myths to
generate public support for ongoing price-support programs. Farmers tend to become
more politically influential as their numbers diminish and those who remain become
larger. Political pressure often leads politicians to collude in publicizing farm fallacies.
Once politicians are lured by the support of vested agricultural interests, they too have a
stake in ensuring that the public is convinced of the importance of their actions. ―We
have got to protect the poor farmers!‖ is the most audible refrain when politicians are
questioned about their particular pork-barrel project. Meanwhile, 80 percent of the
subsidy money continues to go to farmers with gross sales of over $250,000 a year.118
This is not meant to be a criticism of farmers who are doing well. Americans have always
supported those who excel by their own efforts, and they will encourage them to continue
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to do so. The point is that once a person reaches that level of success, the public should
no longer be obligated to give them food stamps or their equivalent.
The policies have also become extremely complex, which may explain why the
cotton, sugar, and grain sectors have remained highly protected. It should not be difficult
to separate what is necessary from those areas that no longer require assistance; yet,
congressmen and agricultural agencies have come to see themselves as defenders of
farmers‘ interests, and their role becomes one of claiming the maximum possible budget
for their activities. Once they have assumed that mantle, there is no turning back. Lonely
is the congressman or congresswoman who will admit that his or her position might have
been wrong or that he or she may be misinformed.
There are many aspects of agricultural policy formation and that includes the
political pressure that is applied to sustain them. What began as an economic issue has
evolved to nostalgia for the past and resistance to change. Each contributes to the process,
making it difficult to determine which motive is dominant at any given time.
Nevertheless, the failure of agricultural policymakers to efficiently address the obvious
imbalance and obsolete objectives implies that the root cause of current support policies
must be seen as politics, as incompetence, or as a measure of both. As economic growth
continues worldwide, these back-room forces continue to operate and it becomes ever
easier for governmental organizations to continue the programs rather than risk the wrath
of those receiving the support, although the increasing strong influence and strict
oversight procedures of the WTO may soon impinge on this comfort zone.
Against this blind loyalty, some of the traditional myths about agriculture are
gradually being eroded, partly because the interests of developed and developing
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countries are being brought into sharper relief, notably in the more protected sectors such
as sugar and cotton and partly due to the WTO action in exposing the fallacies of the
current policies. In the past, the American public was complacent and trusted in
governmental agencies to do the right thing, and in the long run these tendencies cost
them huge amounts of money. It is becoming more apparent that trust in the American
government to protect the taxpayer‘s money may have been misplaced. For example,
large sugar, cotton, and grain producers are more likely to protest against the removal of
support than consumers and consumer protection agencies are to protest against the high
prices. Those responsible for making equitable decisions that benefit the majority of
American taxpayers have been slow to act.
The WTO, over a period of time, has brought the fallacy of these policies to light
and has brought pressure on the United States to make the necessary changes. If
policymakers respond defensively to these pressures, then they will place themselves in
the position of having to defend existing policies, which will eventually become an
impossible task. One way of addressing these challenges in the past was to claim that the
policies being pursued were in fact consistent with stated policy goals.119 In other words,
―I had nothing to do with it; the program was already in place when I took office‖
(sometimes referred to as political speak). The final fallacy is the agricultural
organizations‘ manifestation of the idea that it is all being done to preserve the moral
richness and cultural contribution of family farming when, in fact small family farming in
many areas of the country is a thing of the past. Traditionally, sons followed their fathers
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on the family farm. Today most small farmers are past middle age, and their sons have
left for more attractive careers and better-paying jobs elsewhere.
How Price Supports Affect Consumers as Well as Small Farmers
Millions of small establishments and employees from restaurants to corner
convenience stores are already burdened by high taxes and regulations. Federal farm
policies make the products they sell costlier to produce and therefore more expensive to
the consumer. A 2002 study estimated that the Farm Bill enacted that year would
ultimately cost consumers $271 billion in government-inflated prices over the next
decade. Forcing taxpayers to pay for programs that in turn raise the prices of the products
they buy actually undermines the small-town rural economies those programs were
designed to protect.120 In 2002, total transfers to this sector, as calculated annually by the
OECD, cost consumers and taxpayers $318 billion, or 1.2 percent of GDP. Three-quarters
of those transfers were provided as support to farmers, accounting for one-third of their
gross receipts.121 A recent study conducted by the GAO demonstrated that the sugar
program costs consumers at least $1.9 billion annually in higher costs for their personal
purchases of sugar and sugar-containing products. According to the GAO, the sugar
program also costs taxpayers another $90 million annually through higher prices for
sugar and sugar-containing products purchased for the federal government‘s food
programs for the poor.122
Much of the work of the peripheral industries and workers who drive the
American economy depends on reasonably priced raw materials, including agricultural
products. For every person employed in growing and producing sugar in the United
120

Riedl, 2006.
Brooks, 2003.
122
US GAO, 2000.
121

81
States, there are 10 people employed in sweetener-using industries. But, because of
subsidies and tariffs, the cost of sugar in the United States is nearly twice as high as sugar
on the world market. This added expense literally takes US manufacturers out of the
world market and has driven some, who make products high in sugar content, such as
candy manufacturers, to either shut down completely or move to a more competitive
country, taking with them American jobs. An example is the Lifesaver Company, an
American standard in the candy business, which has now moved its manufacturing
facilities to Canada, where sugar sells closer to the world-market price.123
While the United States continues to subsidize domestic agriculture at the expense
of its trading partners, American taxpayers are stuck with annual bills each year in food
aid that is sent to struggling nations. Some believe that rather than forcing American
taxpayers to subsidize domestic producers, pay higher prices for imported goods that face
tariffs, and then send billions in foreign aid to those countries that are harmed by these
policies, the United States might be better off if Congress just phased out this entire
scheme. The United States has a competitive advantage in many products, and exports
more food to other countries than any other nation, but it risks harming these competitive
advantages when they continue to support trade policies that invite other countries to
retaliate by raising barriers of their own against American farm products. This is
especially tough on American farmers with specialty crops, who could obtain a good
price abroad without the government‘s help124
The cost of the CAP can be measured in two ways: the money paid out of the EU
budget and the cost to the consumer in higher food prices. The EU spent 49 billion euros
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on agriculture in 2005 (46 percent of the budget), while the OECD estimates the extra
cost of food in 2003 at 55 billion euros. The program actually cost the EU 88 billion
euros in 2005 to support an outdated program.125 Between 1992 and 1999 the total EU
agriculture budget increased from 32 billion euros to 40 billion euros, or an increase of
nearly 25 percent. However, during that same period export rebates, in the EU, went from
9.5 billion euros to 5.5 billion euros, a decrease of nearly 40 percent. The combination of
the two had a direct impact on world market prices. Fortunately, between 1992 and 1999,
the combined subsidies decreased from 26 billion euros in 1992 to 12 billion in 1999—
over 50 percent. EU direct payments to farmers in 1999 accounted for 70 percent of the
agricultural budget. However, that represents a decrease in payments that directly affect
trade, from 82 percent in 1992 to 30 percent in 1999. The defining factor was the decision
to decouple prices from production levels.126 In comparison, during the same period, the
United States spent about 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on agricultural
payments, while the EU budget for agriculture was down to about 0.5 percent of GDP.
Although these numbers appear to be comparable, there are some major differences.
Europe actually has more farmers, but the farms are considerably smaller. While the
average government payment per US farmer in 2000 was $14,500, the average EU farm
received $4,500.127
All is not lost, however; the CAP budget has continued to decrease as a
proportion of EU GDP since 1985, as European collaboration has steadily expanded into
other areas. EU members reached an agreement in 2002 that limited agricultural
expenditure for the period 2006–2013 to the 2002 figures, even though 10 new members
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were scheduled to become a part of the EU in 2004. Based on the assumption that the
new members would participate in the pool, the money paid to farmers in older member
states began to decline by five percent in 2007. In addition, if new members Romania and
Bulgaria are paid in relation to their need, that could trigger additional cuts to the old
members of 8-9 percent.128 As expected, agricultural expenditures held their own in 2004,
but increased in 2005 slightly when the 10 new members were admitted. Under the
European Commission‘s 2005 proposals, expenditures were designed to max out in
2008/2009.
Why are These Farm Support Programs Still in Existence?
For years, responsible members of Congress have claimed that they have been
trying to eliminate those programs that have enriched the minority big producers of sugar,
cotton, grain, and other products at the expense of the majority of US citizens. Even when
Congress enacts laws that promise to correct the farm subsidy inequities, the bills are
designed to perpetuate the programs by replacing the old with new agendas, sometimes
disguised as environmental protection, and new language designed to present the old
programs in a new light. However, the tide is turning, as even hard-line advocates of
price supports admit that there is the potential for foolishly spending funds that could be
used to better advantage elsewhere. It is becoming harder to defend these programs
during difficult times and periods of economic shortfall. Those seeking to limit the
negative effects of unnecessary production stimulation and trade-distorting subsidies will
still have a difficult time initiating change, however, because their opponents are well
entrenched. Programs such as government-backed crop insurance, and the whole range of
subsidies in the 2002/2008 Farm Bills, were sold to the American people as a way to ease
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the long-term pressure on taxpayers by eliminating the need for yearly emergency-relief
actions from Congress. But less than a year after President George W. Bush signed the
2002 Farm Bill into law, the farm lobby went into action and Congress approved a new
farm-rescue package with a price tag of $3.1 billion.129
When the EU was confronted by the WTO to reduce these complex domestic
support policies, the developed countries faced internal political pressure to give up little,
if anything. Both the magnitude of their domestic farm-support policies and the
professional stature of the politicians involved are at issue. The United States is no
exception. It is extremely difficult for a member of Congress to deny these programs if he
or she has supported them for years in the past. Still, some are willing to stand up and
make economically accurate public statements. An advocate of trade reform, US Trade
Representative Rob Portman said the United States offered a meaningful and credible
proposal when it announced that it would eliminate its export subsidies and reduce its
farm subsidies by an average of 60 percent. ―Our proposal does provide for real cuts in
our programs,‖ he said. ―We are certainly making a serious commitment here.‖130 After
Portman‘s announcement at the WTO meeting in Zurich on October 10, 2005, the Senate
Agriculture Committee Chairman, Georgia Republican Saxby Chambliss, in a panic, sent
him a letter reminding him that he may have overstepped his authority, and that the US
Congress would have the final say on any reductions in US farm programs. This is a
classic example of the difficulty one might encounter while attempting to reform such an
old and entrenched program. In a follow up, Senate Democrats, speaking at a mark-up
session for the Agriculture Committee‘s budget-reconciliation proposal, accused the Bush
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administration of seeking to ―unilaterally disarm‖ US farmers in the WTO talks by
offering to make such drastic reductions in US farm programs without consulting
Congress.131 It is an impossible situation. First, President Bush increased farm aid in the
Farm Bill of 2002. His Senate Agriculture Committee Chairman, Rob Portman, then
announced to the members of the WTO that it would be possible to reduce farm subsidies
by 60 percent, only to be reprimanded by Congress the following day. Although change
is inevitable, it will not be accomplished easily.
As in the United States, the EU pays massive subsidies, at times equal to half the
value of the product in third world countries and non-EU markets, where unprotected
producers find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. The EU trading partners,
including the United States, have complained about the EU‘s heavy export-subsidization
support program in agricultural products. Since EU internal prices are above world
market prices, export subsidies are needed to move commodities into world markets. The
EU commodities that are subsidized are varied and cover most agricultural products but
primarily dairy products, grains, and sugar. EU member nations are barred from
importing outside agricultural products that are available within the Union.132 Robert
Putnam believes that several areas influence EU policy, and describes the players in a
two-level game in the following way. At the national level of the game, ―domestic groups
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, while
politicians are seeking power by constructing coalitions among those groups.‖ At the
international level, Putnam argues, ―national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of
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foreign developments.‖133 In the case of the EU, there may be an additional level of play,
the Community level, in which member states attempt to achieve individual domestic
goals while at the same time attempting to preserve the EC. Therefore, the structure of
the EU requires that Putnam‘s two-level game be altered to include a third level of
negotiations that would include domestic, as well as Community, and international policy
options. One can only speculate whether the EU is expressing the interest of all the EU
member states or whether any agreement reached by the EU would be validated by the
members after the fact. Unfortunately, negotiations do not proceed sequentially from one
level to the next, but occur as if all three levels were synchronized. This means that
strategies, outcomes, and agreements at each level affect one another. As Putnam notes,
―the political complexities for the players in this game are staggering. Any player at the
international table or the Community table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may
upset the game by failing to ratify the agreement, and conversely, any leader who fails to
satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.‖134
Interestingly, Putnam tells us that the most likely situation for agreement at all three
levels depends on how heterogeneous the conflict is. The more heterogeneous the
conflict, the more likely it is that the government will be able to strike a deal
internationally.135 Most advanced industrial states have heterogeneous economies to a
degree, and, consequently, a variety of interest groups that shape them. In all cases,
certain interest groups are more powerful than others and as a result are able to influence
the passage or defeat of certain issues. Both Wayne Moyer and John Keeler have found
that as a result of these interest groups, farmers in the member states (particularly in
133
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France and Germany) have political power disproportionate to their numbers.136 Putnam
also states that the possibility of an internal agreement depends on the cost of having no
agreement. The lower the cost of having no agreement, the smaller the possibility of
concessions, and eventual agreement.137 A third element is the politician‘s strength, and
his or her perception of how his decision will affect him in the future if he does not reach
an agreement. These costs are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, because they
involve a politician‘s personal perception of their political standing.138
Manipulating the member vote becomes a game of strategies. Keeler notes that if
the possibility of success is great, with little chance of a veto, then only incremental
adjustments to the CAP will be considered unless the vote is a great win for all
involved.139 The strategy is to win but to not win too big. The larger the win, the more
likely it is that an agreement can be reached but also the more difficult it may be to ratify
the agreement at the domestic level. Thomas Schelling‘s definition of ―strategy‖ is useful
here. He argues that
strategy takes conflict for granted, but also assumes a common interest among
adversaries; it assumes a rational value maximizing mode of behavior; and it
focuses on the fact that each participant‘s best choice of action depends on what
he expects the others to do, and that strategic behavior is concerned with
influencing another‘s choice by working on his expectation of how one‘s own
behavior is related to his.140
All of this will be influenced by the two demands on a negotiator, one from across
the table and one from the negotiator‘s own organization. A major reason for the
continued payment of these benefits was that both Chancellor Helmut Kohl, of Germany,
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and President François Mitterand, of France, were facing important elections in 1988. As
in the past, political analysts expected agricultural lobby groups, which were fairly
homogeneous in their support for the status quo, to once again play an important role in
determining the outcome of these elections. This placed Mitterand and Kohl under
extreme pressure to reach an agreement at the EU level that would not be detrimental to
their domestic agricultural constituency, even though France and Germany were net
contributors to the EU budget.141 Kohl‘s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party was
forced to deal with the additional problem of elections in Baden-Wurttemberg and
Schleswig-Holstein. These two areas comprised an important agricultural vote that was
key to the party.142 The CDU well understood that the vote from these two areas could
strongly influence the election; therefore, the decision was made to maintain the status
quo rather than to reduce farm support that would force the farmers to pursue more
efficient farm practices.143 The dependency of the CDU on the farm vote placed Kohl in a
precarious position with respect to agricultural reform. He could ensure his reelection
prospects by continuing price supports, or he could reduce the support payments, in turn
lowering food costs to the rest of the nation, while running the risk of losing the election.
Kohl had been through this before, and fully understood the power of the agriculture
lobby. Two months prior to the European Parliament election in 1984, a decision to
reduce milk supports cost the CSU an estimated 708,000 votes. Again, in 1987, the CDU
lost another estimated 245,000 votes in a general election after implementing price
freezes; 110,000 of those votes were lost in rural areas. As Hendriks notes, ―It must
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therefore be concluded that drastic reform measures will, in fact have a detrimental
impact on the farm electorate. Also, it is probably true to say that the CDU believed that
the party would lose farm votes if it were to ignore the interests of the agricultural
sector.‖144
The French were faced with a similar situation in that they were spending a large
share of their budget on agriculture, but were afraid to change for fear that the backlash
would defeat the ruling party in the coming election. Even though France is a more
efficient producer of farm products than Germany, the artificially high prices established
under the CAP was causing France to lose market share to other EU countries, including
Germany. Mitterand, who was facing strong challenges from opposition leader Raymond
Barr, and Jacques Chirac, knew that the agricultural bloc could be crucial to the outcome
of the election.145 There was no question that France and its efficient farmers could
absorb a price cut with little adverse effect on the agricultural community, but unlike
Germany, France had to deal with the cultural rural tradition that a conservative
government was one that represented the interest of the farm community.146
The situation in the United Kingdom was somewhat different than that in France
and Germany. The nature of the farm lobby and its relationship with the British
government was different in that the farm lobby had taken a more nationalistic position
and argued for a CAP that was more in line with world market pricing. Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher was answering to a more heterogeneous and agreeable lobby set. The
United Kingdom had already made internal structural changes as a result of both the
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Enclosure Laws and the repeal of the Corn Laws. English farmers were both efficient and
accustomed to change in the size and form of agricultural support.147 Both the farm
community and the government of the United Kingdom were and are still of the opinion
that farm supports payments to the EC budget are simply a means of bringing the less
advanced member nations up to a common plane where each can compete on the same
level. Essentially, they are supporting their competitors‘ agricultural programs until those
nations can support themselves. It is by no means a lose/lose situation, however. The
CAP is important to British farmers in that it assures British farmers of a market for their
produce at a competitive price. In essence, although the farm lobby in the United
Kingdom represents the farmers, it is progovernment, in contrast to farm lobbies in many
of the other EU nations.148 Therefore, Prime Minister Thatcher was able to take the
position that imposing new limits on EU farm spending would be her condition for
agreeing to any increase in the total budget, and if the payment and distribution
procedures were to change in any way, she insisted that Britain end up no worse off than
under the existing system.149 The message was clear. The United Kingdom would support
agriculture reform, but would, under no circumstances, agree to anything that would
worsen its position, or cost it more than it was already paying.150
With these narrow alternatives, the EU Agriculture Council members found
themselves facing a collision of philosophical and political interests. While the United
Kingdom and Denmark proposed a CAP reform based on fiscal responsibility, France
and Germany were being squeezed into a decision based on political and sociocultural
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considerations. In order to control overproduction, the United Kingdom proposed a
maximum production level for certain agricultural products. If growers exceeded that
level, a 15 percent price reduction would be imposed on the overproduced crops, and
those who overproduced would be required to pay a tax to offset the cost of storing the
excess, and to defer the cost of export subsidies. The United Kingdom attempted to halt
the annual increase in spending by suggesting that the 1987 EU grain production levels of
155 million metric tons be adopted as the maximum guaranteed quantity (MGQ) that
could be produced in any given year. The Germans and the French countered with a
proposal that would raise the ceiling on grain production to 165 million metric tons per
year and impart insignificant penalties for exceeding the MGQ. In essence, they were
asking the rest of the EU member states to support them in their bid to retain their
political party leadership by allowing them to appease their constituency with a 6 percent
increase in production over the already unacceptable 1987 levels.151 The British, the
Dutch, and the Danes held the upper hand in the negotiations because at that time
Denmark held the presidency of the EU Council of Ministers. The three countries were
adamant that they would not approve any additional funding for agricultural support until
some agreement was reached on the establishment of a spending cap. This ultimatum
created an impasse whereby neither side was able to reach an agreement by the end of
1987.152 The Commission then increased the pressure on the Agriculture Council to reach
an agreement on reform by taking the member states to the European Court of Justice for
not producing a 1988 budget. It also threatened to cut off intervention payments if the
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Agriculture Council did not agree on budget stabilizers by February 1988.153 The
members knew that West Germany was scheduled to take over the presidency of the
Council of Ministers in January 1988; therefore, all of these ultimatums fell on deaf ears
and were taken lightly. When the final agreement was struck in February 1988, France
and Germany were successful in achieving the maximum 3 percent price cut for grains
that they wanted, and overproduction taxes that took effect only when grain production
exceeded 160 million tons. As compensation to the other EU member nations, Germany
agreed to pay an extra five billion ECU to the fund over a five-year period, representing a
30 percent increase in their net annual agricultural budget contributions.154 The result of
the increase of grain production to 160 million tons before additional tariffs were added
pushed the savings window out to 1990, if ever.155
Moyer and Josling recap the proceedings as follows:
West Germany got credit for forging the agreement and could claim success for
minimizing the cuts in farmers‘ incomes. France could argue that the welfare of
French farmers had been protected by the infusion of new funds into the CAP and
that the potential damage of stabilizers had been limited. The UK and the
Netherlands won limitations on agricultural spending plus price cuts for over
production. The Mediterranean nations received large increases in regional
structural, and social funds. The Commission attained new revenues to keep the
European Community solvent, and all the participants benefited in that the
movement towards the single European market could proceed smoothly.156
To summarize, the stabilizers agreement was achieved through a series of
compromises. First, from a political and sociocultural perspective, France and Germany
were handicapped by what they perceived to be strong vocal farm lobbies. The United
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Kingdom, on the other hand, was driven by economic responsibility and more
nationalistic interest groups. This set the stage for negotiations and compromise. As Agra
Europe concluded, ―The British government sold out its half hearted objective of CAP
improvement in return for more important gains to British industry, banking, insurance,
and other service industries.‖157 Thus the United Kingdom agreed to the reform primarily
because of its implications for resolving other internal issues. They were willing to give
up short-term losses in the agricultural industry for the long-term health of a group of
unrelated industries.158
The Commission played a vital role in the negotiations when it raised the cost of
having no agreement by taking the member states to the European Court of Justice for
failing to produce a 1988 budget. This placed additional pressure on Germany, as the new
president of the 1988 Council, to negotiate a compromise that would satisfy both internal
farm lobby pressure and external Community interest. Germany was able to resolve the
situation by satisfying the local farmers by continuing the status quo, and placating the
other member states through an increase in their budget conformation. Through a
circuitous route, they simply took the money from the German taxpayers and gave it to
the farmers.159 The question in Europe became one of whether reform would be
externally or internally driven. The February 1991 Directorate General (DG) VI released
a detailed blueprint for CAP reform in the form of a ―Reflections‖ paper. This
represented a departure from other reform proposals in that it looked back at what had
been unsuccessful in the past, and suggested a different approach for future reform.
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Rather than attempting to patch the existing program, the so-called MacSharry plan
(named for Ray MacSharry, the EU‘s Agricultural Minister at the time) assumed that one
of the main aims of rural policy in the 1990s should be to retain rural populations. This is
quite different from previous plans that dealt with supporting small farmers and retraining
excess farm labor, in that the MacSharry plan was to keep them as farmers. It proposed
price reductions in certain key areas balanced by direct compensatory aid payments to
farmers. In other words, it proposed that farmers be compensated for being farmers, and
not for the amount of crops that they produced.160 This would encourage small farmers to
maintain the small farm lifestyle, while at the same time reducing the amount of labor
necessary to produce an overabundance of agricultural products. While the MacSharry
plan did not suggest that all support prices be eliminated, it did emphasize that some
payments would no longer be attached to production and placed more emphasis on
paying farmers to be more efficient, and on improving farm awareness of conservation
and the environment.
The budget as presented would actually increase expenditures in agriculture by
2.24 billion ECU, but would save money in compensatory payments and export subsidies
after the first few years.161 As Agra Europe reported, the MacSharry proposal would
mean that the guaranteed budget for the CAP in 1997 would increase to 37.5 billion
ECU. This is considerably more than the 1991 level of 32.5 billion ECU but much less
than the estimated cost of 42.7 billion ECU expected in 1997 if there were no reforms.162
The result of the MacSharry proposal would be lower grain prices due to less price
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support money, less surplus product that would require export subsidies, and less product
to be dumped on the LDC market. All of these goals could be reached internally without
the need for negotiating through the WTO and the Doha Round of negotiations. As David
Gardner reported, export subsidies were the ―high octane fuel of the GATT row,‖
because of their ruinous effects on industrialized and developing country competitors.163
The Economist reported, ―The Community has insisted all along that the talks on reform
are separate from the Uruguay Round, in which the Americans and Europeans have been
deadlocked over farm subsidies for five years. Mr. MacSharry said the Community was
showing it was able to meet its commitments to the GATT round in full without
multilateral agreements with the US. It will be up to the others to match us.‖164 While
MacSharry was attempting to sell his new plan to the member states, the economic
situation was declining in Germany. In 1992 the political complexion had changed
drastically as a result of reunification. As reported in The Economist, Germany was faced
with a ―unity induced financial crisis,‖ and it was estimated that ―Germany‘s total public
sector debt could soar to more than DM 1.8 trillion by 1995. That figure would be more
than 50% of GNP compared with a ratio of 40% in Western Germany before unity.‖165
Germany had few options. It went from being one of the most financially sound members
of the EU to facing potential financial collapse over the period of a few months. The
government discontinued all new public spending, regardless of priority. The spending
moratorium included internal programs such as health care and care for the aged as well
as external programs that included EU assessments and agricultural support subsidies.
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The German government began an intense financial accounting and, not surprisingly,
revised its attitude toward the ever-increasing agricultural expenditures in the EU.166
German unions were afraid that an influx of low-paid workers from the East would create
a loss of jobs at worst, or a reduction in pay at best. In an effort to counter the effects of
thousands of low-paid workers entering the marketplace, the unions went on strike to
increase the Eastern wages up to the Western levels. Nearly one hundred thousand
workers from every avenue of union labor went on strike in support of a pay increase of
9.5 percent. The government now preoccupied itself with appeasing labor and industry
lobbies while attempting to maintain the electoral base that was slowly slipping away. As
growing budget deficits continued to climb, the importance of the EU and support of its
agricultural underwriting became increasingly less important.167 The German
government was overwhelmed by the decline of its cooperative relationship between
labor and industry. It was experiencing its first serious cash flow emergency since the end
of WWII, its tax base was being undermined by the labor strikes, and the EU was asking
for an increase in funding.168 The farm sector itself changed with reunification. As the
Financial Times reported, ―German agriculture is no longer dominated by small farmers.
A whole new category of huge factory farms on the eastern model must now be taken
into consideration.169 The huge factory farms had not been subsidized while under the
protection of the Soviet Union (USSR). Now, the costs of subsidies and export
guarantees for the former East Germany would have to be financed by the CAP;
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however, West Germany had traditionally been the primary underwriter of the CAP,
therefore the former West Germany was facing the possibility of having to contribute to
an even greater CAP budget. The prospect of supporting agriculture in its East with the
knowledge that the East would not be able to contribute proportionately to the overall
German share was one more reason not to vote for an increase in the EU agriculture
assessment. Prime Minister Kohl, breaking with his previous position on CAP reform,
declared that ―the EU agricultural reform was not possible without substantial price cuts,
especially for grains.‖170 This was a signal to German farmers and other EU member
states that Germany could no longer afford to underwrite the cost of the CAP as it had in
1988. As a result of these internal social, political, and institutional changes in Germany
in 1990, and the subsequent mobilization of the unions and other interest groups
including industry and manufacturing, agricultural interest groups no longer held the
political power they had held in 1988. Reunification had forced German leaders to
consider the interests of a more heterogeneous coalition of interest groups in 1992 than in
1988.171 Reunification was instrumental in forcing Germany to change its political
position on agriculture support and CAP reform, but what influenced France to agree to
the MacSharry reform? The French government finally realized that without Germany‘s
support, continually increasing budget expenditures would lead to continual budgetary
crises. France had become a very efficient producer of agricultural products, especially
grains, and as such could easily operate profitably even with the prospect of a decrease in
support prices. France‘s main concern was that it would lose both internal and external
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market share if a system of quotas were introduced to control production. The Financial
Times characterized French concerns as follows: ―France, the EC‘s agro-superpower,
accounting for nearly half the community‘s grain exports, was in the end, frightened that
prices would not come down far enough and that quotas would be used to limit
production blunting its competitive edge.‖172
With Germany and France in forced agreement, the United Kingdom had little
problem with compromise, as it had always advocated EU agricultural reform to bring the
CAP in line with world prices. As a 1991 House of Lords study states:
Recognition of the need for fundamental change in the manner in which the
Community supports its agricultural sector is hardly new. Six years ago on the last
major debate on CAP reform; we reported to the House that reform was
imperative. We reiterate that view. The CAP denies the free operation of the
market, distorts the relationship between supply and demand and leads to a
welfare loss to the whole Community. It fails to pay sufficient regard to
environmental concerns or the needs of consumers, and threatens the ability of the
Community to trade freely on the world market . . . This is clearly indefensible.173
The British made no secret that they favored support reductions. The House of Lords
report states that ―The price mechanism has, in the past been the means by which the
Community has encouraged an expansion in agriculture production. One means of
restoring market balances in the Community is therefore to reduce support prices.‖174
Prime Minister Thatcher‘s previous strategy had been to minimize British financial
support for the CAP even as Germany and France insisted on maintaining it. With
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compromise in the air, the United Kingdom was now agreeable to considering a more
serious agricultural reform proposal.175
To sum up, the EU was under greater international pressure from GATT to reform
its agricultural policy in 1992 than in 1988. At the same time, agricultural expenditures
were eating up the EU budget, and two of the three main contributors to the budget,
Germany and the United Kingdom, continued to vocalize their reluctance to increase
their budget contributions, while France reluctantly expressed its willingness to listen to a
reduction in payments. All these factors converged to produce a ratified MacSharry
reform package.176 The final reform proposal, with its myriad of revisions, was
eventually adopted in May 1992. The member nations agreed on an overall package that
included a 29 percent decrease in grain prices over a three-year period. In addition,
Britain and Germany were able to fulfill the promise to their farmers that they would be
insured against the loss of any income as a result of the agreement. In exchange, large
farmers would remove 15 percent of their arable land from production. Similar
programs—such as the Land Bank in the United States—have never worked well, mainly
because technology has always made up for the land taken out of production. Only
marginally productive land is ever enrolled in these programs. Efficient producers will
always find a creative way to continue to produce the maximum so long as they are
receiving compensatory payments. Finally, with only a 29 percent cut in internal prices,
export restitutions would continue to be required. Yet most experts agreed that the shift
from high consumer prices to deficiency payments represented a major philosophical
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change and a moral victory for the Commission. Even DV VI officials later admitted that
the old programs could not be sustained, and that it was only a matter of time before
taxpayers refused to pay farmers to do nothing, although it was not politically possible to
admit that at the time. The consensus was that this latest round of CAP reforms would
eventually move the Community in the direction of greater dependence on world
markets. No one would have believed at that time just how difficult future cuts would be.
Despite intense protest by France, the MacSharry reform proposal represented the
lesser of two evils. If no agreement was reached on the reform package, quotas quite
likely would have been imposed to balance the budget. This was wholly unacceptable to
domestic agricultural groups in France. The cost of having no agreement would have
resulted in increased consumer prices throughout the member states. Although the French
argued that further adjustments would be needed to meet the new GATT commitment,
they were unable to veto the agriculture agreement because it was not voted on
separately, but as part of the entire Uruguay Round agreement, which was their way of
saying, ―we voted for it but we did not want to.‖ In fact, the French did not want it, and
postponed making a decision until they were able to negotiate a plan that would
compensate their farmers for losses that might occur after the 1992 CAP reform was
implemented.177
Why was the EU able to adopt a radical new initiative in 1992, when it failed to
achieve more than an incremental change in 1988 and has been unable to reach
agreement on reform in the 2000s? First, the power and diversity of interest groups affect
the outcome of the negotiations. The more heterogeneous the interests of the parties in
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negotiations are, the easier it is for them to come to an agreement. In the earlier
negotiations, Kohl and Mitterand were virtually held hostage to the politically influenced
interests of their farm lobbies. They knew they could never win and that their parties
faced defeat if they tried to implement reforms that would change the status quo of these
relatively small but politically powerful lobbies. By 1992 the unification of Germany had
expanded the number of union and agriculture lobby groups, diluting the strength of each
and reducing the power of their demands on the German budget. This gave Kohl the
leeway he needed to expand his platform to include substantive agricultural reform
without the fear of losing large blocks of votes. Even so, Germany would never have
been able to carry it off alone. Germany‘s ability to change its political strategy allowed it
to form an alliance with England to push forward with a plan for strong agricultural
reform. Second, the higher the cost of having no agreement, the more likely it is that a
substantive reform will be passed. In 1988 the cost of having no agreement was mitigated
by an increase in the German budget contribution. The expansion of the EU brought
about by the Maastricht Agreement and the unrelenting annual pressure placed on the EU
budget by the CAP accentuated the necessity for agricultural reform.
Some, but not all of this posturing, positioning, and maneuvering has been the
direct result of political influence with little interest in what these programs will or will
not do for the individual nations or for the Community. On the other hand, there is still a
dedicated part of the populace that is genuinely concerned about the farm community,
and that continually lobbies for the continuation of these funds for fear that if they are
discontinued, the mythical small farmer will disappear from the land. There is convincing
evidence that most of the farmers who remain could be profitable in the long term if price
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supports were removed. For example, New Zealand farmers no longer receive
agricultural price supports. They get five cents a liter for their milk; EU farmers get 30.
This is why the New Zealand dairy industry can ship butter 13,000 miles around the
world to Europe and still undercut British farmers by 125 percent in their own market—
or could, if the EU did not impose a tax on the imports to stop them from benefiting UK
consumers in this way.178 This subsidizing activity is at the root of the running diplomatic
battle between Brussels and Washington and between the two and the WTO.
Isolationism and Autarky
Prior to restructuring, the EC-6 was only about 85 percent self-sufficient in terms
of food, and exports were small. Problems began when subsidized production of certain
products expanded beyond domestic consumption, and subsidized exports had to be
increased.179 Between 1975 and 1986, the EC moved from being an overall net importer
of agricultural produce to being a net exporter of grain and wine.180 European
overproduction caused agricultural surpluses to increase faster than demand. This
contributed to a drop in world prices and necessitated a rapid expansion in the
agricultural support programs. As Agra Europe reports, world grain stocks rose by 70
percent in the early 1980s, and, as a result, world prices fell by over 44 percent between
1981 and 1986.181 The policy, which was originally designed to ensure food security,
became an increasingly expensive mechanism that created, collected, and dumped
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surpluses on international markets.182 As it ceased to operate as originally designed, each
European nation in turn began to feel the pressure for change.
In order to reduce excess stocks, the EU had to increase export subsidies in order
to lower the price on the world market. In so doing, traditional, non-EC exporters of
agricultural commodities lost world market share to the EC. Alan Buckwell notes, ―If
these changes had not come about because of the highly productive and competitive
nature of European agriculture, citizens in Europe and abroad would have little to
complain about. However, because the changes have been accompanied by a large and
rapidly rising injection of public support, and because European Community agricultural
prices are significantly higher than those in competing countries, there has been a chorus
of complaints against the European Community and the CAP.‖183 One of the major
beneficiaries of these subsidies, France, feared that it would be ruined by low-cost
imports from some of France‘s relatively more efficient competitors, a fear not well
founded, since France has some of the most efficient farmers in the world. France‘s
reaction was to expand well beyond the level of output that could ever be absorbed by the
domestic market or those overseas territories that were its primary market. France, with
its high prices, could compete on the world market only with the aid of governmental
support. Even though French farm prices were lower than in other European countries,
they were substantially higher than the prices paid to the American, Canadian, and South
American farmers who were their major competitors.184
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In Germany, the second largest economy at the time of the formation of the EEC,
the problem was somewhat different. Germany had lost its most productive farming areas
to Moscow‘s East European satellites. Germany decided to concentrate on rebuilding its
industrial sector, and chose to form an alliance with France to supply its agricultural
needs—a classic agreement of two countries to supply that item in which they each had a
comparative advantage. The EEC then began as an alliance in which one nation was to
supply coal and steel, and the other was to supply agricultural products. For Germany, the
decision was a fortunate one that spared it the rigors of agricultural deregulation. Italy,
Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands made up the balance of the six original
nations to the agreement. They were all in agreement: better a guaranteed market with
one‘s neighbors than the uncertainty of the world market.185
Who Are the Winners?
There can be little argument that the original price-support policies were
beneficial necessities to those attempting to survive the Great Depression. Unfortunately,
the programs had no sunset clause and have continued on into perpetuity. These basic
programs have changed little over the decades; the major difference has been who
benefits from them. Politicians have come and gone on their ability to continue to deliver
and increase these paybacks to their constituency over the past 80 years. The
overwhelming evidence indicates that current agricultural policies fail to meet their stated
objectives, yet changes have been slow to come. A major reason must be that there is a
gap between the officially published objectives of governmental policy and the priorities
of policymakers, who often feel obligated to respond to their political constituents. It
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should be apparent that subsidies cause economic chaos, take money away from valuable
private resources, and are ultimately destructive; however, breaking the power of the
cotton, sugar, and grain lobbies is not likely to happen overnight.
Over time, some progress has been made. For example, in 1997 and 1999 Rep.
Dan Miller (R-Florida) and Sen. Charles Schumer (D-New York) unsuccessfully
introduced bills in the House and Senate, respectively, to phase out the federal pricesupport program for sugar. Although these efforts did not get far, they represented a
beginning and focused attention on a subject that most congresspersons would rather
ignore. It is no longer a matter of whether but of when these destructive programs are
disassembled. Knowing the destruction these programs cause worldwide, one can hardly
overstate how high the stakes are and how important it is that involved governments
make the correct decisions.186
The basic premise of subsidizing farm prices might have continued yet another
five decades had it not been for the resultant worldwide economic chaos that they have
created. With the onset of globalization, the United Nations, and the WTO, the world has
become increasingly aware of its neighbors and of the obligations that each country has
to treat the others fairly. Price supports and export/import protection by wealthy countries
are having devastating effects on late-developing and poor countries around the world.
Members of the global family are becoming more aware of their latent obligation toward
the well-being of their neighbors. The communications revolution has given the public
the tools necessary to become more aware of where the money goes, and how much it
costs them personally. Large cotton, sugar, and grain co-ops, as well as other agriculture
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groups, are losing ground but are far from giving up. The tobacco growers associations
taught them a good lesson, and that lesson was to ―hang on as long as you can.‖ It may be
decades before these support measures are eliminated, or it may be that they are never
fully abandoned; however, they are on the brink of being substantially reduced, and the
world is watching to see how the United States will react.
Before any real change can occur, developed countries must look at the overall
global perspective. Progress and positive change can both be achieved by working
through a neutral transparent agency detached from internal political pressure. The WTO
is working diligently to become the vehicle that the nations of the world can depend on to
make fair and unbiased decisions. No group of countries can make it happen on their
own: such change requires a global effort. The positive side is that agriculture has finally
been brought under the auspices of WTO rules and progress is being made.
Economists have long cautioned world leaders about the negative effects of
protectionist policies. Closed markets and false price levels have a long history of failure.
Many high-ranking governmental officials understand the fallacy of continuing current
policies. But their validity is not the question. The difficulty lies in dismantling such
strongly entrenched and traditional agricultural policies that originally were designed to
protect the real wealth of this country, the small farmer. The fact that these small farmers
today receive only a small portion of the benefits has fallen on deaf ears in the past.
When these programs were first implemented, agriculture was the mainstay of the US and
European economies. Nearly 50 percent of the labor market depended on agriculture.
According to the World Bank, today only a fraction of the GDP comes from agriculture,
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and the proportion of those employed by the industry has been reduced to only 2 percent
(see Table 11).
The large cotton, sugar, and grain cartels have the assets, the power, and the
marketing to intimidate anyone courageous enough to speak up for the American
taxpayer, and against current farm policy. However, the beneficiaries of agriculture‘s
outdated support systems are slowly being identified for what they are, and subsidies are
gradually being reduced. President-elect Barack Obama was cited in the New York Times
on November 26, 2008, as saying that he expected his new director of the Office of
Management and Budget, Peter Orszag, to fully investigate a recent governmental report
indicating that farmers whose incomes exceeded $2.5 million had most likely been
mistakenly paid about $49 million in governmental subsidies from 2003 to 2006. He did
not offer any other specific targets. ―After the financial recovery is under way,‖ President
Barack H. Obama said, ―the chase after wasteful spending will begin in earnest.‖ ―Just
because a program, a special interest tax break or corporate subsidy is hidden in this
year‘s budget does not mean that it will survive the next.‖ He continued, ―The old ways
of Washington simply cannot meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.‖187 In March
2009, President Obama signed the $410 billion spending bill handed down from the
previous administration, with no cuts or revisions. In July 2009, the Office of
Management and Budget released a plan to save $102 million in 15 agencies for the
balance of 2009. None of those are in agricultural price supports, nor was there a
comment on agriculture in the August 2009 mid-term review.188
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An encouraging sign and a good reason to believe that agricultural policies can be
broken is the organizing of the G22 group in Cancun. This group of developing countries
holds a diverse set of views about the benefits of liberalizing their own farm policies,
while at the same time negotiating as a single entity with the developed countries. Their
strength lies not only in their numbers but also in the fact that they have organized in
pursuit of a common goal, to help one another sell their crops on the open market at a
profit. Their goal as a group is to amass enough power to be able to influence the
developed nations to at least listen to their requirements as individual countries.
The success stories in Australia and New Zealand have proved beyond a doubt
that the reduction and eventual elimination of price-support policies will not only benefit
the world‘s consumers by providing lower-priced goods but also will not do great harm to
those farmers who now receive subsidies. The great challenge remains in reinventing the
political systems that continue to advocate these supports for their own private
enrichment. The bright light of the WTO may be the answer as it continues to shine on
the offenders and highlight those who are being offended.
European critics argue that today, the CAP costs too much and benefits too few.
Only five percent of EU citizens, 10 million people, work in agriculture, and the sector
generates just 1.6 percent of EU GDP.189 Supporters of the CAP argue that it guarantees
the survival of rural communities, where more than half of EU citizens live, and that it
preserves the traditional appearance of the countryside.
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Table 11
Agriculture Contribution to GDP, and Percentage of Employment

Agriculture as a
percentage of GDP
(%)

Agriculture as a
percentage of
employment
(%)

Japan

1

5

United States

2

2

Western Europe

2

5

Namibia

11

31

Romania

12

42

Kenya

16

18

Indonesia

17

55

Uganda

32

91

Country

Note. From World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2005.

Only five percent of EU citizens, 10 million people, work in agriculture, and the
sector generates just 1.6 percent of EU GDP.190 Supporters of the CAP argue that it
guarantees the survival of rural communities, where more than half of EU citizens live,
and that it preserves the traditional appearance of the countryside. This forces one to ask
the following: if 50 percent live in rural areas, and the farm population in these areas has
declined from 90 percent to only 10 percent today, and the appearance of the countryside
has not noticeably changed over the past 40 years, then how will discontinuing the
program be harmful? With an overall EU GDP of only 1.6 percent the importance of
farming to the overall economy is marginal, although some of the newer members still
190
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rely on agriculture to a much greater degree. The upside is that a large percent of the job
market is filled by displaced farm labor. For example, in Poland, 18 percent of the
population works in agriculture, compared with less than two percent in the United
Kingdom and Belgium.191 The number of people working on farms in the older EU
countries today is half what it was in 1980, and the attrition rate for farmers leaving the
industry is almost two percent annually. This pattern is also developing in the newer
member states that were previously agrarian in nature. As they become more
industrialized, the farm population decreases. For example, between 2002 and 2003, the
farm population in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia
decreased by more than eight percent.192 The numbers reveal that those that receive the
benefits of the support programs are declining, and yet, the programs are still in place and
operating at the same levels. Those countries that receive the bulk of the funds are
reluctant to give them up, even in the face of statistics that show they are no longer
necessary. Not only is the EU supporting unnecessary programs, it is sending it to the
wrong countries. Subsidy money is still not properly allocated to those countries with
larger agrarian populations because the older members are reluctant to give up their
share.193
Although the decline in farm labor was not part of the formula, the farmpopulation dilemma may be self-correcting over time. Not only is the farm population
declining, but the average age of farmers is rising. In 2000, more than half of the farmers
in the 15 countries that made up the EU were 55 or older. As the Eastern European
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countries became members, their older populations drove that number even higher.
Farming is not an easy way to make a living. Farm workers work long hours at hard labor
in all kinds of weather for sub par wages. Younger men often leave the farm for better
jobs in the city that pay more, breaking the family tradition of passing the farm from
generation to generation.194 Supporters of the CAP claim that many farms would actually
be unprofitable if EU subsidies were withdrawn. The question is, if only five percent of
the population is still farming, then how many is many? How many farms would actually
fail, and how much would it cost to reeducate those failing farmers and/or relocate them
to some other area? The answer is, much less than the subsidies that are being paid today.
Is it Possible to Eliminate Agricultural Supports?
All parties have their own take on the advantages and/or disadvantages of a freemarket system. Brazil and other South American cotton-producing countries charge that
cotton subsidies result in US farmers producing so much cotton that farmers from poorer
nations cannot compete. They claim that if crop supports were eliminated and the United
States and others were forced to sell on the world market, it would have little negative
effect on American growers but would benefit all other cotton-producing countries. Other
groups, such as the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, advocate a cut in subsidies,
so that less land will be devoted to overproduced crops such as cotton that require
environmentally harmful fertilizers and more will be planted in ―biomass crops for
regional energy production.‖195
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Naturally, those in the US cotton, sugar, and grain industries worry that what they
view as negative WTO decisions eventfully will cost US farmers their subsidies and
prevent them from making as much profit from their products. David Blandford, a Penn
State University professor of agricultural economics, says ―not to worry, even if subsidies
are cut, it‘s not clear that cotton production would decline in the USA, because U.S.
producers are so efficient.‖196 A number of studies have analyzed the effect of
eliminating domestic subsidies on the global cotton market and have shown that if
American domestic subsidies were eliminated, there would be a positive impact on total
cotton prices (12 to 22 cents per pound). Extending this hypothesis to the elimination of
direct subsidies worldwide shows an even more positive effect.197
Large cotton, sugar, and grain producers are the most adamant advocates of price
supports because they stand to lose the most, but what about the rest of the American
farmers—how would they fare if crop support programs were to go away? First, federal
farm programs actually work against the interests of many farmers. Only one-third of
farmers actually receive subsidies, and most are in the sugar, cotton, and grain arena. The
two-thirds who do not receive subsidies pay a heavy price through lost export
opportunities from retaliatory high trade barriers abroad. The World Bank estimates that
if global agricultural barriers to farm trade were removed, that worldwide farm exports
would be 74 percent higher in 2015 than they would be otherwise.198 At first blush, this
appears to be a world saver; however American farmers, not LDCs, would be the biggest
winners. The World Bank believes that reducing export tariffs world wide would mean an
196

WTO. 2003. The cotton initiative.
Ibid.
198
Griswold, Slivinski, and Preble, 2006.
197

113

additional $88 billion in annual US farm exports by 2015 and an additional $28 billion in
farm imports, for a net $60 billion surplus.199 A $60 billion surplus might help offset part
of the $618 billion trade deficit the United States experienced in 2003 or the $668 billion
deficit it experienced in 2008.200 Manufacturers would have access to less-expensive
foreign agricultural products, reducing their cost of raw materials and lowering the cost
of their end products. This would benefit millions of Americans through lower costs for
products at retail, and in higher disposable incomes.
The Office of Management and Budget estimates that taxpayers paid out an
additional $26 billion in direct agricultural subsidies in fiscal year 2005, the biggest
single-year subsidy bill since 1986.201 That is $26 billion that could go back into the
economy if subsidies were substantially reduced. These are the savings in the United
States; the benefits to the world economy are exponentially larger. A 2001 study by
Drusilla Brown at Tufts University and Alan Deardorff and Robert Stern at the
University of Michigan estimated that even a one-third cut in tariffs on the agriculture
industry would boost annual global production by $613 billion; a cut of one-half would
result in an increase of $929 billion.
How would the elimination of these support measures affect American farmers?
Would it put them out of business, as some farm-support groups suggest, or would they
continue and prosper? As suggested earlier, only a few products are actually protected by
these programs. All other farm products, such as fruits, vegetables, nuts, and specialty
crops, have no guaranteed price-support systems, or protected markets. They operate
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successfully on the open market, just as other industries do. Will the lifting of these
supports deal the American farmer a death blow? It may not be necessary to grow corn,
rice, cotton, or sugar on many of these farms. Substitution of other market-demand crops
may actually be more profitable. For instance, the bio-energy field is opening up entirely
new opportunities for the American farmer.202
New Zealand and Australia are very good examples of what can happen when a
negative event is replaced with a positive plan. Before the formation of the EU, nearly 70
percent of all agricultural products produced by these countries were exported to
England. The former colony supplied that country with meat, dairy products, grain, and
other farm products. The EU agreement stipulated that all these products were to be
purchased from member states, effectively eliminating all imports from New Zealand and
Australia. This requirement had the two-pronged effect of forcing Australia and New
Zealand‘s agribusinesses to diversify, and of raising England‘s food prices from one of
the lowest in Europe to one of the highest. Faced with agricultural meltdown, these two
countries enacted unilateral reforms that included the elimination of import and export
barriers, as well as their entire price-support programs. As expected, the farm industry
underwent a reformation that included its downsizing. Forced to innovate or perish, the
agricultural sector opened itself to innovation, and productivity and output surged.203
Prior to reform, these two countries had farm policies that featured many of the
same flaws as those of the United States and the EU. The answer to the question ―what
would happen to the American farmer if farm supports were eliminated?‖ is ―probably
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nothing.‖ In New Zealand, only about one percent of all farms (about 800) faced forced
sales after the reform was completed.204 For those who were forced to sell, the
government purchased the farm, and contributed to the relocation and retraining of those
who were displaced. For the same money the US Congress paid to farmers during the socalled phase-out period between 1995 and 2003, the federal government could have
purchased outright more than a quarter of the farms in the United States.205 With this in
mind, one percent would be a small price to pay in the United States.
Before New Zealand reformed its farm programs, the situation was actually worse
than in the United States, and the level of subsidization was nearly twice that of
American farmers. The success story is that since New Zealand eliminated its subsidies,
and took government out of the marketing equation, its farm output has increased 40
percent, while farm productivity growth has averaged six percent annually.206 According
to the OECD, New Zealand now spends less than five percent of farm receipts on
agriculture support. Twenty years after deregulation, the president of Federated Farmers
of New Zealand, Don Nicolson, proclaimed that the end of agricultural-support programs
forced farmers to become highly efficient, and more aware of market demands and
consumer preferences. Farm productivity increased by six percent annually and actually
created 450,000 jobs in farm-related industries in a country of four million people.
According to President Nicolson of Federated Farmers of New Zealand, ―Fear of change
often runs rampant, but once you are farming in accord with your comparative advantage,
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it becomes possible to adapt your production system to fit consumer needs and adjust
production costs accordingly.‖207
Australia and New Zealand have prospered under the same revisions that other
nations will be forced to make. In addition, in Australia (a country of over 20 million),
dairy production is as important as grain and is the third most important agricultural
product. Out of necessity, this industry was also deregulated, and farmers were offered
similar short-term assistance either to help them adjust to the new program, or to find
other means of support. This readjustment assistance was funded by taxpayers, who
actually came out ahead as a result of reduced retail pricing.
The Australian agricultural industry made the necessary adjustments in order to
save Australian farms by using modern marketing strategy to keep those farms profitable.
After the formation of the EU, it was evident that the change to a free-market position
was inevitable and that they had little choice in the matter. While the number of farms
decreased, herd sizes increased, and farmers educated themselves in more efficient
methods in order to be competitive. Because they no longer rely on governmental
support, they have become better businesspeople, relying solely on the world market for
their success.208 The success story of Australian and New Zealand farmers, who have
adjusted to deregulation and are doing better today than they did before deregulation, is a
model for other nations that find themselves in the same situation today. Evidence from
Australia and New Zealand shows that farmers in rich countries can succeed without
supports, and can sometimes do better. American farmers growing commodities such as
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fruits and vegetables without support programs do not qualify for the lucrative subsidies
that farmers of rice, cotton, sugar, grain, and other products receive. However, like the
farmers of Australia and New Zealand, they nonetheless succeed. Some contend that this
is evidence that governmental interference actually hinders development and
improvisation. The defense of wealthy countries‘ current agricultural policies on the
grounds that reform would hurt local farmers and lead some exporters to lose their
preference margins is becoming less acceptable as it becomes more apparent that
agricultural supports and subsidized imports are not the way to generate long-term
development. If all the member countries of the WTO would work within its framework
for smoothing the transition to more productive accords, it would be obvious to those
who are listening that the plusses far outnumber the minuses.209
Can the Problem be Corrected Worldwide?
Most countries recognize and understand that the total elimination of domestic
support for cotton, sugar, and grain production will not take place overnight. The WTO
has suggested that until support for the production of these crops has been completely
phased out, financial compensation should be given to LDCs to offset their loss of
revenue as a result of dumping policies created by overproduction. The only practicable
short-term measure is financial compensation for those being harmed, to be paid by those
doing the harm. Such financial compensation might be calculated in proportion to the
subsidies granted by countries that support their farmers‘ production, making the United
States and the EU the major contributors to this compensation fund. The contributions
could decrease as the subsidies are reduced and abolished, the idea being that the higher
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the compensation, the bigger the incentive and the greater the motivation to phase out
subsidies as quickly as possible.210 But how would countries be convinced to agree to the
idea, who would police the plan, and how could it be enforced?
The member countries of the WTO emphasize that the objective of the Doha
Development Agenda is to establish a fair-market-oriented trading system that would
include reforms to eliminate unfair restrictive practices and incorporate oversight
measures that would ensure that the new agreements are honored by all. During the Doha
Round, a commitment was made to take into particular account the needs and interests of
developing countries, particularly the poorest among them. The specific issues raised by
smaller, less powerful countries are currently the subject of procedures under the WTO‘s
dispute-settlement system. Although this system has become one of the world‘s most
effective legal courts, it can resolve, at best, only part of the problem. In order to take into
account the urgent need to restore a global market that functions according to the WTO‘s
principles and to thus combat poverty in LDC agrarian countries, the member countries
have called for the following: 1) The establishment of a mechanism for phasing out
support for cotton production with a view to its total elimination. This would include
setting a specific date for the complete phase-out of cotton production support measures.
2) Until cotton production support measures have been completely eliminated, cotton
producers in LDCs should be offered financial compensation to offset the income they
are losing, as an integral part of the rights and obligations resulting from the Doha
Round. (In addition to the price supports and aid already being paid. It‘s getting more
expensive.) The signatory countries emphasize that the objective of the Doha
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Development Agenda is to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system. The
agenda provides for fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific
commitments in order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets.211 The WTO will be unable to accept any outcome of the
negotiations that allows the WTO disciplines to be circumvented by reclassifying
subsidies, which has been a favorite ploy of US cotton, sugar, and grain co-ops.212 OECD
ministers have long recognized the need for reform and in 1987 agreed on a set of
principles for reform based on the idea of ―market orientation,‖ principles that have been
reaffirmed over the past 16 years of tiring negotiations. Because of the large number of
members involved, the proceedings have been exceeding slow; however, a commitment
to agricultural reform continues to be the primary objective. The relative lack of progress
only highlights the difficulty the world faces when presented with the prospect of
agricultural reform.213
The CAP and Its Attempts at Reform
The crops initially supported by the CAP reflected the climates of the six
founding members (France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries of Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Cereals, beef/veal, and dairy products still receive the
lion‘s share of CAP funding, but the addition of new members in the 1980s brought new
crops such as cotton and sugar into the system. Each country in the EU has its own
special agricultural interest that it defends on the grounds that it is essential to some part
of the nation‘s economy. For example, payments to olive farmers in 2003, at 2.3 billion
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euros, were larger than those to fruit and vegetable farmers at 1.5 billion euros, sugar
producers at 1.3 billion euros, or wine producers, at 1.2 billion euros.214 Wine is a
singular case, with special funding designed primarily to placate France, although other
wine-producing nations such as Spain and Italy also benefit, but to a lesser degree. For
example, the EU subsidizes the overproduction of grapes, and then provides funds to
convert surpluses into brandy or fuel, a process known as crisis distillation, and pays to
replace poor-quality with high-quality vines that will produce even more surplus wine.
The EU budget sets aside almost 220 million euros every year to fund wine distillation
and conversion.215 The Environmental News Service reported on June 8, 2006, that the
EU distilled more than six hundred million liters of French and Italian wine into
industrial alcohol because producers were making more wine than they could sell on the
EU market. That is 1.05 million gallons, or 5.25 million bottles of wine, that the
government subsidized and then paid to have distilled.
The Agenda 2000 reform agreed to on March 1999 took the next step in EU
agricultural reform. Faced with the prospect of increasing expenditures with the
expansion of the EU to include more Eastern European countries, it was incumbent that
additional budgetary limits be implemented.216 The agreement was designed to run
between 2000 and2006, with a mid-term review (MTR) in 2003. In June 2003, during the
MTR, an agreement was finally reached by the EU Council of Agricultural Ministers. In
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what was to become the Luxembourg Agreement, the EU decided to reinvent the CAP by
formally eliminating the connection between direct payments and the amount of crops
farmers produce, whereas in the past it had simply reduced those funds.217
The new policy, which came into effect in January 2005, operates as follows:
Farmers involved in beef and sheep production and in cereal growing will
receive an annual payment based on the average direct payment they
received in the three-year period 2000–2002. In the case of Irish farmers,
this annual payment will be fully ‗decoupled‘ from production. In other
words, farmers will not have to keep animals or grow crops in order to be
eligible for the payment.
The quota system for beef, sheep and tillage will be abolished. The milk
quota system will be maintained. The EU support structure milk will be
reduced and farmers will be paid direct ‗compensation‘ for the reduction
in supports.218
The MTR set out the CAP framework until 2013, but with the 2008 worldwide crises it is
unlikely to be the last CAP reform. The continuation of these supports, and the amount of
the continued payments, will depend on the EU‘s financial health from 2009 through
2013.
Those EU ministers, led by the United Kingdom, who already understand that
they cannot afford to continue paying their farmers as they have in the past under the
CAP and export support systems, are calling for change. Although the admission was
regarded as a negotiation victory by the WTO, the concession by the EU was not entirely
voluntary. Throughout the Doha Development Round, the EU‘s agricultural policies have
217
218

BBC News, 2008.
Agriculture and Food Development Authority, 2003.

122

been under constant fire by the international community, who considers the EU export
policy to be economically destructive to developing nations. The EU claims that its
policy is designed to protect its local farmers and the nontrade aspects of agriculture.
However, this claim is not defendable when the structure of its import and export
programs is examined by WTO and the rest of the world community.219
The reform of the EU‘s system of direct subsidies remains the primary obstacle to
openness in EU agricultural trade. What these countries say, and what they actually do, is
quite often dissimilar. For example, prior to the Cancun ministerial meeting, Trade
Commissioner Pascal Lamy, in a May 2004 letter addressed to all WTO trade ministers,
announced the explicit EU willingness to fully eliminate export subsidies. The EU and
the United States then presented a draft framework for the liberalization of agricultural
trade that neither mentioned the gradual elimination of export subsidies nor addressed the
specific complaints of developing nations. The proposal was not what the WTO had
asked for, nor was it what it had expected. What the EU and the United States proposed
was so far removed from what was on the table that it could not be countered. Having
reached a stalemate, the Doha negotiations were declared closed until further notice.
Political difficulties surrounding CAP reform and export subsidies, compounded by the
inability to move forward exhibited by politically compromised actors such as foreign
governments and the US Congress; imply that progress toward an actual agreement may
continue to be slow, even in light of the current economic chaos.220
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Many developing nations have little faith in the EU‘s ability to reform even if its
member states could reach agreement. Change does not come easily, as each nation seeks
to protect its own personal interests, with little regard for the overall international picture.
Had the WTO not intervened in the negotiations, the EU sugar regime might have
continued unchanged indefinitely. Louis Belanger, a spokesman for Oxfam in Brussels,
adequately summed up the situation: ―the huge level of compensation offered to EU
farmers is an insult.‖221 The proposed reduction of EU support prices by 36 percent will
reduce consumer prices and force producers to improve their production techniques in
order to continue to compete on the international market.222 All developed nations must
face the same difficult decision concerning agricultural support issues. The EU has made
some progress with its CAP reform, which discontinued the pay-to-produce program,
while the US Congress passed the Freedom to Farm Act in 1996, which also eliminated
agricultural production subsidies in favor of fixed payments to farmers. Although the
Freedom to Farm Act fell into disarray, it too was a first step in admitting that these
programs are no longer necessary for the support of small farmers and that these small
farmers will survive without governmental intervention.223
The EU, under tremendous pressure from the WTO and the united group of LDCs
has made several attempts at CAP reform that would eliminate many of their agricultural
price supports. In 1987, prior to MacSharry, the EU was engaged in two negotiations to
reform agricultural policy. At the international level, the GATT Uruguay Round of
agricultural negotiations was underway, and at the EU level, the CAP reform negotiations
221

Bilefsky, 2005.
EU-25 Sugar and Sweetener Policy Reform, 2006.
223
WTO. 1999. The original mandate.
222

124

were in full force. Although the negotiations were independent of one another, they were
both designed to deal with agricultural overproduction and the unsustainable budgets of
the 1980s that resulted from the poor EU and US planning of the 1960s and 1970s. The
Uruguay Round of negotiations between 1986 and 1994 was productive but not
considered successful, nor was the Singapore Round in 1996, the Cancun Round in 2003,
or the Doha Round, ongoing from 2001 to the present. An important factor in the failure
of these negotiations has been the EU‘s posturing, both individually and collectively.224
The EU could have been the driving force in the success of these negotiations had
it not continued to attempt to extract concessions from developing countries, which were
not in a position to deal at arm‘s length, and by its desire to extort reciprocal concessions
on agriculture from the United States. The EU‘s inability to change its historic
negotiating position has played a large role in preventing the world from reaching
multilateral agreements in the area of agriculture, and has delayed the WTO agreement
by several decades.225 The EU‘s ongoing agricultural reform plan is concentrated around
the grain sector because of its central role in European agricultural production, incomes,
and exports.226 As one can see, there have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to
reform the program during the 1990s and 2000s.227 Part of the problem is the EU‘s
reluctance to address the problem for what it is. Instead of directly confronting the
subsidy/antisubsidy debate, the EU has instead directed its attention to renaming and
camouflaging subsidies that continue to drain the Union‘s bank account.228 In addition to
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crop subsidies and import tariffs, there is a third number in the formula, and that applies
to export subsidies. Without some form of subsidy, the higher internal prices would make
it impossible to sell surplus grain on the world market. The farm crop subsidies represent
only about one third of the total producer support estimate (PSE) in OECD countries. A
much larger subsidy expenditure is the market price support (MPS) system. The MPS is
an estimate based on the difference between the internal price and a market price for a
given commodity. Since there are many market prices in the world market, the OECD
arbitrarily selects what they believe to be the most competitive one and then compares it
to the lowest price among the EU exporting countries.229 But market price support, in
itself, does not lead to the export of products at prices below the cost of production. Small
farmers are not usually exporters; therefore, export measures have little effect on them.
Agricultural export markets are usually the realm of a small number of large traders.
These traders control both sides of the market as buyer and seller. As large-volume
buyers, they can influence local producer prices, forcing them down to their lowest level,
and as large-volume sellers on the world market, they possess the power to push prices
upward. Internal price supports insulate nations from large price swings to a degree;
however, the price for this insulation is high. EU subsidies are applied not to all products
of farmers, but to what it considers to be the most important products of the big
cooperatives and the food industry. For example, there is no support for milk from
farmers, but there is support for butter, skim milk powder, and cheese from the dairy
industry; there is no support for cereals at the farm production stage, but there is support
for big volumes of cereals for the cereal wholesalers. Although the support programs
229
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were designed to protect the small farmer, the food industry and the big cooperatives are
benefiting from the support system, and family farms are benefiting less.230 Likewise,
export subsidies go not to farmers, but to the food industry. Export subsidies were
installed not to support farmers—for by 1988 farmers were producing more than they
could use—but in order to dismantle the massive surpluses. In 1988 these subsidies
amounted to almost $12 billion euros, declining to around 7 million euros in 2003. Export
subsidies are counterproductive in that they have no purpose other than to artificially
force down export prices of EU products to a level that is often below world market
levels.231 It is a catch-22 situation. Farm subsidies are paid to farm cooperatives to raise
the farm income above the world market, and export subsidies are paid to force the price
back down to market value. It is a never-ending circle in that export subsidies must be
continued so long as subsidized internal prices for agricultural raw materials are higher
than world market prices. None of this has much to do with Europe‘s small farmers, but
is highly beneficial to the large farm coops. For example, in Great Britain the royal
family, as a large landholder, benefits from farm subsidies. The figures show that the
Queen received more than 769,000 pounds in EU farm subsidies in 2003–2004, while
Prince Charles benefited from around 300,000 pounds in agricultural payments to his
personal estate in Cornwall.232 The English population is taxed to support a program
designed to help the small farmer survive, and the Royal Family is included as a
beneficiary of this program.

230

Wiggerthale, 2005.
Ibid..
232
FOIA, 2005.
231

127

As pointed out earlier, a series of suggested reforms have proven to be more
symbolic than functional. Although many have been placed on the world dais, few have
contained substance, and many simply went by the wayside. For example:
1992: Direct payments and set-aside introduced and later discontinued
1995: Rural development aid phased in and then changed
2002: Subsidy ceiling frozen until 2013 with options
2003: Subsidies decoupled from production levels and made dependent on
animal welfare and environmental protection
2005: Sugar reform introduced and then tabled.233
Conclusion
The cross case comparison of the U.S. and the EU reflects a similar history born
of necessity. The large numbers of small farmers for whom the programs were intended
no longer exist and the benefits are now divided between large agribusiness concerns on
both sides of the Atlantic who, in most cases, would continue to prosper without these
price supports. The cost to consumers continues during times of economic slow down and
recession even as small farms decline and large farms increase in number. Over the
decades since the beginning of agricultural support programs in the 1930s and 40s,
political morass and large farm lobbies have kept these programs in place, changed in
name only, and unvarying in content. Nine years of negotiations within the WTO Doha
round of trade talks have produces little compromise, but has focused the light of
revelation on these unsustainable protectionism policies.
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CHAPTER IV
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Introduction
Enter the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO has attempted to
accomplish something from the outside that individual nations have failed to do
internally. Although the WTO has not been able to accomplish all of its goals, its
achievements have been a resounding success in every area with the exception of
agriculture. The WTO‘s Doha Round of agricultural trade negotiations has repeatedly
broken down as a result of the political and economic inability of developed countries to
reduce agricultural tariffs and price supports from within. With the WTO at a standstill,
the world‘s nations have substituted additional bilateral agreements in place of WTOsponsored multilateral agreements. The WTO holds the developed nations responsible for
this shift, and claims that these agreements might eventually undermine its authority and
stature.
The WTO vision is to create a free market among the nations of the world, where
every nation can trade with one another at arm‘s length, equally, without regard to size or
economic power. The vehicle for this transition is multilateral agreements that apply to
every member equally. In words that still hold true more than 30 years after they were
first written in the 1975 Rambouillet Declaration, the G7 stated:
We seek to restore growth in the volume of world trade. Growth and price
stability will be fostered by maintenance of an open trading system. In a period
where pressures are developing for a return to protectionism, it is essential . . . to
avoid resorting to measures by which they could try to solve their problems at the
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expense of others, with damaging consequences in the economic, social, and
political fields.234
This case study will outline the progress of the WTO as it attempts to bring the
countries of the world together under a common set of agricultural agreements. It will
revisit the extraneous variable of political interference that once again prevents progress
from taking its logical course as the WTO experiences the difficulty of harnessing outside
political influence while it faces the challenge of encouraging its member nations to
focus on a common goal that all agree is in the worlds best interest. It begins with the
history of the WTO and progresses through the first Uruguay round of negotiations in
1986 to the present day Doha stalemate. It will discuss the oscillating position of the US
and the EU, the difficulty of reaching equitable agreements between nations accustomed
to negotiating preferentially, and the limited negotiating skills of developing nations.
While the WTO continues to level the playing field by establishing rules on what
products should have tariffs and determining their life span, it faces the seemingly
impossible task of codifying these rules into a format that is acceptable to all members.
This section will address the WTO‘s admission that one set of rules that will apply to all
is not feasible, and chronicle the painstaking process of analyzing the needs of each
nation. The conclusion deals with the WTO‘s direction to its membership on how it must
deal with those developing nations that have not yet become a viable part of the world
trade system.
On two occasions in the past 100 years, the United States has found itself in a
position of dominance among nations in financial chaos. Isolationism and nationalism
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prevailed after World War I and again during the Great Depression. Difficult economic
times have always been the breeding grounds for tariffs and protectionism. America took
a defensive stance, and passed the Tariff Acts of the 1920s and the Smoot-Hawley tariffs
of the 1930s, which had the reverse effect of improving the economy while actually
curtailing internal growth and precluding any possibility of war-debt repayment.235
The end of World War II provided the second occurrence of economic
dominance, or another opportunity to reduce tariffs and increase world trade; however, as
a result of the war, America was the only economy left intact and therefore the only
nation still producing export products. US leaders came to the realization that if the
nations of the world were to survive economically, it would be up to the United States to
provide the forum for that survival, and it did just that, in the form of the Bretton Woods
meetings. At these meetings, 44 nations formally established the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, and eventually in 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).236
GATT was originally intended to be a temporary organization designed to handle
trade issues while the United Nations International Trade Organization (ITO) developed
its own organization. When the ITO failed, GATT inherited responsibility for world trade
agreements and regulations, and remained at the reins for the next fifty years. GATT was
never more than an informal organization of nations that operated on gentlemen‘s
agreements. It did, however, father the ―Most Favored Nation‖ (MFN) concept,237 which
operated on the premise that every member was entitled to the same trade agreements that
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were applied to any other member. The organization‘s weak spots were that, with the
exception of Japan, its members were strictly from Western countries, and since it was a
loose organization based on handshake agreements, it had little enforcement power.
When a nation was accused of violating an agreement, it could easily subvert the panel
hearing or veto the findings if they were not favorable. GATT was also limited in its
scope. It did not address trade in services, intellectual property rights, or trade-related
foreign investments.238 Considering its limitations, GATT enjoyed a successful reign as
organizer and mediator of trade agreements, and in securing the liberalization of much of
the world trade over the next 47 years. Its first round of negotiations resulted in 45,000
tariff concessions affecting $10 billion or about one-fifth of world trade.239
Even so, it was obvious to most that serious changes must be made if it was to
remain effective in the future. By the late 1970s and early 1980s it became apparent that
GATT had fallen behind. It had not advanced at the same rate as world trade, and the
decisions it had made in the 1940s were no longer relevant in the 1980s.
Over a period of years, those involved in GATT had formulated a wish list of
what the organization needed in order to be more effective in the changing economic
world. During the Uruguay Round of trade dialogue and after eight years of
collaboration, members negotiated the ―Marrakech Protocol to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994‖ which codified the entity known as the World Trade
Organization (WTO).240
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The establishment of the WTO became the break point in international trade
regulation. This was the first time that nations had attempted to democratically regulate
virtually all aspects of trade between nations in a way that included both regulatory and
judicial authority. Although the agreement fills 500 pages, the first four paragraphs fully
define the direction the WTO was to take:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world‘s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to
ensure that developing countries and especially the least developed among them,
secure a share in growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development.
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.
Resolved therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts and all of the results of the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiation, determined to preserve the basic
principles and to further the objectives underlying this multilateral trading
system.241
It is rare for a governmental or international agency to successfully reorganize
itself. The WTO is a classic example of how an organization can morph into a bigger and
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more effective entity while maintaining the same management organization. Among the
principal differences between GATT and the WTO are the following:
1. The GATT was a set of rules for multilateral agreements, built on a
weak institutional foundation, while the WTO is a permanent institution with its
own

secretariat.
2. The GATT was applied on a provisional basis, while the WTO‘s

commitments are permanent.
3. The GATT rules applied to trade primarily in merchandise goods,
whereas the

WTO is all-inclusive in that it covers trade in products, services

and trade related

aspects of intellectual property.

While GATT had always focused on multilateral agreements between all
members, by the 1980s it had pursued many bilateral agreements when it appeared that
multilateral agreements might be impossible. This defied the original goal of a common
market between all members. However, the percentage of multilateral agreements of the
WTO is much higher than those of GATT and therefore encourages commitments for the
entire membership.242
As of April 2008, the WTO had 152 members plus 30 observing governments
waiting to be accepted, and governed roughly 97 percent of global trade.243
Strengths and Weaknesses
The WTO membership is made up of most of the countries of the world, and
operates on the basis of a somewhat more democratic system than the United Nations in
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that it is a one-country/one-vote organization without being hamstrung by ―permanent
member‖ veto powers. This allows developing countries to have a somewhat more equal
voice, and a greater opportunity for true multilateral agreements that benefit all parties. It
is made up of a General Council, a Trade Policy Review Body, and a Dispute Settlement
Body. There is also a Council for Trade in Goods, a Council for Trade in Services, and a
Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
However, where the WTO may show signs of undemocratic behavior is in
possible under representation of the interests of poorer countries (roughly 75% of the
members). Even though each member has an equal vote, the United States and the EU
have a much greater influence on the outcome of agreements than any other country
simply as a result of the negotiating process. The WTO uses the Most Favored Nation
rule in combination with principal supplier negotiations to organize talks. Simply stated,
this means that the leading principal supplier of a product negotiates with the principal
purchaser. Whatever agreement they come to is extended to include all other members:
Any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for
the countries of the other contracting parties.244
In reality what these rules mean is that the same large trading countries do all of
the negotiations and apply the agreement to the other members even though those
members were not involved in the actual bargaining. The argument for this system is that
since the United States and the EU account for roughly two-fifths of world trade, they
will be affected most by the outcome; therefore, they should do the negotiating. Almost
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all WTO negotiations include the EU on one side and the United States on the other.245
Rarely are LDCs principal suppliers, or purchasers involved in the negotiating process.
One of the most dramatic improvements of the WTO over GATT is the Dispute
Resolution Body. If a member feels that there has been a violation, it can request that a
Dispute Settlement Panel be organized. These panel members are selected from a pool of
so-called qualified experts. They are allowed to reach their conclusions based on
evidence presented by interested parties, without lobbyist or interested government
interference. The WTO also has the authority to authorize sanctions against the guilty
party.246
If there is a weakness in the system it is that the WTO does not have an adequate
oversight mechanism. It lacks mechanisms for public accountability or participation. The
decisions are made behind closed doors; therefore, it is not required to discuss the process
by which it reaches its decisions or to release documents until after its decisions have
been made. It has been argued by WTO critics that dispute-resolution procedures should
be no different from any other court of inquiry and that they should be open to the
public.247 They argue that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should also be
involved in the process and that they should be allowed to contribute opinion and
suggestions to the deliberations just as they are allowed to observe UN meetings.248
Although the WTO has been reluctant to include NGOs in their negotiating
sessions, they have made an effort to introduce oversight measures into these proceedings
by introducing the ―Friends of the Chair,‖ which allows LDCs into the WTO decision-
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making ―Green Room‖ where decisions and compromises are worked out. The idea was
to neutralize the concept that the meetings were secret closed decision-making forums
that catered to large industrialized countries to the detriment of smaller nations, and to
demonstrate that the decision making is by open cooperative consensus.249
Another prominent weakness of the Dispute Resolution Body that was carried
over from the GATT is its inability to effectively enforce its conflict-resolution decisions.
On finding a violation, its only recourse is to allow the injured party to initiate counter
sanctions, which are actually a reversion to the very sequence of events they are
attempting to eradicate.250 The WTO has urged member nations to create individual trade
legislation to match international standards, where possible, similar to those codified by
the UN. This would allow the WTO Dispute Resolution Body to make rulings that would
be in concert with both a country‘s national law and WTO rules. For example, if one
nation set a higher standard on health or food safety than the international norms, a
country with a lower standard could challenge the law as an impediment to trade
providing that it fell within its law and WTO rules. The argument against this is that no
international organization should be able to challenge a nation‘s laws on the grounds that
they are too stringent. If all nations are required to change their laws to meet the WTO
rules, then some nations will have to lower their standards.251
The WTO system is still far better than anything that has preceded it. There are
always those who believe that external enforcement powers represent an unhealthy shift
of power from locally elected officials to unelected bureaucrats. However, most WTO
hierarchy agree that these fears are unfounded. Membership in the WTO should not be,
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and is not a surrender of a significant extent of a member state‘s national sovereignty.
The WTO and its settlement procedures are nothing more than a contract organization
that arbitrates disputes among its members on the basis of rules that all have previously
agreed to follow, and every member has the power to veto any agreement of which it
disapproves.
Any organization made up of members from differing cultures and governing
preferences will disagree from time to time. During the Seattle Round of negotiations in
1999, there were mass protests by the ―anti-globalization coalition‖ with claims that
international trade and investment are ―lose-lose‖ propositions. They protested that lowwage workers in developing countries would gain employment at the expense of
developed nation workers. They also posited that increased trade with the West would
lead to exploitation and continued poverty of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and
that little or no effort would be made to improve those economies. One of the major
claims of the protesters was that the WTO was undemocratic in that the government was
appointed rather than elected, therefore eliminating the ability of the people to change
management. 252 However the two previous CATO ―Report Cards‖ found that when
markets are opened it is beneficial for the economies of all parties. It also found that so
long as there is freedom of choice, the rules governing world trade do not infringe on
national sovereignty. There is no evidence of a labor ―race to the bottom‖ in developing
countries, and increased trade in developing countries has been tremendously influential
in increasing wages and improving working conditions. To the contrary, globalization has
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made it possible for more people to lift themselves out of poverty more quickly than ever
before in the history of the world.253
In answer to the critics‘ claim that the WTO and the industrialized nations have
no interest in improving economic conditions in developing countries, the WTO set
―Millennium Development Goals‖ for each of the LDCs to be reached by 2005. Even
though only a few of the countries involved actually reached their goals, the date really
means nothing; the idea is valid in that the trade negotiations are directed toward each
country individually in order to reach agreements on individual countries trade
barriers.254
The WTO is in a position to bring the needs of both sides to the table. It is also in
a position to educate both sides on the fallacy of protectionism through agricultural
subsidies and the probabilities of short-term unemployment as a result of lifting those
tariffs and subsidies. During the Doha Round of the WTO in November, 2001, the
organization addressed the issue of antidumping rules, and their effect on the poor
nations, and promised to include negotiations on reducing barriers to free trade in farm
products and services. The object of the WTO negotiations was to improve the rules
while at the same time bringing to light the illogical aspect of product protection and
subsidies. Initially, the agricultural portion of the agreement did little to address the
problem of export dumping, which is undermining food security and food sovereignty
worldwide to the benefit of multinational agribusiness companies.
The WTO is very much aware that millions of farmers across the world sell their
goods in local, regional, and world markets. Yet, as a result of dumping practices,
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farmers in developing countries that are members of the WTO continue to compete with
artificial low prices, lost market shares, and unfair competition. The overriding argument
of the WTO is that multilateral trade agreements would force all nations to trade on the
open market, which would correct many of the poverty problems of the LDCs.
The United States was the founding father of the WTO, and has spearheaded the
elimination of tariffs, and the development of a democratic free market. However, the
irony of it all is that the United States and its closest rival for world exports, the EU, are
the two biggest offenders when it comes to price supports of agriculture products and the
eventual dumping of these surplus products on the world market. For example, the EU
sugar regime is one of the most powerful examples of product support and dumping.
Mozambique is one of the poorest nations in the world. Roughly 80 percent of its
people are farmers, and sugar is their major crop. Over the years they have become one of
the world‘s most efficient producers of sugar. The EU is also a major sugar producer, and
the second largest sugar exporter in the world, with exports in 2001 of over one million
tons to Algeria and Nigeria alone (the Mozambique market). However, it is also one of
the highest-cost producers. It remains a major exporter only because it subsidizes its
growers and exporters. The World Bank estimated that these subsidies have caused the
world sugar market to fall by 17 percent, forcing Mozambique and other growers out of
the market.255
The EU maintains a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with a budget of over
$46 billion, almost half the EU budget.256 The original idea of preventing food shortages
by developing a stable market and providing incentives to increase production has created
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an oversupply situation. Subsidies that promote overproduction also promote dumping
practices as a by-product. Farmers that have been subsidized by as much as 75 percent of
the world market price can easily sell their products below the cost of other countries‘
production.257 The United States is no better. When GATT was formed, the United States
demanded that farm trade be excluded from tariff reductions. Ironically, today American
farmers still claim that unfair subsidies in Europe undermine their competitiveness in the
world market.
The WTO has an unparalleled success record in every section of international
trade with the exception of agriculture. It was forced to take a hands-off position on
agricultural agreements in its early years as a world negotiating institution. During that
period, the WTO addressed international trade in every area of commerce, with the
exception of agriculture. This changed in January of 2000, with the beginning of the
Doha Round of negotiations, which was to deal exclusively with agriculture and
agriculture-related items. The inclusion of agriculture in WTO negotiations came with the
realization that all nations recognized that agricultural reform was no longer an option.
Although each nation understood that these price supports could not continue
indefinitely, they had also come to realize that they had no power to make these changes
internally. History, political immobility and personal greed were the international
roadblocks to success. If change were to come, it must find its impetus in a higher power.
The WTO provided the forum for change in an arena beyond the internal obstructions of
local government. The organization launched the current round of negotiations, the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) or, ―Doha Round,‖ at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in
Doha Qatar in November 2001. The Doha Round may have been an overambitious effort
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to make globalization more inclusive and to help the world‘s poor, by eliminating or
drastically reducing developed countries‘ trade barriers and farm subsidies, but it was
also a beginning. The talks have been highly charged and an agreement has not yet been
reached, despite the intense negotiations at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Hong
Kong in December 2005, and the Seventh Ministerial Conference in Geneva from July
2006 through July 2008.At the end of the Geneva conference, the WTO‘s DirectorGeneral, in frustration, formally suspended the negotiations and reorganized his resources
for a new start.
Formal negotiations for more liberalization of trade in farm and industrial goods
collapsed when the Group of Six, which included the United States, the EU, Japan, and
India, failed to reach an agreement on reductions in farm subsidies and tariffs, which the
WTO holds to be critical in their quest to include underdeveloped countries in
international trade. While the United States and the EU were either unwilling or unable to
make significant concessions on farm subsidies, the developing countries organized
themselves into the G-20, and were just as inflexible in their demands as were the G-6.
As noted in chapters 1 and 2, there is really no choice but to eliminate these agricultural
barriers. It is no longer a matter of whether it will happen, but of when. The question
becomes why has it taken so long, and why can these countries not come to closure when
they are in agreement that changes must be made and there is a formal and neutral
organization ready and willing to put the agreements together?
The partial answer is that all are to blame, including the WTO, which has taken
the position of ―Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, and it must be approved by
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all members.‖258 Although the WTO has been extremely successful in all other areas of
trade, the organization has been powerless to force both rich and poor nations to deal in
the area of agriculture, which is often held to be sacred and untouchable. The decision
that the WTO wants these nations to make may be inevitable, but it must happen in their
own time.
Throughout the negotiations, developing countries have been frustrated with what
the WTO refers to as the hypocrisy of the US and European governments, which push for
equal market access while attempting to negotiate one-sided agreements that protect their
own agricultural sectors through continued tariffs and crop supports. The truth is that
both the developed and the developing countries use the same agricultural tariffs, and
neither side is willing to make the first move. One of the obstacles is the WTO‘s
overzealous desire to promote mutually beneficial international trade. Although the cause
is a noble one and beyond the reach of logical argument, it is grandiose in nature, and the
cause might be better served by more attainable short-term goals. The G-20 claims that
those rich nations who argue for trade liberalization in kind with developing countries
completely fail to understand the poverty and character of millions of poor farmers in
developing countries who live in remote areas with very little or no infrastructure, lack
access to education, own little or no land, lack access to credit and market information,
and generally are at the mercy of those countries that possess these attributes at the
negotiating table. It also argues that without protective measures, these poor people not
only will be unable to take advantage of new market opportunities, but their food security
and livelihoods will be put at risk. In essence, a level playing field, out of necessity,
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cannot be perfectly level, and must actually be slightly tilted in favor of the developing
nations.
The second obstacle is the internal structure of the WTO itself. The sheer volume
of information it produces is sometimes overwhelming. After the information has been
processed, and agreements drawn up, they must then be approved by the entire WTO
membership. The very essence of negotiating and bargaining renders total agreement on
any issue a time-consuming task and, more often, an impossible one. WTO agreements
sometimes take10 years or more to complete. As the WTO negotiations become more
complex, so does the infrastructure of the WTO itself, which creates even more obstacles.
Until 1995, GATT was highly successful in most areas of international trade, but
its efforts were largely ineffective in negotiations concerning key aspects of agricultural
trade. GATT found the subject of agriculture to be so large and complicated that it could
not come to grips with it without first breaking it into its separate parts. For example,
production subsidies, import tariffs, and export support were independent of one another
and had to be treated as individual problems and not as a single entity. The 1986–1994
Uruguay Round negotiations recognized the situation early on and devised separate areas
of negotiation for each area. All aspects of agriculture trade are now firmly within the
WTO multilateral trading negotiations. The original WTO Agriculture Agreements, made
by the member states, were significant first steps toward agricultural reform, but reform
has been extremely slow, and even the goals themselves have taken years to establish.259
The reform goals were designed to strike a balance between agricultural trade
liberalization and the WTO‘s desire to pursue agricultural policy that would benefit both
developed and developing nations. The original idea was, and still is, to bring all
259
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agricultural products under the same type of multilateral rules that apply to all other
forms of trade.
Nations have agreed to multilateral agreements in all other areas of trade
including the manufacturing of steel and other goods which include clothing, intellectual
property, and international services. Now, for the first time, member governments are
committed to reducing agricultural export subsidies and trade-distorting crop-support
payments. In addition, they have agreed that those who receive farm support should be
treated no differently than any other industry, and have agreed to agree on reform that
will eventually eliminate these supports. These commitments are unique to the
agricultural sector, which in the past has held itself to be immune to reform.
History of the Negotiations
The overriding question is: if all nations agree that most nations‘ farmers no
longer need these supports, and agree that revisions must be made, and that it will benefit
all involved, then why have the negotiations been prolonged over a period of 10 years,
with little progress? The answer lies in the record of the negotiations as outlined below.
Phase one of the Uruguay Round of negotiations attempted to set up a framework
of rules that would reduce agricultural protectionism and trade-distorting support
payments. To simply set up a framework of rules sounds simple enough. Article 20 of the
Agriculture Agreement directed members to start negotiations on reform rules at the end
of 1999. Ten years later, those negotiations are still underway.260
In light of the lack of progress, the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration,
a new commitment to make the goals more explicit was mandated, and deadlines were
established for each of the subsequent meetings. These negotiations became difficult and
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far-reaching because of the wide range of views and interests among member
governments, as each country attempted to protect its own turf while the WTO attempted
to keep everyone focused on the further liberalization of agricultural trade. It was the
hope of the WTO then, and is now, that liberalization would benefit those countries that
could compete on quality and price rather than on the size of their subsidies. That is
particularly the case for many developing countries whose economies depend on primary
agricultural products that they export to a variety of markets, including both developed
and other developing countries.
The objective was continued reductions of agricultural restrictions and a more
level playing field. The WTO was and is looking for substantial reductions in tariffs,
domestic support, and export subsidies in these negotiations. In essence, it would like to
bring agricultural trade under the same rules and disciplines as trade in other goods. One
of the hurdles that must be overcome is the conceptual differences, marked by the
importance that individual members attach to the major issues in the negotiations. Some
countries have described Article 20 as a ―tripod‖ whose three legs are export subsidies,
domestic support, and market access, sometimes referred to as ―the three pillars‖ of
agricultural trade reform. Others referred to Article 20 as a ―pentangle‖ whose five sides
also included nontrade concerns and special and differential treatment for developing
countries as separate issues in their own right.261The negotiations that were designed to
be completed within a reasonable period of time are now in their ninth year, but under the
reformulated mandate of the Doha Declaration that ministers issued in Doha, Qatar, in
November 2001.262
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This running commentary, taken from WTO proceedings, will follow the
monumental and, up to now, seemingly impossible task of getting over 90 percent of the
nations in the world to agree on what is fair and right. As some predicted, negotiators
began missing the deadlines at once, and also missed the March 31, 2003, deadline for
producing targets, deadlines, formulas, and other rules that member countries had
committed to. A revised draft of a ―modalities‖ (rules) paper was put on the negotiating
table on March 2003, and although it was not agreed on, it was incorporated into the
discussions to be used in subsequent months. A number of framework proposals dealing
with the rules parameters were submitted and discussed before and during the Fifth
Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003, but it was not
until August 1, 2004, that even the parameters could be agreed on.263
The next stage was to agree on full modalities, which would in turn be used to
define the agreements between the member nations. The Doha Declaration had planned
that countries would submit individual drafts, based on the agreed-upon rules. To assist
the negotiations, the WTO Secretariat produced 22 background papers through 2004, at
the request of members. Most of these can be found in the G/AG/NG/S series of official
documents.264 As the date for the Cancún Ministerial Conference drew near without a
consensus on rules, this target was not met either. With little progress made, the deadline
for completing the negotiations, January 1, 2005, was postponed on August1, 2004, and
no new date was set.265 The point of the above commentary is to emphasize that the
nearly impossible task of all countries reaching agreement on even the issue of modalities
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was a frustrating and time-consuming experience. To reach an actual agreement would
prove to be nearly impossible.
The Negotiating Process
Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement specifies that WTO members must
negotiate to continue the reform of agricultural trade:

Recognizing that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in
support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process,
Members agree that negotiations for continuing the process will be initiated one
year before the end of the implementation period, taking into account:
a) the experience to that date from implementing the reduction
commitments;
b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture;
c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developingcountry Members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented
agricultural trading system, and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in
the preamble to this Agreement; and
d) what further commitments are necessary to achieve the above
mentioned long-term objectives.266
The direction of the reform was clearly set out in the article ―substantial
progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform.‖267The
first meeting began in early 2000 and concluded with a meeting on March 27, 2001. This
meeting consisted of 126 member states out of the 142 members. Those present
submitted 45 proposals, and had six negotiating meetings of the Agriculture Committee.
In spite of the enthusiastic participation, this first meeting made little progress, and
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consisted of individual countries submitting proposals representing their personal starting
positions for the rest of the negotiations.268
The proposals received in this phase covered all major areas of the agriculture
negotiations. Proposals from the United States and the EU dealt with the big picture in
that they covered the entire range of international agricultural subjects, while the majority
of the other countries presented proposals that dealt with subjects specific to their
interests.269 The challenge then became one of reducing the myriad proposals to a
manageable number of issues that could be debated in an arena of common interest.
In the second phase, the members agreed on a work schedule. It set a timetable for
the six informal meetings in May, July, September, and December 2001, and February
2002. In this phase, the discussions attempted to bring the subjects under a common
umbrella by inserting more technical details into the proposals. This was necessary in
order to find a way to allow members to develop specific proposals that were applicable
multilaterally. Despite the fear that increased complexity and objections to personal
projects would discourage developing countries, they continued to participate actively in
the process. In November 2001, the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in
Doha, Qatar. The Doha declaration issued on November 14, 2001, was designed to
continue negotiations already underway in agriculture with added impetus on establishing
rules and guidelines that could be followed throughout the negotiations.
The Doha mandate From the Doha Ministerial Declaration, November 2001, states the
following:
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13. We recognize the work already undertaken in the negotiations initiated in
early 2000 under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including the large
number of negotiating proposals submitted on behalf of a total of 121 members.
We recall the long-term objective referred to in the Agreement to establish a fair
and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental reform
encompassing strengthened rules and specific commitments on support and
protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets. We reconfirm our commitment to this programme. Building
on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the outcome of the
negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at:
substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support. We agree that special and differential treatment for developing
countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be
embodied in the schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in
the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to
enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development
needs, including food security and rural development. We take note of the nontrade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by Members and
confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as
provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture.
14. Modalities for the further commitments, including provisions for special and
differential treatment, shall be established no later than 31 March 2003.
Participants shall submit their comprehensive draft Schedules based on these
modalities no later than the date of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference. The negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines and
related legal texts, shall be concluded as part and at the date of conclusion of the
negotiating agenda as a whole.270
The declaration built on the work already undertaken in the agriculture
negotiations. It confirmed former objectives, elaborated on procedures that would reach
those goals, and set more timetables for reaching these objectives. Agriculture was now
part of the overall multilateral agreement system that encompassed all other areas of
international trade.
The message to the member nations was that they should commit themselves to
negotiations that would benefit the entire membership, while refraining from imposing
270
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individual demands that would prevent the other members from reaching agreement.
They were to concentrate their efforts on the reduction of exports subsidies, domestic
farm support programs, and any and all other programs that distort trade.
For the first time, the declaration addressed the special problems facing
developing countries, and the difficulties that some of the nations might have with
multilateral agreements. The declaration included several new non-trade issues
concerning the international community, such as environmental concerns and future rural
development that would result from reduced or discontinued farm-support programs.
Originally designed as a twelve-month program that would deal primarily with planning
and rules agreements, the Doha Ministerial Declaration was nevertheless focused on
international market access, elimination of export subsidies, and substantial reductions
over production through domestic support systems.271
The ―modalities‖ were designed for members to produce their first offers or
―comprehensive draft commitments.‖ The Doha Ministerial Declaration took place in
November of 2001, and already had some history of what to expect when the
membership was called on to make important decisions. With this in mind, it was
determined that members would be asked to produce their first comprehensive draft
commitments at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, Mexico, September 2003.
That would give them almost two years to work out their original plans for reformation.
Cancún 2003
The Cancún Ministerial Conference in Geneva on September 11–14, 2003, was to
be the event that brought agriculture and the other Doha Agenda issues together. There
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were approximately 30 ministers present prepared to meet in formal and informal
negotiations hosted by various governmental groups.272 Cancún set an important
precedent in international compromise when members began to show some keenness to
finally move away from their original self-serving positions toward a more central
position that might eventually lead to forming a multilateral agreement. Although many
of these compromises were small, they represented a willingness to put self-indulgence
aside for the benefit of the other members. Although it was a first step, in most cases it
was not enough to satisfy most members to the point of actually reaching an agreement.
Many felt that the membership was hesitant to make the first move until one of
the superpowers took a definitive lead. This occurred at Cancun when the EU and the
United States reached an agreement on policy as part of the EU CAP reform. This was
well received by the membership, and it encouraged the two powers to continue the
leadership role.
In an effort to jump-start the process, the United States and the EU decided to
limit their deliberations to one or two important issues. If they could garner a consensus
from the membership on a few select subjects, it could prove to the members that
progress was in fact being made, and small bites might be easier than attempting to digest
everything a once. The agreement was completed and presented to the membership
on August 13. Although it was narrow in scope, as planned, and deliberately left blanks
to be filled in later for the amount of tariffs and embargos to be reduced, the members
were still unable to come to grips with it. While the question of how the agreement would
be applied to developing countries was left open for those nations to make their own
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proposals, an agreement still could not be reached.273 Although the issue was not passed,
the initial attempt by the United States and the EU received a positive response by the
membership, who presented six alternative proposals over the next week. The common
cause agreement was the beginning of the G-20, a coalition of 20 developing countries.
Other drafts from Central America, Japan, Switzerland, the Republic of Korea, Norway,
and Kenya were also presented. Although most believed that the agreement proposals
were a success as a result of the diversity of the nations involved, there was still evidence
that some nations continued to present propositions that addressed only their own
personal agenda, which once again contributed to the failure of the proposals.274
In addition to the failure of the member nations to reach an agreement on new
issues presented in Cancun, there were also carry-over issues that failed to be resolved.
Although it was now 2003, some members were still not in agreement on issues brought
forward at the Singapore conference in 1996. These included aspects of investment,
competition policy, transparency in governmental procurement, and areas of trade
policy.275 At the conclusion of the Cancun Round of negotiations the WTO declared that
there was strong evidence that the member nations had a renewed desire to continue to
build on their recent success. As 2004 approached, the WTO declared that they would
continue work on the framework of the overall agreement and would reserve the
modalities for a later date.276
In spite of the WTO claims that progress was being made, members once more
failed to meet the March 2003 deadline for agreeing on modalities; nor were they able to
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present their draft commitments by September 2003. At this stage in the negotiations, the
Doha Round had been in effect for four years, and the membership still had not agreed on
the rules of the road. It was originally thought that before the process could arrive at a
work schedule, the program for preparing the modalities had to be agreed on. After a
series of consultations that produced the necessary consensus, a partial agreement was
finally reached on August 1, 2004, where it was agreed that the framework should come
first. The entire negotiating process had been derailed because of the idea that the
modalities should be worked out first. Meetings that had been scheduled were cancelled
or postponed, and informal meetings of all WTO members were held to report on where
the roadblocks were, and how they could be corrected. All negotiations were pushed
back, and meetings rescheduled.
The new guidelines for the rules began by adding special treatment for developing
countries to the three pillars: export subsidies, market access, and domestic support. As a
result of the formation of the G-20 a change in direction from strictly multilateral
agreements to multilateral with ―exceptions‖ was designed to bring developing countries
into the voting process. It was suggested that the first set of the future 2004 meetings
would cover the export side: subsidies, competition, taxes, and restrictions. These were to
be informal meetings calculated to direct the focus of the members toward the items to be
discussed in the formal special sessions that came later. If successful, the same process
would be used during the market access and domestic support conferences. The informal
meetings, prior to the formal special sessions, were deliberately designed to allow
members to vent their positions on nonscheduled items before they entered the formal
sessions.
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Chairperson Stuart Harbinson said, ―the discussion on all three pillars of the 2003
meetings added to the depth of knowledge and understanding of the various positions.‖
But he noted that delegations tended to repeat existing maximal positions in key areas, in
some cases with a continuing lack of specificity, for example: ―the lack of figures in
some proposals.‖ This, he said, is ―not particularly helpful from the point of view of
drafting the ‗overview paper‘ towards the end of the year.‖ But, he added, ―the
negotiators still have a bit more time, including stock-taking meetings scheduled for
November (of 2003).‖277 ―The time has now come to change gears,‖ he said. ―We have
prepared assiduously over the last two and a half years. The clock is now running fast and
the critical period is upon us. We do not have much time in hand if we are to meet the
deadlines of 18 December for the ‗Overview Paper‘ and 31 March for establishing
modalities. In the process we must also change our mindset. We need a more creative
approach in which participants start looking actively for compromises and for ways to
bridge gaps.‖278 ―Common ground exists,‖ he said, ―but in critical areas much more
flexibility is needed. I therefore, urge you all to reflect deeply and urgently on what your
delegation can contribute in order to bring this exercise to a conclusion acceptable to all
by the end of next March.‖279
This was neither the first nor the last time that Harbinson would deliver this
message. Once again, by the November stock-taking meeting some of the members still
had not produced contingency plans for reducing export subsidies, domestic support, and
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tariffs. Given that all of the agreements had to be approved by all the members, any
member who failed to present a proposal for approval could hold up the entire process
The failure to produce the documents on time, was more than likely not due to a
lack of effort on the part of the members. During the preceding three years, members
continued to negotiate nonstop despite the missed deadlines. As the negotiations
continued, it became apparent that some of the missed deadlines were the result of
misdirection by some member governments which continued to play the same political
game that had dominated previous negotiations, while others were simply inept at
presenting proposals at the level required. After missing the March 31 deadline,
Harbinson told delegations that the failure to meet the deadline was ―certainly a setback.
We must all be disappointed that all our efforts have not come to fruition.‖280
Unfortunately, many negotiators lacked their governments‘ approval to make
decisions without first submitting the agreement to their legislators. Without the ability to
negotiate, the move toward consensus on the main questions was continually delayed. At
a negotiating session at the end of June 2003, Harbinson reminded delegations that they
should negotiate with each other, not with their governments or the chair.281 He went on:
―However, the same could not be said with respect to core issues regarding the modalities
for the further commitments, notwithstanding repeated appeals by the chairman for all
delegations to work on and come forward with solutions that might contribute to the
development of a basis for compromise. In these circumstances, achieving the objective
of establishing modalities as soon as possible has continued to remain elusive. Clearly,
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any modalities established must faithfully reflect the Doha mandate. As matters stand,
collective guidance and decisions are required on a number of key issues in order to clear
the way for reaching this goal.‖282
US Trade Representative Bob Zoellick wrote to WTO ministers on January 11,
2004. His message to them was that negotiations could not continue in a haphazard
manner, with each member using the venue as an opportunity to vent old grievances at
the expense of international progress in the area of agricultural trade. If the members
were to move forward they must work together for a common goal. He suggested
focusing on key areas with the goal of developing a framework by midyear and a WTO
ministerial to be held by the end of the year.283
EU Commissioners Pascal Lamy and Frans Fischler followed up on May 9 with a
letter outlining concessions the EU was willing to make. These included dropping the
potentially destructive Singapore issues if other members would give ground on other
issues. They also suggested that the EU negotiate a date for the end of export subsidies. It
was hoped that a firm date in the future would give members some sense of urgency to
reach agreement before then. 284
By this time in the negotiations, market access had become the subject of
objection. The EU and the United States reintroduced the ―blended formula‖ as a way of
deferring the objections in the negotiations. This had been suggested previously in
August 2003, and suggested that tariffs be divided into three groups: duty-free, reduction
of tariffs by simply averaging all reductions by a certain percent, and the ―Swiss
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Formula,‖ which reduced higher tariffs by greater amounts while getting a maximum
future tariff rate.285 This introduction of the blended formula was designed to divert the
increasingly deadlocked discussions deadlocked to a more palatable agenda.286 Market
access was recognized as an issue that directly affected all members, unlike export
subsidies and domestic support, where only some members could make reduction
commitments. The New Zealand WTO Ambassador Tim Groser observed that part of the
delay was that people were willing to explore others‘ ideas while having little intention of
accepting them. This included the ―tiered approach,‖ which was little more than a
diversion anyway.287 Ten months after the beginning of the Cancún negotiations, the
deadlock was broken. On August 1, 2004, 147 WTO members approved a package of
agreements that included a framework outline to be used to complete the modalities on
agriculture. The breakthrough occurred after member-state delegates negotiated 24 hours
a day for 14 days. The last day of negotiations was a nonstop session that began at 5 p.m.
on July 30, 2004, and ended 24 hours later.288
The Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, in Annex A of the
agreement, gave some idea of what to expect from the next phase of the negotiations. It
achieved exactly what the WTO wanted in that it agreed on key aspects of the modalities
without delving into the operational details. While it agreed on goals and timelines, it did
not spell out the exact formulas or procedures for getting there, nor did it give the exact
numbers to be used to determine how much reform would be achieved. In spite of the
blank spaces, and the use of all-encompassing phrases such as ―substantial reductions‖
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and ―substantial improvements,‖ the WTO considered the agreement a resounding
success in that it was the first real conclusion reached by the membership.
The introduction pointed out that the past failure of members to reach agreement
was not the result of noninterest, as was demonstrated by the willingness of member
states to spend 24 hour days at the negotiating table. It also suggested that a common
agreement that would apply to all members might not be the best avenue to pursue.
Throughout the framework it was stressed that developing countries may require
special treatment in all areas of the three pillars. The framework also mentions that the
filling-in of the blanks may be more difficult that the original agreement and that the
outcome will be known only the end of the negotiations.289 The agreement was, in
essence, an agreement to improve rules that would streamline trade and reduce import
and export barriers. It was an agreement by all the members that agricultural supports
were no more necessary than any other product-support programs. The framework also
addressed some political questions, such as how negotiators could sidestep the regional
political pressure that prevented the necessary changes in agricultural policy. This would,
hopefully, prepare the member states for the decisions that would be made during the
next session, in October 2004.
Export Subsidies
As the negotiations developed through the period of 2002–2003, the discussion on
export subsidies and competition became more focused on the details of the various
subjects. The negotiators broke the discussions into five headings: export subsidies;
export credit, guarantees, and insurance; food aid; exporting state trading enterprises; and
289
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export restrictions and taxes. Each of these headings were divided into even more
detailed subheadings.290 The subjects and their subheadings were partially at the request
of developing countries, which had not been able to reach agreement previously because
of their claim that they would be further handicapped if one agreement was to be applied
to all. This group included mostly countries that were net food importers, nations where
the economic impact was secondary to survival. In addition, many countries, including
the developing countries, wanted to improve the rules and oversight for preventing
governments from circumventing their commitments on export subsidies, including the
use of food aid and subsidized export credits. India proposed a separate set of rules for
developing countries to allow subsidies on some products to increase while subsidies on
other products are reduced. Although this proposal may have some merit, it also presents
opportunity for those countries with special privileges to beat the system.291
Developing countries complained that the rules as they were written were equal in
terms, but unequal in benefits. The major area of contention was that according to the
agreement, developed countries would be allowed to continue export subsidies at a
reduced level, while developing countries, which had never had export subsidies, could
not because only those countries that originally subsidized exports would be allowed to
continue. This was the first time that an organized group addressed agricultural dumping
that was the direct result of export subsidies.292 During the negotiations a variety of
proposals were presented, each recommending a new solution to a self-perpetuating
problem. Those proposals presented by developed countries entailed provisions for
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continuing subsidies at a reduced rate, while those from developing nations
recommended that they be allowed to retain high tariffs in order to protect their starving
farmers. (ASEAN ) and India suggested the elimination of all developed countries‘
export subsidies while allowing developing countries to subsidize on a per-need basis
until their economic conditions improved. The ―one for all, and all for one‖ concept of
the WTO faced a monumental task, as is evidenced by the myriad positions of the various
countries.
In Phase 1, the discussion on export subsidies and competition spanned several
subheadings. As the talks progressed into greater detail, these subheadings were
separated into subtopics designed to enable the members to make decisions on small
issues rather than large ones. On export subsidies, one proposal in Phase 2 involved a 50
percent reduction as an immediate compromise, followed by eliminating subsidies
completely in three years for developed countries or six years for developing countries.
Another proposal was similar but more controversial in that it actually expanded some
export subsidies, for a period of time, that developing countries are currently allowed
under Article 9.4 of the Agriculture Agreement. In both cases, reductions would continue
throughout the course of negotiations and would be completely eliminated within three
years for developed countries or the end of negotiations that were scheduled for 2006 for
both developed and developing nations. These proposals received mixed support, and
opposition, depending on who they benefited most, or least.293
The sheer number of member states involved facilitated an abundance of
alternative proposals. While some suggested more moderate reductions on specific
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products in return for steeper reductions on other products, others suggested raising
international prices without eliminating export subsidies. It was proposed that countries
simply use matching measures on imports with those on exports. Not surprisingly, one of
the major issues to be overcome was agreement on the degree of importance to assign to
each of the support programs to be discussed.
The one issue that most were in agreement on was that smaller developing
countries would not be able to negotiate at arm‘s length with more developed nations.
There was a consensus that export subsidies should be eliminated in those countries, but
over a longer period of time to help them adjust to higher food import bills.294 The USEU draft proposed that if some countries insisted on export subsidies, then credits should
mirror those of export subsidies. The G-20 proposal, which sought elimination of both
subsidies and subsidized credit, added that the interests of net food-importing and leastdeveloped countries could not possibly exist under the same rules as the rest of the
countries. Whatever differences may have existed between negotiators, all were in
agreement that aid for humanitarian purposes is essential. The major issue on this subject
had little to do with export subsidies, and more to do with proper oversight and how best
to ensure that the aid goes to those really in need, would not interfere with the local farm
populations‘ ability to sell their own products, and would not simply be a vehicle for the
disposal of surplus agricultural products.295
Many developing countries used the forum as their first opportunity to be heard,
and to call for binding commitments to supply food products when they are needed at a
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price that is affordable, and to not interfere with local farm production when these
products are not in demand. They also requested more technical and financial assistance
to help these countries develop domestic production instead of relying on food aid.296
Food Aid
Most recipient countries say aid has not been a problem when it is given in
response to an appeal from a relevant international organization such as the World Food
Programme or the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, or if the country
declares an emergency. Historically, problems occur when the aid is given bilaterally or
through other institutions. The contention is that such aid is often nothing more than an
attempt to redistribute surplus agricultural products in the guise of humanitarian aid. The
counter argument is that governments and organizations such as the United States and the
EU can respond to an emergency faster than international organizations. All are in
agreement that however aid is distributed or by whom, there must be more oversight, and
all member nations must reach an agreement on how humanitarian aid will be handled in
the future.297 The objective of the discussion was to ―avoid displacing commercial
transactions, i.e. to provide food aid when commercial transactions are not possible; and
not to obstruct bona fide food aid.‖298 Some of the questions that were presented were 1)
Exactly what is the role of international organizations in the area of humanitarian
intervention? 2) Who should determine whether there is a need for food aid, and, in turn,
who should deliver the aid? 3) Should the aid be in the form of a grant, a credit against
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future trade, or should it be in money to be spent, locally if possible, by the receiving
country?299
To continue in another vein, the agreed-on framework states clearly that all forms
of export subsidies will be eliminated by a ―credible‖ date.300 The sunset clause was
designed to involve every type of agricultural subsidy currently in effect, including
export credit, food aid, and state-sanctioned and private NGOs. It was important to the
negotiators that they include all entities that would be involved in agricultural subsidies,
including those NGOs whose actions are equivalent to subsidies. The eventual negotiated
date will mark the end of export subsidies as listed in members‘ reduction commitments;
―all export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment
periods beyond 180 days; those with shorter repayment periods but failing to conform
with disciplines that are to be negotiated; trade-distorting practices of state trading
enterprises that are considered to be subsidized; and food aid that does not conform with
various disciplines, which will also be negotiated.‖301
It was determined that the reductions would be in annual installments, although
the details were left to future negotiations. The most important aspect of the agreement
was that the members agreed to agree at some time in the future. This was the first real
conformity to come from 10 years at the bargaining table. One of the deciding factors
was the concurrence that transparency would be an overriding factor in future
negotiations, and that developing countries would be allowed more lenient terms.302
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The formation of the G-20 was both a voting bloc, and a turning point in the
negotiations. With its formation, the less-developed and developing countries gained a
new and powerful voice in the outcome of the negotiations. The G-20 was able to
convince the membership that they could not survive under the same agricultural rules
that would be applied to developed nations. One of the elements inserted into the
proposed agreement was that they be allowed to continue to subsidize transportation and
marketing (Article 9.4 of the Agriculture Agreement) ―for a reasonable period, to be
negotiated,‖ beyond the date for ending the main subsidies.303 Furthermore, the eventual
termination of subsidized credit and insurance would be implemented in a way that
would not be detrimental to the least-developed and net food-importing countries.304
While designing the framework, all were in agreement that the ultimate goal was
to not only do away with all subsidies but to also guarantee that these subsidies would not
reappear under different names or disguised as something other than subsidies. This led
to a list of items to be researched at a later date that included ―the basic approach to
disciplines; definitions of entities to be covered; specifying which practices distort trade;
how to eliminate these; transparency; future use of monopoly power; and special
treatment for developing countries . . . practices such as price, and monopoly power.‖305
In the preparations for modalities the discussions followed similar themes, while
attempts were made to attach relative importance to each factor. The membership was
asked, ―are export restrictions as serious as import restrictions, and should bindings and
reductions on the two sides be symmetrical?‖306 For those countries that depended on
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imports for food, the answer to both questions was ―yes,‖ while others with surplus crops
to dispose of argued that export supports were less serious. Each country had its own
specific cure for the problem; however, as in the past, most cures favor the country
making the suggestion.
Tariffs
Currently, among WTO members, agricultural products are protected only by
tariffs.307 It was agreed that all nontariff barriers would be eliminated or converted to
tariffs at the Uruguay Round of negotiations between 1986 and 1994. In order to reach an
agreement, the equivalent tariffs mandated to offset the nontariff barriers were too high to
allow an opportunity for imports. To compensate for this malfunction, a system of ―tariffrate quotas‖ was created in order to help minimum access levels continue. In simple
language, this amounts to lower tariffs within the quotas, and higher rates for quantities
over and above the established maximums.308
Since the Uruguay Round, the discussions have focused on two issues: ―the high
levels of tariffs outside the quotas, with some countries pressing for larger cuts on the
higher tariffs, and the quotas themselves, their size, the way they have been administered,
and the tariffs charged on imports within the quotas.‖309 When the Cancun round of
negotiations began in 2002–2003, the discussions had expanded to six headings: ―tariffs;
tariff quotas; tariff quota administration; special safeguards; importing state trading
enterprises, and other issues.‖ Within each heading was a list of subheadings that
included ―general comments; scope/definitions/product coverage; stages/timetables;
307
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transparency and notification.‖310 The influence of the G-20 was evident in the
negotiations, as special and differential treatment for developing countries and nontrade
concerns were discussed under each heading. At the Cancun conference, LDCs, new
members, and transition economies continued to lobby for ―special and differential
treatment‖ because of the state of the LDCs‘ economies and because some new members
had not yet concluded their market-access commitments under their WTO membership
agreements.311
The discussion of tariffs was all-inclusive in that it covered quantities of products
both within and outside the agreed-on quotas. Prior to the WTO involvement, tariffs had
been negotiated bilaterally, product-by-product, by the developed countries. The results
were not always equitable in that the poorer countries had little bargaining power. Prior
to the arrival of the G-20, some countries, such as Canada and the United States,
suggested ―zero-for-zero‖ agreements that included the complete elimination of tariffs,
and export subsidies on both sides. Although it sounds fair and equitable on paper, it does
not work well for those countries that import much of their products and have little to
export.312
One of the major points of the agreement was that each country would reduce
tariffs by a universally agreed-on number that would increase over a specified period
until the tariff was completely eliminated. Some countries had already reduced tariffs
prior to the agreement, and argued that they should be given credit for having already
made these reductions, while newer members of the WTO who had previously reduced
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their tariffs as a concession for membership felt that they should not have to reduce them
further.313
As each section of the negotiations was broken down into its smaller parts, it
became more obvious why some members had not been able to reach agreement in
previous sessions. Trade is a complicated business, and over the years the degree of
sophistication increased as large trading partners developed ways to counter nonsupport
agreements by substituting new and more complicated programs to offset their losses.
Developing countries complained that they could not increase their incomes by
processing the agricultural raw materials that they produce because their export market
countries impose higher tariffs on processed imports than on the raw materials, in order
to protect their own processing industries. They are left in a catch-22 situation where they
must either sell their products at market prices, which are often lower than what it costs
to grow the products with unsophisticated farm production systems, or process them and
attempt to sell the finished products at an above-market price.314 Importing countries
counter that import tariffs are necessary to protect domestic production and to protect the
local farm industry in order to maintain food security. The developing countries argue
that if export support payments were reduced, export subsidies could also be reduced to a
reasonable and negotiable level.315
The agreement produced two strong tariff-reduction proposals. The first was
taken directly from the 1986–94 Uruguay Round of negotiations, which used a shotgun
approach to average the reduction over all products, with some exceptions where
countries could show that the reduction was too severe. The second proposal, known as a
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―cocktail‖ approach, suggested a flat-rate percentage reduction for all products from all
countries, with higher reductions on higher tariff products, again, with certain exceptions
for developing countries.316
It is obvious that by 2004, a much larger part of the discussions focused on special
treatment for poor and developing countries, countries that had recently joined the WTO,
and countries in transition to market economies. For the first time, developing countries
could argue that their tariff cuts would work only if developed countries were to reduce
their domestic supports and export subsidies at a higher rate than the LDCs. What about
smaller island or landlocked countries? Should they be subjected to the same new
restrictions? All of these questions were asked for the first time at Cancun, and answered
for the first time by the rest of the world.317
After the arguments were heard, the goal of the conference remained the same as
it was in Uruguay: to reduce tariffs to zero, over a period of time, for the same products
imported into all major importing countries. It was moderately successful in Uruguay,
and more so in Cancun. The next logical step is to eventually eliminate the tariff quotas
and domestic supports established in Cancun. It is certainly possible now that the LDC
issue has been explored and accepted as an issue that must be dealt with separately.
Although few agree on how the issue will be resolved, all accept the problem as one that
must be corrected prior to any long-term agreement.
Tariff /Quotas
The use of quotas, one option explored at the conference, was suggested as an
interim phase of agricultural-support elimination. Although a quota system could
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certainly ease the pain over the short term, it was a complicated and controversial system
of controls. The most difficult part of the quota system was in the organization of its
administration. The proposed quota system was made up of many custom methods for
giving exporters limited access to the international market at reduced pricing. The new
sections included ―first-come, first-served allocations, import licensing according to
historical shares and other criteria, administering through state trading enterprise,
bilateral agreements, and auctioning.‖318 It was agreed that the terms for each item and
country could include specific time periods for using the quotas, applying for licenses, or
delivering products. Some countries complained that quotas handicapped their ability to
trade as they had in the past. Unfortunately, quotas were not designed to make it easier
for countries to continue trade as they had in the past. They were designed to ease those
countries out of their import tariffs.
There were many methods proposed during the conference, each of which
addressed some aspect of the import/export problems, and often in dissimilar ways. For
some countries quotas would be more beneficial, while for others, simple across-theboard reductions would be best, and for some LDCs, a combination of the two would
work better. While most member states understand that there is probably no single best
method, some continue to look for the easy quick fix, while yet others continue to work
for the system that best suits their own interests.
The US-EU draft referred to tariff quotas in two contexts: the amount of tariffs to
be charged on in-quota products, and how to deal with the higher tariff rates when the
quotas have been reached. The G-20 provided answers to these questions by suggesting a
more simplified and transparent quota program to benefit developing countries and that
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―developed countries‘ quotas be expanded by a percentage of domestic consumption and
in-quota tariffs be eliminated, with additional expansion through negotiation.‖319 This
proposal was met with resistance from Japan, Norway, and the European–East Asian
group, who opposed any effort to expand tariff quotas.320
As expected, quotas became the most difficult of the three pillars to negotiate. As
agriculture negotiations chairperson Tim Groser pointed out, ―all countries have market
access barriers, whereas only some have export subsidies or Amber or Blue Box domestic
supports. Therefore the range of interests involved in the market access side of the
negotiations is more complex. Most governments are under pressure to protect their
farmers, but many also want to export and therefore want to see others‘ markets open up.
Among developing countries, some are less confident about importing and exporting and
take a defensive position, while others are more confident and want to see more SouthSouth trade as well as increased exports from poorer to richer countries.‖321
In spite of the difficulties incurred in reaching an agreement, the actual
framework was a monumental leap forward for the WTO. The agreement bound member
states to agree to the reduction and eventual elimination of agricultural subsidies and
open market access for agricultural products. Although the framework left the details for
future arbitration, key factors were identified as keystone issues and potential stumbling
blocks. These included the formulas to be used in determining the actual amount of
reductions to be imposed: how special exceptions would be treated and what oversight
procedures would be imbedded in the system to insure fairness and equality; the special
needs of developing and less-developed countries that must be integrated into any of the
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support; how to enforce the agreements when conflicts arise between members; and how
to encourage and promote alternative crops for agrarian members whose primary crops
consist of illegal narcotics.322 The one factor missing from the framework was a formula
for negotiations. The framework merely agreed to negotiate again in 2005, but did not
offer any guidelines or a formula for those negotiations. The framework did specify that
any formula for negotiation should address each member‘s tariff structure individually
and offered guidelines on how to begin:

1) ―single approach‖: everyone except least-developed countries has to contribute
by improving market access for all products
2) tiered and progressive: the formula will be based on tiers so that tariffs in
higher tiers have steeper cuts
3) reductions from ―bound‖ rates, i.e. the ceilings that members have committed
in the WTO, rather than the actual or ―applied‖ rates, which in developing
countries in particular, are often lower, sometimes considerably. (When an
applied rate is much lower than the bound rate, the formula might not mean a cut
in the tariff actually charged on the import, only a lower ceiling limiting the
government‘s ability to raise the tariff.)
4) developing countries are to be given ―operationally effective‖ special treatment
5) sensitive products: all countries are to be allowed some flexibility in the way
these products are treated, although even sensitive products have to see substantial
improvements in market access.323
Although it was agreed that reductions would be achieved through the use of
levels or tiers, it was left to future negotiations to establish those levels. The agreement
was nothing more than a framework that left questions about formulas, maximum and
minimum tariffs, and special treatment for LDCs to be answered in the future. The
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agreement summed up the future tier system in one sentence: ―the role of a tariff cap in a
tiered formula with distinct treatment for sensitive products will be further evaluated.‖324
A footnote to the agreement states that the final draft should reflect ―the sensitivity of the
product‖ and emphasizes that the formula for creating quotas should be open to all
members.325 These two notes refer to special treatment for rural development, and food
security for developing nations. The framework continually points to the necessity to
involve these developing nations in the negotiations because of their special needs, and
emphasizes that the membership must remain aware that these member states have localsensitive products that will require smaller tariff quotas and protracted time frames. In
particular, these exceptions should be applied to products that are directed toward food
and livelihood security.326
Domestic Support: Amber, Blue and Green Boxes
The members of the WTO were in agreement that agricultural price supports of
every form were detrimental to international trade. The dilemma was that all countries
were not equally guilty, not all products from each nation distorted the market in the
same way, nor were the solutions such that they could be applied to each member country
in the same way.
The goal of the WTO became one of identifying the offending products of each
country in a manner that would bring them to the surface for all to see, and then
recommending the terms for reducing these supports country by country. The solution
was the introduction of amber, blue, and green boxes. These boxes were nothing more
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than categories established to identify the offending price supports according to their
degree of harm. The amber box was for subsidies that would be reduced and eventually
prohibited, including items that were considered to be trade-distorting and detrimental to
international trade. Green-box items would consist of agriculture-related subsidies that
are not considered to be trade-distorting, and blue-box items would consist of support
payments that are not subject to amber- or green-box restrictions.
In WTO terminology, the boxes are like traffic lights. Green-box items are
permitted; amber-box items are to be slowed down, or reduced; and red-box items are to
be stopped, or are forbidden. Naturally that scheme was too simple, so the red was
replaced with a blue box for subsidies that have little effect on international trade and that
are primarily programs that limit production. Each of these boxes contains options and
exceptions designed for developing and less-developed countries. The list of
subheadings, formulas, definitions, and interventions exceeded 200 in the September 23–
25, 2003, session.327 The three-box system was supposed to be a simple design according
to which each country identified each of its agricultural support programs and marked
them for one of the three boxes, whereupon a committee would determine the amount
they would be reduced by and the length of time before they would be eliminated. Once
this procedure was agreed on, countries realized that they would be opening up all of
their programs to public scrutiny, and each nation began to look for ways to bypass the
amber-box designation. For example, developing countries, new members, and transition
economies argued that they should have special dispensation, and should not be treated
the same as developed countries. New members argued that the very reason they sought
327

WTO, ―Phase 1: Domestic support: Amber, blue and green boxes,‖ 2004.

174

membership was to improve their economic condition, and that their membership
agreements did not include reductions in farm subsidies. Others claimed special and
differential treatment based on their level of development and per-capita income. Many
developed countries agreed that smaller agrarian economies should have special
treatment, including trade preferences and longer times to adjust. In reality, all of these
negotiations for special treatment, and each country‘s efforts to improve its own position,
slowed the process to a crawl.328
Although the membership agreed to the three-box treatment of agricultural
support, once it was placed online, some expressed remorse and concern about revealing
the inner workings of their support programs. For example, several developed nations,
including the United States, realized that this agreement would restrict Congress‘s ability
to develop farm policies because any subsidies would have to come under WTO limits.
Some conservative nations went so far as to claim that the original Doha mandate was
never designed to completely eliminate trade-distorting subsidies. Although they had
previously signed the agreement, once they understood how it would affect them
financially they unsuccessfully argued that eventual elimination would be too drastic to
allow them to continue with the reform process. As each nation attempted to protect its
turf, they began to present arguments proposing different rates of reduction
commitments, one for export products and another for domestic consumption, in an effort
to avoid the amber-box restrictions.329
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The Amber Box
The amber box was designed to accommodate all domestic support programs
considered to distort production and trade applies to 34 members who have committed to
reduce their trade distorting domestic supports. The WTO membership agreed that
anything and everything in the amber box must be reduced and eventually eliminated.
One of the questions that was delayed to a later date was, Should the reductions be in the
aggregate, or should each specific product be treated separately and be disaggregated by
product class?330 It was agreed that that decision would be postponed to phase two, at a
later date. Depending on how these reductions would affect each nation, some countries
proposed drastic cuts on higher levels of support and smaller cuts on smaller offences,
while other countries agreed with the proposal that amber-box subsidies eventually be
eliminated completely, per the original plan.331
Proposals went across the board, from no change to lower levels of reduction for
developing countries, and/or transition economies to higher levels of cuts or abolition for
developed countries. One hundred and twenty one countries, roughly 85% of both
developed and developing countries led by the US, agreed with the original plan that
proposed that amber-box subsidies be eliminated or brought down to de minimis levels in
three to five years for developed countries, and over a longer period, such as nine years,
for developing countries.332 This would bring all member nations down to de minimis
levels, de minimis being calculated as five percent of agricultural production in
developed countries, and 10 percent in developing countries. While this was acceptable to
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the majority of the members, some developing nations still held out, arguing that
minimum levels should be completely eliminated for developed countries. The
framework says minimums will be reduced by an amount to be negotiated, with special
treatment for developing countries, which will be exempt if they allocate almost all de
minimis support for subsistence and resource-poor farmers.333
As of 2008, developed countries are allowed a five percent minimal amount of
amber-box support. This is defined as five percent of the value of total agricultural
production. Specific product support is also limited at five percent of production of that
product. Developing countries also followed the original proposal, and are allowed up to
10 percent of total agricultural production.334
Since each of the nations was asked to present a paper outlining its concept of
how the boxes should be used, there were several hundred proposals concerning the
amber boxes. Some suggested a large down payment, in which half the reduction would
be made at the outset, while others proposed that de minimis numbers be applied only to
developing countries and possibly transition economies, while others completely missed
the concept of eventual elimination and suggested that inflation factors be included in the
reduction scheme.
During the discussion process, several of the members suggested that some
domestic support programs might have the same effect as export subsidies because the
supports vary according to market prices, rising when prices fall, and dropping as prices
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go up again. As prices are manipulated locally, the portion that is exported can influence
the international market.
Prior to the Cancún meeting in 2003, the combined US-EU proposal suggested
broadly reducing trade-distorting supports by a range of percentages to be negotiated at a
later date. As the negotiations progress, it becomes more obvious that the WTO
encouraged the membership to agree on the big issues while saving the details for a later
date. A case in point is the US-EU proposal that countries with larger distorting supports
would make a greater effort at reductions. This proposal would be an easy sell to the rest
of the membership since it only affects the large trade nations.
Japan proposed that the reductions be on total aggregate measurement of support
(AMS), allowing shifts between products. De minimis payments would then be applied to
an overall reduction for amber, minimum payments. This suggestion was not received
well, as it would make it easier for the developed countries to manipulate the system.
As one would imagine, the G-20 proposal was quite different from those of the
developed nations. The G-20 proposed reductions on each product rather than for the
whole agricultural sector, emphasizing large initial reductions, referred to as down
payments, on more heavily subsidized products of the developed nations, and even larger
reductions for products that represented a large share of world exports, the term ―large
share‖ to be defined at a later date.335 Norway made a strong statement in support of the
G-20‘s suggestion that there be larger reductions on products for export. Norway next
proposed negotiating reductions for the amber and blue boxes combined, which would
effectively eliminate the blue box. The G-20 also suggested that amber-box items be
335
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capped by some percentage of total production to be determined later. The European–
East Asian group argued that their supports have little impact on world markets and that
therefore they should not be involved at all. Any reductions that they would make should
be negotiated together with market access issues and export subsidies, while the African
Union and the least developed countries, which have few exports, called for substantial
reductions in both amber- and blue-box supports for developed nations, strongly
supported their eventual phasing-out and elimination.336
The negotiations eventually determined that amber-box supports would be cut
using a tiered formula, so that countries with higher supports would have steeper cuts. It
was decided that limits would be placed on supports for specific products in order to
avoid shifting support between different products that might occur if aggregate formulas
were used. The result of the tiered formula is that it applies to the total of support on all
products but not in the aggregate.337
Green Box
If everything that is trade-distorting must be in the Amber box, then it stands to
reason that all subsidies in the green box must not distort trade, or at least must cause
minimal distortion in order to qualify. Additional requirements are that these subsidies be
government-funded, and that they may not be supported by higher consumer prices. To
qualify, these programs must not be directed toward any specific product, and may
include direct payments to farmers that are decoupled from crop production and that have
no bearing on international price levels. Other items that qualify include environmental
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issues and regional development and conservation plans. Among other items that qualify
are programs that reimburse costs arising from the protection of animal welfare, and a
special section was added to protect developing countries that face serious poverty and
food security issues. Developing countries from that category requested additional
leeway for their special needs, including a development subcategory box that could be
changed in times of need. This proposal suggested a resolution that would update the
green box for decoupled income supports, by changing threshold levels for income
insurance, and safety net programs for relief from natural disasters. The most popular
proposal was one that would maintain the green box simply as a set of measures that do
not distort trade or are minimally distorting. Anything that fits the criteria of the green
box is allowed, without limits.338
Naturally, all nations that are heavily into the amber box aspire to transfer some
or all of those items into the green box. A great deal of the discussion about the green box
revolved around each country‘s attempt to get as much into that box as possible and to
avoid the restrictions of the amber box . One of the first proposals suggested that the
green box be expanded to cover additional types of subsidies. This was quickly overruled
by the membership, who agreed that the green-box concept was very satisfactory if used
as it was designed.339
Still, there were dissenters who criticized the green-box concept, arguing that the
WTO had not yet formulated a definition of ―non distorting,‖ and therefore would not be
able to accurately differentiate between offending and nonoffending products. They
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claimed that despite the WTO‘s position on nondistorting qualifying items, some items
that that were listed as acceptable actually distorted trade and lowered world prices. They
went on to recommend ―a quantitative means of measuring whether a policy is nondistorting; removing direct payments, decoupled income support, and subsidized income
insurance and safety nets; revising criteria for structural adjustment programmes that
include factor ‗retirement‘; notification and evaluation criteria for disaster relief,
investment aids, environmental programmes, and regional assistance; transparency for
food security measures and food aid; and limits on Green Box spending.‖340 The
membership agreed that the criteria for defining supports as ―green box‖ would be
reviewed and clarified to ensure that green-box items would not distort trade, or would do
so minimally, adding that a solid definition would preserve the basic concepts of the
green box, and make it stronger, safer, and non-trade-distorting.341
As the proposal continues to become more complicated, it begins to take on the
flavor of the US Senate, as each country tacks on its own wish list as the price for
agreement. While some countries attempt to preserve their own private corner of the
market, a flurry of activity from others ensues as they hurry to present their own selfserving propositions. Many proposals addressed the desire for greater flexibility for
developing countries, such as measures that would allow these countries to place
products into the box without restrictions. In the end, it was all rhetoric without substance
and was rejected. Their argument was based on the premise that the large amounts that
would be spent under the green box would have an effect on wealth and income that
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could significantly distort production and trade.342 In the final vote, the majority of the
members agreed to define green-box subsidies as those that cause no or minimal
distortion. Therefore, any shift in support to the green box should be welcomed as
progress.
Blue Box
The blue box is a hybrid designed to appease some countries that balked at
signing the original agreement because of the strict rules applied to the amber box. The
WTO has described the blue box as the amber box with conditions. Agricultural subsidies
that would normally fall into the amber box can become blue-box items if they require
farmers to limit production. The advantage over amber-box classification is that there are
no limits on blue-box spending.343
Blue-box supports are to be capped at no more than five percent of the value of a
country‘s agricultural production over a period that has yet to be negotiated. The blue box
is designed to be more flexible and therefore more appealing to those countries whose
blue-box items make up a large portion of their distorting subsidies. The blue box is
therefore an exemption from the amber-box rule that all subsidies linked to production
must be reduced immediately or kept within defined de minimis levels. It includes
payments linked to acreage, but in situations where production is limited by quotas or
land set-asides. It is not commonly used because of the uncertainty about the exact
definition of trade-distorting. Countries are reluctant to place items in the blue box only
to have them later placed back into the amber box. At present, the WTO reports that only
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a few members have used the blue box; they include the EU, Iceland, Norway, Japan, the
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United States, which no longer uses it.344
The blue box was actually designed for the few who use it. The framework
endorses the contention that some countries need to be able to switch from the more
trade-distorting amber-box subsidies to the less-distorting blue box in order to be able to
participate in the overall plan for subsidy reform. The text therefore says ―members
recognize the role of the Blue Box in promoting agricultural reforms.‖345
Even the definition of the blue box is flexible and anticipates additions and
deletions of those items that qualify. Some of those additions will certainly include
changes in direct payments that do not require any production as well as payments that
are based on fixed production. But the WTO has given its assurance that new criteria will
always be based on the idea that the blue box is less trade-distorting than the amber box.
There was some concern among the membership that a number of the proposals
were so ambitious that many of the countries would not be able to implement them and
therefore disrupt the reform process. It was obvious that if every member insisted on
promoting its own agenda then none of the deadlines set in Doha would be met. A plea
was made to all members to focus on the original mandate, which was to achieve
―substantial reductions‖ in agricultural supports.346 It was pointed out that the greatest
offenders would have to make the greatest concessions, and that any attempt to place
noncomplying items in the wrong box would simply be a time-consuming exercise with
an unhappy result.347
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The Doha development round was the first step toward equality for developing
countries. The outcome of the negotiations in reference to developing countries could be
huge. Developing countries had a great deal at stake, and the delaying tactics served only
to hinder their proposed progress. The results of the Doha Round could reduce crop
dumping on the international market, which could improve the lives of 900 million
people who live in poverty. To delay the decisions by introducing frivolous demands
could actually increase the poverty of millions of people.348 This is not to say that the
developing countries were the only cause of the delays. The developed countries were
very much involved in their attempts to move products from amber- to blue-box status.
However, simply changing definitions and redefining terms does not change the fact that
the rich countries are the main offenders when it comes to subsidized agricultural
production.
In the past, the EU has been the number one user of the blue box as well as the
number one offender in trade-distorting programs, amassing more than 20 billion euros
annually in subsidies. During the Doha negotiations, the EU was the major supporter of
the blue box, as it attempted to transfer amber-box items into the more liberal blue box.
Fortunately their efforts were not successful, and today, only Norway uses the blue box
for its subsidies.349
In the beginning, the United States was no less guilty than the EU. The United
States saw an opportunity to include all countercyclical payments (subsidies paid to
farmers when market prices fall below a certain level) in the blue box. The WTO
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objected and determined that these payments were clearly trade-distorting and should fall
into the amber-box category. When Congress enacted the 2002 Farm Bill, it was
described as a safety net for farmers. Representative Charles Stenholm, the Democratic
leader of the House Agriculture Committee, said, ―First and foremost, it provides for a
strong safety net for our agricultural producers.‖350 The fallacy of this statement is that
the countercyclical safety-net payments plan set price targets so high that the payments
were annual. For example, the countercyclical target for payments for wheat were set at
$3.86 per bushel. The average wheat prices for wheat over the previous fifteen years was
$3.22 per bushel. Over a period of forty years, wheat prices had reached $3.86 on only
two occasions (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. History of average wheat prices.
Reproduced from ―A Little Blue Lie: Harmful Subsidies Need to be Reduced, not Redefined,‖ Oxfam
Briefing Note, 2005, retrieved August 24, 2009, from
http://www.farmingsolutions.org/pdfdb/bn_bluebox.pdf
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The safety net for cotton was set at $0.72 per pound. Cotton prices had never been
over $0.59 per pound in the previous 15- year period (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. History of average cotton prices.
Reproduced from ―A Little Blue Lie: Harmful Subsidies Need to be Reduced, not Redefined,‖ Oxfam
Briefing Note, 2005, retrieved August 24, 2009, from
http://www.farmingsolutions.org/pdfdb/bn_bluebox.pdf

The WTO rejected the request with the admonition that these prices were set by
politicians without regard to international trade.351 The WTO claimed that these
countercyclical payments provided an ongoing subsidy and therefore did not qualify as a
blue-box item. Furthermore, the WTO added to the framework the statement that bluebox subsidies would be limited to five percent of a country‘s total agricultural production.
The end result was that developing countries would be granted smaller cuts over
longer periods, and would continue to be allowed exemptions under Article 6.2 of the
Agriculture Agreement. They could also give investment and input subsidies that are
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integral parts of development programs, and provide domestic support to help farmers
shift away from producing low-profit and illicit crops.352
Eventually, the framework provided guidelines for a tiered formula for amberbox, de-minimis, and blue-box products. As originally suggested, the program is
designed so that higher levels of support will experience steeper cuts. In addition, it was
declared that in the first year, each country‘s ceiling of permitted overall support would
be cut by 20 percent. Details also included how to measure the blue-box component for
the overall cut.353 Near the end of the negotiations, the more liberal members called for
the blue box to be phased out over a period to be negotiated later, while others proposed
five years for developed countries and nine years for developing countries, similar to the
amber-box phase-out. The extensive debate about the blue box was neutralized when it
was declared to be a temporary measure that would soon outlive its usefulness. The
arguments of the defenders of the blue-box‘s importance as a less intense complement to
the amber box fell on deaf ears as the WTO moved on to the next level.354
The majority of the members, which included both developing and developed
countries, agreed that the blue box had no lasting value, and that most everything that
was placed there would best be served in the amber box. These countries agreed with the
WTO that the blue box was nothing more than an interim measure designed to facilitate
countries movement of their products through the amber-box subsidies.355
Nevertheless, the blue box remained a permanent provision of the agreement,
even though only one country, Norway, continues to use it. The EU says it is ready to
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negotiate additional reductions in amber-box support so long as the concepts of the blue
and green boxes are maintained.356
Non-Trade Concerns
The Agriculture Agreement also provided for members to pursue important
nontrade concerns such as food security, the environment, rural development, and the
easing of poverty in developing nations. Article 20 specified that the negotiations must
make nontrade concerns a part of the negotiations.357
Thirty-eight countries produced papers for the September 2000 meeting that
included sections on nontrade concerns. Many of these countries presented research
studies for debate, while all agreed that everyone has some nontrade concerns. The major
concern of the membership was that these nontrade measures might derail the more
important negotiations on agricultural reform. Agriculture is not only about producing
food. The question debated in the WTO is whether some of the trade-distorting subsidies,
outside the green box, might be needed in order to help agriculture perform its other
roles.358
It was the opinion of some member states that all the objectives could be achieved
more effectively through green-box subsidies, which are designed to implement
nonagricultural objectives without distorting trade. Examples given included food
security, direct payments to producers decoupled from production, safety-net programs,
environmental programs, and local-area assistance programs that do not stimulate
agricultural production or affect prices. These countries maintained that what they had in
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place was sufficient to cover the peripherals, and that those who were opposed must show
that the existing provisions, which were already included in the Uruguay Round, were
inadequate for dealing with these concerns. The opposition countries, which once again
missed the entire reason for the negotiations, held that nontrade concerns are closely
linked to production, and suggested that some subsidies based on production are needed
for these nontrade concerns.359
Some countries, including the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Norway, believe that
nontrade concerns should have the same level of importance as agricultural support,
while the EU proposal suggests that nontrade concerns should be discussed as a separate
entity. They argue, for example, that environmental issues should be addressed through
separate environmental protection programs.360
The consensus of the exporting developing countries is that if these nontrade
concerns are approached outside the green box, it will be to the advantage of the rich
developed countries. These developing countries believe that the WTO is obligated to
treat nontrade concerns the same as any other economic industrial activity. Their
argument is that every industry has nontrade concerns that must be dealt with during
negotiations, and that agriculture is no different.361
As the debate continued in length, it became obvious that those on both sides of
the debate agreed that food security for many of the countries was of maximum
importance, especially for developing countries. If this issue could not be addressed to
everyone‘s satisfaction, the overall agreement would not pass. The major issue became
359
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how to deal with the problem to everyone‘s satisfaction. In other words, how does one
ensure food security without some sort of protection for agricultural production? There
was no immediate consensus on how it should be handled; however, they did agree that
the answer would include degrees of trade, stockholding, and some domestic
production.362
The developing countries made a strong argument for self-intervention in
agricultural trade and against relying on outside help in times of need. They based their
argument on historical fact in that they saw little prospect of developed countries ceasing
to distort markets with subsidies and protection. In the past, developed countries had
done whatever was in their best interest, with little concern for the plight of the poor
developing countries. There is concern in the economic sector, that if agricultural trade
rules are changed in a way that will prevent developing countries from protecting that
industry during its infancy, then these poor countries will run the risk of permanent
stagnation. There are virtually no cases where a developing country has industrialized
without going through a stage of protecting its infant industry. Before these developing
nations compete on the world market, they must first protect their infant industries. As
they mature, only then do they liberalize their protectionism policies. India‘s textile
industry is a good example of opening up free trade before its time.363 Developing
countries must protect and nurture areas where they have a distinct advantage in before
they can move to the next step in their development. Total reliance on developed
countries will eventually evolve into economic suicide.
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The question became one of short-term versus long-term food aid programs. The
short-term solution for supplying food to developing countries has been for developed
countries to supply food aid under humanitarian relief fund programs. Long-term
programs have been lacking and have only recently been placed on the WTO agenda. The
continuation of food aid from other countries is not the solution. A more viable approach
is to build better infrastructure in these countries by raising income levels through
selective internal agricultural support programs. Where countercyclical programs distort
the world market for developed countries, they may become an integral part of a
developing nation‘s plan for self-reliance. The increasing risk of crop shortages when
weather and other conditions are unfavorable may require the introduction of
internationally funded insurance programs in those regions. These are the very programs
that the membership is trying to reject for developed countries.364
Those opposed agree that raising incomes is the long-term solution to food
security. But for the short term, the Marrakech Ministerial Decision on Net FoodImporting Developing Countries and Least Developed Countries, combined with food aid
and other emergency measures, already applies. At this point in the negotiations, it
became apparent that some members were still thinking in terms of guaranteed income
for the less-developed nations as opposed to corrective agricultural contract negotiations.
Some countries proposed creating an international stockpile that could be used in
times of need. A block of developing countries suggested that they create a revolving
fund that would allow net food-importing developing countries and LDCs to borrow
against in times of need. Developing countries concerned about food security and
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starvation agreed to the proposal in the short term, but wanted a more specific program
that will help them develop their own safety net in the future. This suggestion prompted
the question of whether this was actually a WTO problem since existing World Bank and
IMF programs are already in place.365
Once again, WTO members have agreed that agricultural price supports are a
problem that must be corrected, and once again the solution has become so complicated
that the details overshadow the solution.
The Cotton Initiative
The two major U.S. trade issues remain cotton and sugar. These issues are so
volatile that the WTO chose to handle them separately for fear that they would sidetrack
the rest of the negotiations. Various members even disagreed as to whether these subjects
should be negotiated under agriculture or in some other part of the negotiations. The
separation came about when Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali posed the question to
the General Council. They emphasized the damage that the four believe has been caused
to them by cotton subsidies of richer countries, and called for the subsidies to be
eliminated, and for compensation to be paid to the four for economic losses caused by the
subsidies.366
The complaint was presented to WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi
on April 30, 2003. It requested the formation of a Sectoral Initiative in Favor of Cotton,
which was presented to the Trade Negotiations Committee on June 10, 2003, by Burkina
Faso President Blaise Compaoré. The message from the members was that they
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considered the cotton initiative to be more important to them than any other item on the
agenda, and emphasized two main issues: trade issues covered by the framework, and
development issues.367
The framework that is in place directs the negotiations to ensure that the cotton
issue is given ―appropriate‖ priority, and is independent of other sectoral initiatives. It is
written this way to ensure that cotton negotiations do not derail the rest of the Doha
Round of negotiations. The wording specifies that both the framework, and the cotton
initiative itself, are the basis for ensuring that the cotton issue is handled ambitiously,
quickly, and specifically within the agriculture negotiations but not as a part of it.368
The result of the WTO Secretariat‘s March 23–24, 2003, workshop on cotton,
held in Cotonou, Benin, was very specific in its directions to the Secretariat and the
Director General, to work with the development community and other NGOs such as the
World Bank, IMF, FAO, and the International Trade Centre, and to report regularly on its
progress to the General Council.369
Cotton Sub-Committee
The Cotton Sub-Committee was set up under the framework the following year at
the November 19, 2004, meeting of the agricultural negotiations. Its purpose was to
continue to direct the members‘ focus on cotton as a specific but separate issue during the
agriculture talks.370 The Cotton Sub-Committee was designed to be an open-door
committee available to any and all WTO members, NGOs, and observers. Periodic
reports were to be presented to the agriculture negotiations body, which in turn reports to
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the Trade Negotiations Committee, the General Council, and the Ministerial Conference.
The Cotton Sub-Committee was to be a high-profile organization that could not be lost in
the overall scheme of international agricultural negotiations.
The July Package of August 1, 2004, stipulated that cotton would be addressed
ambitiously, expeditiously, and specifically within the agriculture negotiations.371 The
Sub-Committee is directed to diligently work on ―all trade-distorting policies affecting
the sector,‖372 in all three key areas of the agriculture talks, the ―three pillars of market
access, domestic support, and export competition,‖373 as specified in the 2001 Doha
Declaration, which launched the current negotiations, and the ―framework‖ text, which is
part of the July 2004 Package decision.374 The cotton issue, although separate from other
trade issues, would be equal in importance on two fronts: 1) it was one of the major
offenders, and 2) it had a direct connection with the life-and-death struggle of developing
agrarian countries to continue to produce cotton at a profit.375
One of the leaders of international agriculture reform, and also one of the major
offenders in the cotton market, had been the United States. During the negotiations on
cotton price supports, it was revealed that the United States was a part of one of the
contradictions maintained in world trade after the Uruguay Round. As noted previously,
some nations simply interpreted the term ―free market‖ in ways that were most beneficial
to them, and if they were large enough and powerful enough they were able to browbeat
their opponents at the bargaining table into agreements that were not entirely equitable.
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When it came to cotton, the United States was one of the major offenders. Although the
United States is not the world‘s biggest producers of cotton, it is the world‘s biggest
exporter. The United States was able to circumvent the laws of supply and demand by
using millions of dollars of cotton subsidies. While the WTO negotiations were ongoing,
the United States was busy expanding both the amount of acreage planted and total cotton
production with full knowledge that it was creating a world price depression that affected
mostly less-developed and poor nations. It was noted that as a result of US subsidies over
the past twenty years, world cotton prices had at times been as low as Great Depression
levels.376
According to WTO estimates, the cost of producing a pound of cotton in Burkina
Faso is $.21, compared with $.73 in the United States. Technological improvements
including the use of high-yielding varieties, chemicals, fertilizers, irrigation, and
mechanical harvesting have increased cotton output, driving prices down by nearly 65
percent between 1960 and 2001.377
In the past when production was low and prices were high, there were few support
payments. In recent years when prices fell because of high production, the US
government covered the difference, according to Shawn Wade of the Plains Cotton
Growers Association.378 According to a report by the Environmental Working Group,
which advocates the end of farm subsidies, US cotton farmers received $2.7 billion in
subsidies in 2003, down from $3.9 billion in 2002, which was $1 billion more than the
value of that year‘s US cotton production at world market prices.379 Those subsidies are
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under fire from some who say they cause a market glut. In April 2005, the WTO ruled in
favor of Brazil in a lawsuit that charged that US farmers were dumping cheap cotton on
world markets. The United States appealed and lost. The case was the first before the
WTO to look at the effect of governmental subsidies on agricultural products.380
In 2003, Brazil decided that something must be done. The government of Brazil
launched a complaint with the WTO, claiming that US cotton support constituted an
unfair trade practice. Brazil shares the concerns of many African nations, and brought
suit as an injured party against the United States. The WTO‘s Dispute Settlement Body
agreed on March 18, 2003, to establish a panel to rule on Brazil‘s claim against US cotton
subsidies.381
Brazil claimed that there were several provisions that were prohibited under the
WTO agreement: 1) the prohibition of import substitution subsidies, which paid domestic
users to encourage the use of domestic products over imported products; 2) Step 2
payments, which are paid to exporters and domestic mill users to compensate them for
their purchase of US cotton, which tends to be priced higher than the world market price;
3.) export credit guarantees: The USDA has been underwriting credit extended by private
US banks to approved foreign banks for purchases of US agricultural products by foreign
buyers. These credits were good for up to 10 years; and 4.) in addition, the Supplier
Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP) insured short-term open account financing designed to
make it easier for exporters to sell US agricultural products overseas.382
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The United States replied that it was limited in terms of how much it could
respond, because many of the required sanctions would require congressional legislation.
On July 5, 2002, prior to the hearing, the US Secretary of Agriculture announced that the
administration was sending three proposed statutory changes to Congress to comply with
the WTO case: 1) elimination of the Step 2 program, 2.) removal of the 1 percent cap on
fees that can be charged under the GSM-102 program, and 3) termination of the GSM103 program. The United States had channeled nearly $3 billion to the US cotton industry
since 1996.383 Afraid of being undermined by the hearings, the National Cotton Council
immediately began negotiating new forms of price supports to offset the loss of those
being eliminated, with little regard for the WTO rulings or the Doha negotiations to
reduce tariffs.384
When Brazil filed its suit in 2003, the complaint was answered by the United
States Subsidies on Upland Cotton (WT/DS267). They denied all charges categorically,
and then defended their position on the grounds that current supports were far less than in
1992. In other words, they were wrong, but not nearly as wrong as they had been. They
claimed that GSM-102 and GSM-103 had been in existence since 1980 and had been
discussed during the Uruguay Round and the current Doha Round without complaint.
The court viewed the fourteen-page document, answered each of the thirty-three
paragraphs, and found the United States guilty on all counts. The United States
appealed.385 In early March 2005, the WTO released its report on the US appeal. The
rulings proclaimed that the payments from the Step 2 program, marketing loan program,
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crop insurance, production flexibility contracts, market loss assistance, and other listed
programs grant support specific to cotton and that they caused significant price
suppression in the world cotton market.386
In its final report, the WTO panel recommended that the United States withdraw
those support programs identified as ―prohibited‖ subsidies by July 1, 2005, and bring
into compliance those programs identified as ―actionable‖ subsidies with no deadline
given. With the July 1, 2005, deadline looming and the world watching, US Secretary of
Agriculture Mike Johanns announced that the administration was sending proposed
statutory changes to Congress to comply with the WTO case.387
The end result of the cotton dispute is still uncertain. How Congress and the
administration will respond to this ruling, either in modifying the current Farm Bill or in
creating the next Farm Bill, if there is one, is unknown. But the WTO cotton ruling,
combined with the federal budget pressures we are now seeing in Congress, has the
potential to set off substantial changes in US agricultural policy.388
Although this was the first modern-era decision to go against the United States, it
was neither the first complaint to be filed nor the first ruling against US agricultural
policy. Prior to the WTO complaint, a similar case was presented to GATT, the
predecessor to the WTO. In January 1989, the sugar-import restrictions and the quota
regime for imports, maintained by the United States since 1982, were held by a threemember GATT panel to be illegal with respect to the terms of US obligations to GATT.
The ruling came as a result of a dispute between Australia and the United States. Prior to
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the formation of the WTO, GATT had no enforcement procedures; consequently, the
decision had little effect on the programs being disputed.389
Up to 1995, GATT was effective in initiating agreements between its members,
but had no effective way of enforcing those agreements. International agricultural
subsidies and export and domestic subsidy agreements were made, but without some
method for enforcement, these gentleman‘s agreements were usually ignored. The 1986–
1994 Uruguay Round of negotiations began to change all of that. Agricultural trade was
given the same importance as other trade items and was brought under the WTO‘s
umbrella of multilateral trading systems. The WTO Agriculture Agreement, which was
able to organize its member countries into a structured group, began to agree on
commitments to reduce domestic and export agricultural subsidies. This was the first step
on what was to become more than a 20 year journey.390 It was the beginning of the
establishment of rules and commitments that would eventually evolve multilateral rules
that would affect and benefit all members.
For the first time, member governments admitted the fallacy of subsidizing farms
that were no longer in existence, and made commitments to reduce agricultural export
subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support. They agreed to reduce and eventually
eliminate subsidies that exceed negotiated limits for specific products and established
systems of enforcement that were not available through GATT.
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The Doha Round of Negotiations
The Uruguay Round between 1986 and 1994 was the first successful attempt to
set up a framework of agricultural support rules that could be applied to all the member
nations. The Agricultural Agreement was the initial organizational document that brought
the international family together for a common cause. One of the requirements of the
agreement was that all members support Article 20, which committed them to begin
negotiations on agricultural reform by the year 2000. It is doubtful that anyone present at
that time would have believed that those negotiations would still be going on in 2009.
Article 20 became the foundation from which all other negotiations have emerged and
continued in that role until the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration set a new
mandate that would deal with the details of the Agricultural Agreement of 1986–1994.391
The goals are clear; however, the negotiations have been difficult because of the
wide range of interests and personal objectives of the member governments. The
objectives of agricultural trade liberalization remain the same and include equal
competition between countries regardless of size or economic power. For the first time,
developing countries have an equal voice in negotiations with powerful nations that had
in the past ignored their inability to deal at arm‘s length. The greatest success of the Doha
Round of negotiations so far has been the member nations‘ agreement on the rules, the
―modalities,‖ for achieving their predetermined objectives.
The objective: ―Further substantial reductions in tariffs, domestic support and
export subsidies are prominent issues in the negotiations. In addition, some countries say
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an important objective of the new negotiations should be to bring agricultural trade under
the same rules and disciplines as trade in other goods.‖392
All other trade, including intellectual property, falls under the umbrella of the
WTO. Agriculture is the lone survivor and also the most difficult to control. There are
several reasons for this. One is that no one starves because of a one-sided contract on
intellectual property, but they will if they sign a bad agricultural agreement. The length of
the negotiations is due mainly to the conceptual differences that each member attaches to
the issues that affect them personally. Whether Article 20 is interpreted as the ―tripod‖
theory or the ―pentangle‖ theory, each country must feel comfortable with all aspects of
the agreement before they can assign their people to the long-term commitment that the
agreement requires.393
The negotiations are now in their eighth year, and have missed every deadline
mandated by the WTO at the Doha Qatar Declaration issued on November 2001. They
also missed the March 31, 2003, deadline for producing formulas and rules for further
negotiations. Missed deadlines have not usually meant failure, but only a delay of the
process. For example, in March 2003, a draft for suggested rules was entered into the
negotiations. There was no agreement on the contents; however, the outline was used to
work out technical details at a later date. During the Fifth Ministerial Conference in
Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003, a number of proposals were presented but were not
agreed on until August 1, 2004. It has become commonplace to exceed the deadlines;
however, the date of completion is not as important as the eventual agreement on a
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genuine framework. Some of the 2003 Cancun proposals were delayed until the Hong
Kong Ministerial Conference held in December 2005; even then, many members refused
to formally commit to some items. Although the Doha Declaration had envisioned a
much faster consensus of the member countries, it grudgingly extended the dates, and
encouraged those members who were delaying the process to make stronger
commitments to realistically negotiate in good faith. As expected, the deadline for
completing the negotiations on January 1, 2005, was officially postponed on August 1,
2004, and no new date was set.394 Much of the delay was caused by the inability of the
membership to agree on the rules of the game. No agreement could be reached until the
modalities were determined. Although at first glance it appears that some of these
countries were just being difficult, one must give them some leeway when we realize that
billions of dollars were at stake for the developed countries, while personal survival was
an issue with many of the LDCs. While many member countries had trouble with one or
both of these issues, other nations became frustrated at the delays, and had difficulty
understanding why these negotiations should be any more difficult than previous
agreements that were made on trade in other goods.395 The WTO remained confident that
if the members could at least reach an agreement on the modalities, the negotiations
would proceed at a much faster rate, and deadlines would be met. To the contrary, in the
summer of 2006, the proceedings collapsed completely. Although many nations were at
fault for pursuing their own personal interests to the detriment of the rest of the
organization, the United States bore the most guilt in that it refused to reduce its subsidies
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in the amount proposed by the committee, and it also proposed a ceiling for domestic
support that was actually above levels used in previous years and was unacceptable to the
membership.
The United States was asked to reduce support by another $5 billion to $17 billion
below levels used in past years, which it refused to do unless other developed countries
agreed to do the same. They were also asked to:
1. Reduce the blue-box subsidies by $5 billion.
2. Reduce the non-product-specific de minimis by $5 billion.
3. Reduce the product-specific de minimis by $5 billion.396
Relatively speaking, these requests would not be difficult for the United States to
agree to. The amount requested is small compared with the total amount spent. At this
stage in the negotiations, each of the developed countries is wary of giving up more than
the others, and therein lies the problem. In order for the negotiations to succeed, each
nation must be willing to give up some degree of protection and support regardless of
what its neighbors do.397 The balance of 2006 and 2007 were not productive for the Doha
negotiations, and were occupied with suits and countersuits brought by nations concerned
that others were not abiding by the agreements that had already been made.
In January 2008, Canada brought suit against the United States concerning
subsidies being paid to the corn industry that were inconsistent with the Agreement on
Agriculture. The suit was later joined by Australia, Brazil, and others who expressed the
same concern.398 Although the United States has been the target of many complaints, that
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is an indicator not that it is in breach of more agreements but that the transparency of the
US trade regime is more open than those of many other countries and therefore more
susceptible to policy scrutiny.
On September 11, 2008, as the annual Doha Round of negotiations, in its seventh
year, was coming to a close, it became apparent that an agreement on the parameters
presented to the membership in July would once again not be reached. A disappointed
Director General Pascal Lamy was openly critical of those countries that had decided to
continue as before to the detriment of those poor countries that would have benefited
most from the agreement. He alluded to the short-sightedness of developed nations in
their decision. ―Those who gain from trade are seldom as loud in the political arena as
those who lose. In fact, those who gain, are seldom aware that global trade rules may
have had something to do with their gain.‖399 The July package that Director Lamy
referred to included reductions in subsidies, tariffs, banking, and insurance, as well as the
incorporation of the principal of ―less than full reciprocity,‖400 designed to level the
playing field for less-developed nations.
Many of the members were in agreement on a number of the issues but could not
agree on the safeguard issues, better known as the insurance clauses that would protect
them against market fluctuations. Director Lamy‘s frustration was evident in his closing
speech when he said, ―So what now? . . . To let a 7 year international effort to essentially
do good collapse would be a calamity. Who is ready to shoulder that responsibility? Are
we really willing to tell the taxpayer who has funded us for this long that we‘ve wasted
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his/her money!‖401 Four days later, he called the members back to the negotiating table
while admonishing those that would walk away from the table when arguments were not
going their way. He quoted Michael Korda, the British novelist: ―Never walk away from
failure. On the contrary, study it carefully, and imaginatively, for its hidden assets.‖ 402
This was in reference to those less-developed nations who had formed a small coalition
on cotton protection and who refused to concede in their demands.
In the last quarter of 2008, the WTO warned the United States to not fall into the
same protectionism trap that befell them during the Great Depression, warning that
―protectionism and economic isolationism do not work.‖ 403Director General Lamy
reminded the United States of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, which raised US tariffs on
imported goods and led to a disaster in trade between nations.404 He stressed that these
policies did not work in the past and will not work now during this downturn in the
world‘s economy. Nations must continue to trade with one another, and must not
succumb to the temptation to turn inward. As an example, the world depression of 1929
was exaggerated by the actions of the nations as they discontinued trade in foreign
products, and concentrated on the purchasing of local goods. In contrast, the crises in
Asia in the late 1990s were countered by continuing international trade.405 The answer to
the current economic situation is to reach trade agreements with rules and guidelines that
benefit all, which can only be achieved through mutual elimination of subsidies and
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harmful tariffs.406 Lamy refers it to as ―a global insurance policy against the disorder
caused by unilateral actions.‖407
Lamy‘s advice is well founded in today‘s economic climate. We have the
advantage of history on our side this time. The trademarks of the Great Depression were
the inability to recognize what was happening, inaction when the nation should have been
moving forward, and action in the wrong direction, in the form of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act, when the nation realized that the economy was crashing. The Asian crises
taught us that increased trade is a positive factor in recession recovery, and that the
removal of trade barriers will increase the momentum.
Both the essential factors of the proposed agreement and the restrictions it
contains are responsible for the roadblocks that prevent members from agreeing on this
proposal. According to Lamy, ―Three principal constraints today represent a challenge to
our work: the first is the bottom-up approach, under which members must themselves
always take the lead in tabling negotiating proposals and compromise solutions; the
second is the concept of a ‗single undertaking,‘ which implies that in a round of
negotiations with 20 different topics, nothing is agreed until all is agreed; and the third is
decision-taking by consensus, which is reasonably close to unanimity.‖408
Conclusion
The WTO is, in essence, attempting to establish a standard to which all
agricultural trade must adhere. These standards would greatly diminish the prospect of
international agricultural trade falling into the same situation that the US and
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international banking industries now find themselves in. If one buys the concept that the
lack of financial regulation is the cause of the current banking downturn, and that a set of
international regulations could have prevented it, then the WTO is on the right track. On
the other hand, the banking industry has always resisted governmental involvement,
while pointing to the lack of success in the past when governments nationalized banks,
and became heavily involved in their management.
The WTO has been victorious in its goal to reduce tariffs, and somewhat less
successful in its dispute-resolution process and in its efforts to set parameters that would
protect against market surges, but far more triumphant than its predecessor, GATT. The
WTO system provides the international economy with an insurance policy against the
disorder caused by unilateral actions. The real success story is the WTO‘s ability to gain
a consensus from the international community that developed countries do not require
agricultural guarantees in order to support their farm communities. Those nations
involved have shared that belief by agreeing to reduce and eventually eliminate up to 95
percent of all agricultural support programs. If the offending nations are to honor their
commitment to the WTO, then they must eventually eliminate the price supports that
have continued beyond their useful life.
It is evident that great progress has been made, although it has been a struggle.
The Doha Round has been in progress for eight years. This time frame would appear, at
first blush, to be a failure. In reality, 153 nations have sat down together, agreed to work
out a mutually beneficial plan, and set the parameters by which to work. These members
reached tentative agreement on 17 of the 20 groups of topics on the agenda. The issues
left are the market-surge safeguard clause, and the US and EU cotton subsidies.
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Considering the number of nations involved, and the preponderance of issues on the
table, the achievements can only be heralded as a resounding success.
Large nations have conceded that agreements that are equal for both parties are
not always equitable for LDCs and developing nations. Countries have acknowledged
that the same rules and time frames will not work for all, and have softened their previous
absolute positions to more moderate ones that all can agree on. In a lecture at the
University of California, Berkeley, on October 29, 2008, Director General Lamy said,
―we know that trade opening creates greater efficiencies, encourages innovation and
general wealth. But this does not mean that trade opening is good for every person, every
country, every time.‖409
When the present agreement is passed, the result will be a 50 percent reduction in
customs duties, two-thirds in developed countries, and one-third in developing countries.
That would amount to roughly $20 billion in export taxes for the EU, and another $5
billion in food costs over a period of five to ten years.410
The most important aspect of these negotiations is that all agree that trade
sanctions, and price supports, are in most instances not necessary, hinder trade, drive up
the price of local products, cost nations billions of dollars that could be used in other
areas, prevent growth in LDCs, and promote poverty in poor countries. During the
agreement process, both the United States and the EU were forced to acknowledge all of
the above. When the remaining issues have been agreed on, these two entities will be
charged with the task of implementing the reform in their respective countries.
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There is a parallel between the necessity for the powerful countries of the world to
relinquish their controlling power within the WTO, for a more modern assessment of
what the rest of the world actually needs, and the necessity of the developed nations‘
governments to acknowledge that the old, established system of agricultural subsidies no
longer has a place in the modern world.
Director General Lamy, in a recent plea for unity and agreement, summed the
current crisis thus: ―The financial crisis that we experience is a wakeup call indicating
that the world economy cannot grow above the limits of its real production, and that
feeding it by debt and liquidity may only provoke severe corrections.‖411
Although the WTO has made tremendous advances in its negotiations, it must
take some of the blame for nonconformation. It sometimes wears blinders that hinder its
fairness in decision making. Under the WTO, a nation cannot discriminate against
products based on how they are produced, be it by child labor or with environmentally
destructive technologies. The United States has banned tuna imports from countries that
allow certain kinds of nets designed to catch tuna, but which also trap and kill other sea
animals such as whales, dolphins, and game fish. Yet in the blind eye of the WTO, tuna is
tuna. The fact that other animals and fish are killed in the process has nothing to do with
the trade agreement.412 This policy needs to be addressed in a more equitable manner, and
the involvement of the UN in environmental affairs would make it a natural partner.
The WTO‘s all-or-nothing policy has prevented partial agreement in some areas
where there is little disagreement. The WTO position is that an agreement will be reached
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when everything on the table has been agreed on. This policy has encouraged trade blocs
such as the EU, NAFTA, and other international groups and cartels. During the WTO
negotiations, these organizations have, out of necessity, entered into bilateral agreements
that are formed in ways that sometimes conflict with WTO negotiations. The WTO has
encouraged these organizations to work closely together in an effort to combine their
focus in the same direction. Unfortunately, the power that they possess is easily
transformed into personal agendas that are not in the spirit of the Doha negotiations.
The root causes of the current financial crisis are complex and multifaceted. It is
becoming clear that the system suffers from a lack of regulation, transparency, and
accountability. The WTO Doha negotiations promise the most internationally regulated
environment ever created, and therein lies the problem.413
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CHAPTER V
DEVELOPING NATIONS
How does all of this affect developing nations? The previous chapters reviewed
the US and EU agricultural support programs, examined the reasons for their
implementation, tracked their evolution over time from their inception following the
Great Depression to the current state of the economy, ascertained the identity of those
who receive the support payments, and identified the political influence that is
responsible for their contemporary existence. Chapter three chronicled the difficulties
incurred by the WTO as it attempted to organize the nations of the world into one of
universal trade agreements that applied one set of rules for all, to a recent point in time
when it came to realize that multilateral agreements might not be in the best interest of all
nations, and in particular for less developed and developing nations. The FAO lists 47
developing countries, 24 of them in Africa, which depend entirely on agricultural exports
for their economic development, while the UN has designated 49 LDCs of which 33 are
in Sub Sahara Africa.414 The third hypothesis of this dissertation states: The dumping of
agricultural products on the markets of less developed countries, at prices lower than
these products can be locally grown, is detrimental to the farmers of these nations.
Although the answer seems obvious at first blush, there are some unanswered questions
that must be examined further before one can reach a definitive answer. First: although
the farmers in these countries may be harmed in the short term, what are the long term
ramifications of inexpensive food products being provided to these extremely poor
414
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countries? Would the countries survive without this aid and if the answer is no, then the
conclusion might be different, second: would it be better for these countries if the aid was
in cash instead of agricultural products? That cash could then be used to purchase
products locally as well as on the international market. Keep in mind that the
international market would still be very low in price, because the producing nations
would still have the surplus products to dispose of. The focus of this section is on how
agricultural price supports affect less developed nations. The WTO came to the
conclusion that one set of trade rules may not be best for all countries, and that a separate
set of rules for each nation might be better. The following chapter will examine the
economics of these LDCs, review the benefits versus the down side of price supports,
both internal and external, and evaluate the options. It will also delve into the possibility
that for some LDCs, price supports may have little effect either way. For those countries
where economic growth is at a standstill, crop dumping may be a blessing and a necessity
for survival, where transitional countries may benefit from a reduction of low priced
agricultural products. The crops that are the primary focal point of this chapter are grain,
cotton and sugar. Grain because of its importance to many of the developing nations as a
crop that could mean life or death to those who can raise only enough annually to live on,
sugar because it has traditionally been highly protected and held by the WTO to be
essential to the economic success of many poor and developing countries, and cotton,
because it is the most highly supported crop internationally, and is a staple of many
developing nations.
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Subsidies
World trade talks with in the WTO have reached a stalemate recently, in part due
to developing country demands that developed countries reduce their large farm support
programs to allow poor farmers in the global South to compete on a even playing field .
Claiming that developed nations farm subsidies amount to nearly $1 billion a day, and
that ―the average European cow receives more in subsidies than the nearly three billion
people who live on less than two dollars a day, LDC governments, farmer groups, NGOs
and international aid groups have demanded steep cuts in developed countries
agricultural farm subsidies.‖415 According to Mattie Sharpless, the Acting Administrator,
Foreign Agriculture Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in 2003, the U.S., as
a result of its agricultural subsidies, was able to export below the cost of production, 53
percent of its wheat crop, 47percent of its cotton, 42 percent of its rice, 35percent of its
soy beans and 21percent of its corn.416
The major point of contention is that developed countries are unfairly excluding
LDC product imports while subsidizing their own producers at some $300 billion per
year. LDCs are demanding an opening of markets and a rapid phase out of agricultural
subsidies, which they cite as the primary cause of export dumping in the developing
world which in turn interferes with the sale of locally grown products.417
There can be no argument that agricultural subsidies, and export subsidies in
particular, have adverse effects on the international market, especially on LDCs when the
surplus production is dumped on their market. When exporters are compensated to get rid
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of the excess because production costs are higher then the current world prices, the result
on the very poor nation‘s ability to sell their products can be catastrophic.418
But is the problem of these countries exclusive to agricultural subsidies or are
they simply one part of the problem? There are a number of ways the anti- subsidy
campaign may be missing their mark and some may be in the statistics. The anti-subsidy
advocates, and their studies have largely failed to recognize that today, the bulk of
agricultural support is not subsidy based and that much of the support now goes to areas
other than production, which is the culprit in crop dumping.
It is not uncommon for anti-subsidy advocates to lump all subsidies into the same
basket, claiming subsidy numbers of up to 300 billion or more annually which simply
confuses the issue. Although the dollar amount of farm support may not have changed
much in the last decade, much of that support today contributes little to the export tariff
or crop dumping problem in LDCs. It has been estimated that of the 300 billion in U.S.
farm support, only about 10 to 12 billion remains in the from of export subsidies.
Although the WTO has made the elimination of export subsidies a major part of the July
2004 Doha framework, its member states have not yet reached a successful agreement.419
An example of advocate overstatement came from Allisto Moldovo, the VicePresident of the African Region at the World Bank when he said that OECD agricultural
subsidies of 300 billion annually are equal to Africa‘s total GDP.420 The statement is true,
but out of context in that it misleads the reader to believe that all 300 billion in subsidies
affects the African nations. Mathieu Kerekou, President of the Republic of Benin, in his
address to the diplomatic corps of the WTO stated that in 2002 U.S. farmers had a record
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harvest of cotton in the amount of 4.38 billion kilograms, and that the U.S. supported its
cotton farmers with 3.4 billion dollars. He pointed out that West Africa is the third largest
exporter of cotton, and that Mali is the largest grower in that region posting total
production of 200 million kilograms during that same year. However Mali lost money
because the prices fell 66% since 1995 and fell 10% in 2002.421 This would imply that the
reason for Mali‘s losses were due to the U.S. support payments. Although his statement
may be partially true, he did not supply enough information to support it. Yes the U.S.
did supply its cotton farmers with 3.4 billion dollars, however, only a portion of that
money went toward production, while the balance was directed toward other areas of
rural advancement, such as environmental protection, and alternative crop research. This
is not to imply that alternative subsidies cannot influence crop pricing or import tariffs,
because they do. An example of non-crop price support that places import limitations on
LDCs would be sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS). As import tariffs are forced
to decline, many OECD countries have introduced SPS restrictions that prevent LDCs
from exporting their crops. Unfortunately this is also a double edged sword in that in
today‘s world sanitary standards are a necessity in protecting human, animal and plant
life, while at the same time an effective way of preventing LDCs from taking advantage
of the world market. It is not uncommon for some developed countries such as those in
the EU to establish their own sanitary and phytosanitary standards that are much stricter
than the generally accepted WTO STS, which effectively protect their markets from SSA
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imports.422 It has been estimated that the EU‘s SPS strict standards are costing exporting
countries between 140 and 700 million euros annually423
While some insist that OECD support levels have remained the same for the past
20 years in spite of the members claim that they are following the 1994 Marrakesh
agreement to progressively reduce those supports, the WTO counters that present
supports are quite different than those of 20 years ago. To reinforce their statement, they
point to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture which breaks down subsidies into three
different categories of Amber, Green and Blue box subsidies. While the OECD numbers
focus on the total amount that taxpayers spend on agriculture supports in the aggregate,
the WTO reduces the numbers to only those that actually have an effect on the
international market.424
There are several measuring devices in place that can be used to determine the
current amount of trade distorting agricultural support. The Aggregate Measurement of
Support (AMS) of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture calculates market price
support estimates for each commodity.425 The AMS produces a good estimate of support
to farmers, but does not produce good numbers about the effect of this support on LDCs.
An alternative is the Total Support Estimate (TSE) which includes all transfers
from taxpayers to agricultural producers such as subsidies, research, education, extension
services, irrigation and anything else that might fall under the heading of General
Services Support Estimate (GSSE) further confusing the actual effect on LDCs.426
Neither the AMS the GSSE nor the TSE are particularly accurate is estimating actual
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effect on LDCs. The important difference is that price gaps in the AMS calculation are
estimated by reference to domestic administered prices and not to actual producer prices.
With developing countries demanding heavy reductions in developed country
subsidies, the debates on how to measure the actual effect that they have on LDCs is
becoming ever more important. In fact, today‘s subsidies may represent only about onethird of the total Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE) for OECD countries. The bulk of
the PSE, 70% in 1999-2002, came in the form of ―Market Price Support‖ (MPS), which
is another estimate of the cost to consumers due to government agricultural support
policies that result in higher consumer prices.427
Those opposed as well as those in favor of continued low cost products flowing to
LDCs can simply pick and choose from the above list of statistics until they find one that
supports their position. One of the problems is the popular understanding that the PSE
measures subsidies that have a direct effect on LDCs. It does, however it measures more
than that. It measures all support measures including those that have no bearing on
foreign prices or crop dumping issues. There is no question that some LDCs are being
harmed by some of the support programs, however there is also evidence that many
numbers may be included that have no effect on these countries in order to support the
anti subsidy cause. For example, Watkins and von Braun write, ―Each year, rich countries
spend in excess of $300 billion in support of agriculture…Most of the subsidies end up
supporting production and generating large surpluses, which are then dumped on world
markets at prices that bear no relation to production costs.‖ 428 That may have been true
ten years ago, but certainly no so today.
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Combining USDA figures and OECD data, it is estimated that dumping margins
for U.S. corn in recent years have ranged from 18% to 33%. This basically means that
grain that is sold on the market, primarily to poor LDCs that need food products, is priced
18% to 33% below the international market price. The result is that the farmers in those
countries that purchase the grain will not be able to sell their excess crop production at a
profit, or even at a break even price. For example: Mexican corn farmers find it difficult
to compete with US prices that are below production costs and to do so they must lower
their own prices below their costs of production. They are in effect subsidizing their
consumers rather than being subsidized by their government.429 For Mexican farmers this
becomes an economic issue that could eventually drive the farmers off the land and into
the city. For LDCs that have chronic food shortages, such as sub Sahara Africa, the cheap
food is a blessing although it may be harmful to the local farmers. However, in many
cases these countries farmers produce only enough to live on, and have little or no surplus
to place on the market.
The World Bank, which has as one of its responsibilities the distribution of
foreign aid, did a study of the potential benefits of agricultural trade reform. The report
was presented as fact to the membership at the Cancún WTO meetings in September,
2003. It projected that trade reform and anti –dumping regulations would result in
significant reductions in LCD rural poverty. It based its projections on a model that
reduced developed country agricultural tariffs to 10%, eliminated export subsidies, and
decoupled domestic subsidies from production, (which had for the most part already been
done by 2003.) The report projected over $500 billion in additional world income by
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2015, with $350 billion going to developing countries.430 However, further investigation
into the report reveals that there are a number of areas where the numbers have been
arranged in a manner that would support the banks position:
―1) The projected gains overall, when considered through 2015, are quite small.
Developing country income gains are only 1.5% over the entire period,
2) 80% of the projected gains are from own-country reforms, that is, from
developing countries‘ own liberalization measures. These are assumed gains from
the lowering of their own prices.
3) The presumed welfare benefit is not from the reduction in export dumping
but from lower consumer prices, mostly in developed nations, quite the opposite
of the claims made by other studies‖.431
As one would expect, all are not in agreement with these numbers. In an article by
Donald Mitchell and Mombert Hoppe, they claim that if developed nations reduce their
grain subsidies, only a few importer countries would actually experience losses. 1) they
estimate that upward price movement would be only half the average fluctuation that
these countries experience annually as a result of normal cyclical price changes. 2) Those
countries that are food exporters export more than one product, therefore only part of
their production will be affected by liberalization. 3) since prices will raise slowly, this
will allow net importers to get ahead of the game, and possibly even become net
exporters.432
Nevertheless, some SSA countries would require outside help in order to survive.
There can be little argument that these subsidies and tariffs play a part in compromising
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the comparative advantage of some poor countries to the advantage of developed ones.
When the projected effects of subsidy removal are examined, one must
keep in mind that the purported goal of subsidy elimination is to reduce over production,
diminish surpluses which will in turn lower consumer prices in developed nations and
raise them in LDCs. This raises the question: how do higher prices and less available
food products to be used as foreign aid benefit LDCs?
More than likely, what would happen is that the changes produced by such
policies would be a shift in production from Europe and Japan primarily to the US and
others who have already eliminated production related incentives. The high levels of farm
support in Japan and Europe would be reduced and the competitive position of the US
and other recently reformed developed countries would give them a distinct advantage.
Although it is doubtful that this is what LDCs actually want, it is what their
supporters and representatives are asking for. Their position raises the question: just how
much will the price go up and exactly what will the effect on LDCs be? Ritchie, Murphy .
states ―we should be looking for policy reforms that produce price increases of 20%33%.‖433 If the international price of grain goes up 20% to 33%, how will this help
nations that are in poverty, are net importers of food, and have little to sell on the open
market?
In a separate study by the Free Trade Area of the Americas, it found that subsidy
elimination would not generate a 20% to 33% increase, but only a 1.8% price rise for
grains. The USDA‘s Economic Research Service Study shows only a 3.7% rise in
agricultural prices. In another World Bank study, it claims that eliminating specific types
of subsidies yields increases in grain prices of only 3.3% to 4.3%. The Agricultural
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Policy Analysis Center at the University of Tennessee found that the elimination of all
U.S. agricultural subsidies would cause grain prices to actually fall three percent by
2011.434 Which estimate is correct? Each set of statistics would allow one to pick and
choose whichever one that supports its cause best; however, none of these numbers come
close to the Murphy prediction of 20% to 33% or to the World. Banks estimate of a $350
billion landfall for the LDCs.
These and other studies suggest that developed country subsidies and export
barriers may not be the only cause of rural poverty. LDCs may be focusing their demands
in trade negotiations too narrowly on subsidy reduction, when it should be looking at the
larger picture. For many Sub Sahara Africa (SSA) countries, subsidies are a double edged
sword. While subsidies harm their farmers and exporters minimumally, they are a lifeline
for those that are dependant on staple food products.
The U.S. corn market is a good example why simply removing export subsidies
may not help LDCs in their efforts to sell more of their own farm products or correct the
poverty level in those counties. The U.S. has no significant border protections against
foreign corn. Since it is the world‘s largest corn producer and exporter, it has no fear of
external competition. How would an end to corn subsidies and greater access to the U.S.
market be of benefit to the developing world‘s small farmers? The LDC‘s rural poor
resemble Mexico‘s corn farmers in that they grow food crops for subsistence and on
occasion, a small quantity for local markets. The counter argument is that Mexico has lost
two million corn farmers over the past ten years, because it allowed subsidized low cost
corn from the U.S. into the country.435 On the other hand, non food crop subsidies will
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definitely have an adverse effect on LDCs. An example is the U.S. cotton subsidy
program. U.S. cotton subsidies in 2003 amounted to 3.1 billion. (Coincidently, that comes
to about 1.5 times the amount of U.S. foreign aid to all African countries) These subsidies
definitely have an effect on SSA income, as they can lower international cotton prices by
as much as 20 percent. It has been estimated that these subsidies cost West African
farmers as much as $150 million annually.436 Unlike cotton growers, most poor grain
farmers in the LDCs have little or no excess food crops to export. Rather, they are
growing food for their families and selling some portion of their surplus, if there is any,
locally. Greater market access internationally does these farm families little good and
does nothing to alleviate local poverty.437
The reduction or elimination of Developed Nations agricultural subsidies alone
may not have the effects its supporters suggest. Instead of the single minded focus on
subsidy reductions, policy reformers should to focus on these four principal goals:
1) reducing export dumping to those nations that do not need additional food.
2) reducing global commodity overproduction in key crops that end up on the
market at below market prices.
3) reducing the market power of agribusiness conglomerates and the
implementation of programs specifically designed for each individual
antidumping nation through a common institution such as the WTO.
4) open the markets of the U.S. and the EU by eliminating all import tariffs. It is
estimated that if these two producers would open their markets and eliminate
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dumping, African exports would rise by 22 percent, and GDP by 5.7 percent.438
The farmers in these poor countries resemble those in the U.S. during the
depression. While the developed nations no longer need agricultural price supports for
their small farmers, LDC farmers are in a development stage where protection may be the
key to their survival. Unfortunately, most SSA governments have little or no money for
agricultural price supports.
Another important detriment to the internal growth of LDCs is import tariffs.
Although they do not receive the attention that export subsidies do, some of them are
extremely harmful to LDCs development. For example, the EU average tariff on
agricultural products coming into its countries is 22 percent, while the average for the
U.S. is 14 percent. This is nearly four times more than tariffs imposed on other industrial
and manufactured goods. The elimination of these tariffs would open up the market to
those nations that desperately need to expand, and would do little harm to the small
farmers in the EU or the U.S.439
Not all dumping is detrimental, nor are all agricultural products dumped on SSA
countries sold at below market prices, some are free. For over fifty years developed
countries have been sending aid to these nations, some in the form of raw food products.
Although there is no question that this aid has saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of
people, there is some question as to whether it has actually contributed to economic
growth and poverty reduction. The reoccurring question is: have these countries come to
depend on this aid to the detriment of internal progress? Are the leaders of these countries
sophisticated enough in national management to understand that internal growth must
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occur while this aid is available? If not, then the aid simply falls under the heading of
humanitarian relief that will eventually end without any long term benefit to the
country.440 While some developed countries have attempted to attach caveats to their aid,
it has not worked well. SSA countries require external support and guidance for
infrastructure development, however, history has been unkind to those who have
attempted to force change through coheresion.441 During this period of Globalization,
there is a collective view that even if all agricultural support programs and export
restrictions were lifted, SSA still might not be able to participate in the rewards of
international trade. Africa is a continent that is backward in governance skills, poverty
stricken and disease ridden. It is not prepared to strengthen agricultural production or to
improve its trade potential without the help and guidance of others. In 2005 the
Commission for Africa determined that foreign aid would have to be increased by 25
billion annually and double that amount in five years.442
Does the dumping of agricultural products in these countries harm the small
farmers. Probably not as much as advocates of reform would like for us to believe. While
the SSA potential for agricultural production is great in a continent with huge natural
resources, the potential for near term progress is poor. Their infrastructure is poor which
curtails investment, while civil unrest, disease and tenuous land ownership has created an
atmosphere of fear and low productivity.443
If the WTO reforms are passed as written today, in a blanket format, they will
prove ineffective to many LDC nations, but vastly beneficial to developed country
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agribusiness firms. Between 2001 and 2003 SSA countries imported nearly 2.5 billion in
food products. The current WTO Doha round of negotiations would eliminate all
subsidies which in turn would raise prices in nations that are barely getting by now.444
The removal of subsidies will result in higher international market prices which will be
good for non food subsistence countries that produce more than they consume. However,
higher prices will actually reduce consumption in poor countries while undermining their
food security. Many SSA countries will require protective measures similar to those of
the U.S. in the 1930s, and post WWII.445
As noted earlier in the text, large agribusiness has strong government ties,
lobbying accounts in the hundreds of millions of dollars and a significant amount of
political support. The challenge will always be one of breaking the regional popularity of
these programs that go well beyond pork barrel politics and into the realm of big business
while at the same time protecting those that cannot survive with higher prices.
The contest is one of two fronts, and emphasizes Peter Bauer‘s law of unintended
consequences.446 One the one hand, the breakup of agribusiness political power in order
to remove trade subsidies will promote an increase in SSA crop production and augment
the small farmers income. This could increase local trade between countries that have a
surplus, and those that are deficit in food products. On the other hand, the resultant higher
prices could be detrimental to the poorest nations who have little money to buy food at
any price. If the cheap overproduced products of the developed nations go away, the food
security of these nations may go with it.
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Surpluses
The key issue here is the extent to which developed country farm subsidies
actually contribute to rural poverty in the LDCs, by selling overproduced surplus grain to
poor developing countries at a reduced price below their production costs. Even if the
PSE, the MPS or the AMS misestimates agricultural subsidies, the level of subsidies that
still affect pricing are high and do have an impact on developing country farmers. The
real task is to identify the relationships between developed nation agricultural policies
and the degree to which these policies actually harm or help LDCs in their effort to both
sell their surplus crops and improve their internal economic condition.
Most nations are in agreement that 1) low prices prevent some sales of local
crops, and 2) developed nations elimination of subsidies would not raise producer prices
to the extent advocates of such measures have estimated.447 The problem to be addressed
is how to continue to provide assistance to those countries that need it while doing as
little harm to the local farmers as possible, and to reach agreement on how much
international prices would actually increase. In other words, if the developed nations send
one hundred tons of free grain to a starving country, what is the effect on local farmers
who are trying to sell their product locally, and what would happen to the poor if they did
not send it? 448 A good example was the Latin American recession in the 1980s.
Agricultural exports to Latin America were given to the governments to sell to the local
people at bargain prices. Obviously, local producers were not able to supply the needs of
the people, or there would have been no need to give it to the countries in the first place,
however, those farmers that did harvest more than they consumed found that in order to
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sell their product, they had to sell it at below the cost of production. The result was a flat
market that reduced production the following year.449
One of the options is to send cash instead of product. In the rare case where the
U.S. makes grants or loans in place of grain, it is not unusual for the U.S. to require that
those grants and loans be used to purchase U.S. grain and products. Although it is a
reasonable request, it prevents the recipients from using a part of the grant or loan to
build infrastructure that might prevent the necessity for future loans. The argument in
favor of this requirement is that the grantor can account for all the funds by requiring that
it be spent on the open market. In the absence of accountability, those funds often end up
in the wrong hands.450
There have been occasions when unsupervised funds have simply disappeared,
and even free grain has been confiscated by governments and sold on the international
market for personal gain. Foreign aid to unsophisticated governments in the form of cash
has some serious down sides. It is often invested in projects doomed to failure from the
beginning. Unlike investments make by prudent businessmen who weigh the benefits
against costs, governments with little business experience often make the wrong
decisions on how to spend the money, because the money is free, and they basically have
no cost involved.451
To date, Canada may have come up with the most effective idea. Canada has
instituted a co-operative program where half its food aid assistance is in the form of
grain, while the other half is used to purchase foodstuff locally. This has the effect of
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encouraging local production, while providing food for the poor.452 Lack of oversight of
local purchases is a concern of this concept.
Not all foreign aid is what it appears to be. Large corporations and politicians in
the past have been known to establish and enforce import policies that prohibit foreign
countries from shipping products to the U.S. It is a form of protectionism that often
destroys industry in poor developing countries. Once destroyed, these same corporations
send overproduced product, as aid, to the very countries that were harmed. It is a winwin situation where outside products are prohibited, while at the same time creating new
markets for export supported products.453 Neither is food aid free. More often than not,
food aid is a loan that must be paid back. For example, when Indonesia needed grain
during the 1999 food crisis, the U.S. loaned them the food to be paid back over a 25 year
period. This gave the U.S. control over the Indonesian grain market for the next 25
years.454
The Agricultural Marketing Act (AMA) of 1929 was formed to provide U.S.
farmers with a livable income, and to increase production of crops, while the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) was developed in Western Europe in the early 1960s largely
for the same reason. Both were designed for the same purpose, to avoid food shortages, to
provide an incentive for farmers to grow more product, and to reduce poverty in the farm
community. Eighty years later these outdated programs are still in effect. In Robert Higgs
book, Crisis and Leviathan, he makes the appropriate comment that emergencies always
create new government agencies with increased powers, sometimes at the expense of
other freedoms. When the emergency has ended, the new government agency continues,
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sometimes into perpetuity.455 Production incentives and modern farming methods, have
created an oversupply in both the U.S. and European markets. Although production
incentives have been reduced and in some cases eliminated, there is still excess
production that finds an outlet on the international market in the form of low priced grain
and other agricultural products for LDCs that are experiencing food shortages. Although
the EU CAP reforms of 1992, and agricultural reform in the U.S. has reduced production,
both have continued to over produce and to flood the international markets by a
combination of export subsidies, internal price support, and direct aid to producers to
compensate for revenue losses.
It should be obvious by now, that any subsidy that promotes over-production,
directly or indirectly, and increases exports onto the world market at prices below the
costs of production will result in dumping. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture
encouraged developed countries to make a commitment to reduce their agricultural
subsidies and subsequent product dumping. The result of this first attempt at reducing
agricultural support payments was to reduce production through decoupling. The term
decoupling is the new byword for compensatory payment made to farmers when
production incentives have been removed. It is a type of socialist welfare payment that is
paid to farmers who have lost their previously guaranteed incomes as a result of
agricultural reform. It is usually paid in the name of land conservation or environmental
protection programs. In spite of these revisions, the EU agricultural subsidies were $5
billion higher at the end of the 1990s than a decade earlier and continue to grow. The
U.S. is no better, having adopted two consecutive Farm Bills which are estimated to
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increase agricultural subsidies over the next decade by 80% to a total of at least $ 82
billion.456
Although both the U.S. and EU agricultural support spending has increased, and
the overall level of support to agriculture has changed little, the structure of these
subsidies has changed significantly. Both the EU and the U.S. have significantly
decoupled subsidies that directly encourage production, and have replaced them with
direct payments to farmers that are not linked to production. In theory, the further
decoupling of subsidies linked to production, and a shift to investment in rural
development proposed in the EU‘s mid-term review are intended to discourage overproduction still further. Although this practice is a step forward, it has its detractors. For
instance, the OECD has noted that even decoupled payments may encourage farmers to
continue to overproduce because they know that they will still receive support payments
when international prices are low. Farmers, being an intelligent lot, continue to invent
ways to overproduce and thus create surplus corps.457
A good example of how this works is the ability of EU farmers to develop new
ways to receive support in order to produce more product. In 1992 the EU shifted to a
system of direct payments that no longer depended on export subsidies. The result was
that EU grain prices fell nearly 50% but production actually rose, along with exports, to
pre reform levels. If the current trend continues the EU‘s share of world wheat markets
will increase from its 2000 level of 7.85 % to 19.7 % in 2012. They are now producing
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more product while increasing their already large market share which once again results
in surplus crops and reduces the LDCs ability to compete.458
As stated earlier, grain is not the only international issue. The EU also produces
18 % of world sugar exports, 28% of world dairy exports, and around 12% of world
wheat exports. Despite production costs being considerably higher in Europe than in
many other countries, the EU has maintained its large market share through the CAP‘s
complex range of export subsidies and product dumping.459 Although this is not usually
associated with the plight of the LDCs, the overproduction that results in dumping are a
huge cost to taxpayers, consumers, and the environment. In 2002, the CAP cost a massive
€46.5 billion, almost half the EU budget, and farm subsidies accounted for 37% of the
total value of European agricultural production.460
Corporate Farming-Political Influence
The vast majority of farming today is done by large developed country corporate
agri-business who spend millions on advertising campaigns each year, often rightfully
claiming that people are starving because there is not enough food to feed the current
population, and that we are getting further behind the growing population every year.
Some of the developed member states and the agribusiness lobby often fall back on the
argument that the vulnerability of small farmers is at stake if current agricultural policies
are abandoned. Without these safety nets, they argue, the market would destroy those
who sustain their rural traditions. That statement may be true in LDCs, but not in the U.S.
or the EU. In actuality, the only beneficiaries of farm support programs in developed
countries continue to be the largest farmers and agribusinesses, not the small farmers who
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have mostly disappeared. Peter Rossett of Food First asserts that contrary to these
reports, food production has more than kept pace with population growth. He also states
that during the last 35 years, per capita food production has actually grown 16 % faster
than the world‘s population. Mr. Rosset asserts that ―We now have more food per person
available on this planet than ever before in human history.‖ 461
Studies conducted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) clearly
indicate that it is abundance, not scarcity, that best describes the world‘s food supply.
Every year, enough wheat, rice, and other grains are produced to provide every human
with 3,500 calories per day.462 The problem lack of access to the product, not lack of
production. Increasing agricultural output has not corrected the worlds hunger problems
because it fails to address the LDC key issues of: 1) access to land and 2) purchasing
power of those that need the food. As summarized in a Food First report, ―If you don‘t
have land on which to grow food or the money to buy it, you go hungry no matter how
dramatically technology pushes up food production.‖ 463 The new form of agricultural
liberalization as promoted by big agricultural business has not and will not help the small
LDC farmer. To the contrary, it is structured to promote the interests of the powerful, not
the poor.
There is an ongoing theory that colonialism set the stage for large agri business to
purchase large amounts of land from their former colonies. When these nations became
free states, the large plantation owners remained, and the land never passed to the people
of the new state. These new mega farms export most of their product, because the local
market is too poor to purchase the product in any quantity. These industrially grown
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crops are not necessarily the crops that are needed by those that live in the host country
anyway. More often, they are money crops that sell well on the international market. This
is one of the reasons why the poor continue to go hungry while the world producers claim
to be producing enough to support the world adequately.464
The system remains in tact because the local population has never accumulated
enough wealth to regain control of the land. The system is self perpetuating as the people
become poorer and the new colonials regain more control of the countryside.
For this trend to be broken, the dispossessed must find a way to reclaim at least a part of
their land. The WTO and the UN believe that it is unlikely that they will be able to
accomplish this on their own.465
If the land is available but the wrong crops are planted, usually cash crops,
(cotton, sugar or tobacco) are grown, the same outcome will occur. If the people need
food, why would they grow other crops? The answer is that those that are hungry are not
growing the wrong crops; they grow what they can eat. Industry grows the crops that pay
the most, which are not necessarily the crops that the people need. A great problem in
poor countries is land ownership. An example is land ownership in SSA countries. Large
foreign corporations have systematically purchased large tracts of land from the
government, leaving poor farmers with little more than enough land to grow a small
amount of food on which to survive. These corporations grow what is most profitable for
export, and that is not always food crops. In the past decade, industrialized agriculture
has not produced foods for the people, but rather record crops of cotton and sugarcane
and any other crop that is subsidized. These are cash crops, where grain grown for the
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poor is not. The poor have no cash with which to purchase commodities, therefore are not
considered to be potential buyers. Until agricultural reform in these developing countries
establishes rules that protect their people, the large corporations will continue to produce
and export cash crops, and the poor will remain hungry.
How do subsidies actually work to the benefit of these giant EU and U.S. agribusinesses, and who, in fact, gains the most? In 2001, France was once again the main
recipient of CAP funding, claiming 22.2 % of the total budget of €41.53 billion. The next
biggest recipients were Spain (14.8 %), Germany (14.1 %), and Italy (12.8 %) Not
surprisingly, these numbers have changed little today.466 In a detailed breakdown of aid
payments across the EU in 2000, it was calculated that 78 % of EU farmers receive less
than €5000 per year in direct aid, and that number continues to erode annually.
Furthermore, fewer than 2000 of Europe‘s 4.5 million farmers between them take in
almost €1 billion in direct aid from the CAP, and this number continues to grow each
year. Farm subsidies also vary in scale across Europe. In Portugal, approximately 95 % of
farmers receive less than the €5000 each year, compared with 43 % in the UK. Only 380
of the UK‘s landowners and large-scale agricultural businesses, which includes the Royal
family, share aid in the amount of the €300,000 per farmer.467
The CAP was designed to preserve the small farm communities, however, by
continuing these subsidy programs that concentrate on the increased wealth of the richest
agricultural landowners, these policies are actually hastening the demise of small land
holder, all the while declaring that these subsidies are necessary for their preservation. In
countries where rural land accounts for the majority of their territory, such as Spain, Italy,
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and Greece, the active farm population has been reduced to one-fifth of its number in the
1950s. As in the U.S., large-scale agri-business and their powerful lobbies have
successfully influenced the direction and content of the CAP over the years they have
also expanded into the poorest nations where land is least expensive, and labor is cheap.
They continue to defend it against reform, as they reap huge profits from various welfare
farm support programs that eventually trickle down to the demise of the poor countries of
the world.468
Dumping
The EU and the US subsidize their farmers in different ways, while criticizing
each other‘s systems, but the end result is the same, over production and a surplus of
foodstuffs. Some of these are sold below cost of production, or ‗dumped‘ in developing
countries.
There is compelling evidence that LDC farmers are leaving the land because they
can no longer provide for their family through farming. Farming in SSA is one of the
only areas in the world where the industry is becoming less viable every year, and there is
little industry to take those who move to the city.469 The population is facing increased
poverty, and indicators predict that it will get worse every year. Farmers face a future of
less land with which to produce fewer products for both themselves and the surrounding
urban areas. While some argue that this will eventually hurt the farm industry in these
countries, others compare it to what happened in the developed nations as excess farm
labor left the farms for the city, bringing a new labor force to be used in manufacturing
and industry. Farming in SSA is one of the only areas in the world where the industry is
468
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becoming less viable every year, and there is little industry to take those who move to the
city. The population is facing increased poverty, and indicators predict that it will get
worse every year. Farmers face a future of less land with which to produce fewer
products for both themselves and the surrounding urban areas.470 According to the World
Bank‘s 2004 Global Economic Prospects, the LDC‘s trade has stagnated over the past
twenty years, and its share of world agriculture is on the decline, and has actually
decreased to 0.5 percent.471
With the ongoing trend of below cost of production prices that producers receive
from traders and processors, a question not often asked is: how do US farmers survive?
Most of the survivors are large agri-consortiums that receive subsidies, while smaller
farmers often survive because they have acreage enrolled in USDA program crops and
receive various forms of support for those crops. According to a study by the
Environmental Working Group, (EWG) ―Taxpayers provided billion in subsidies,
unfortunately, 10 percent of the recipients, or about 144,000 participants, collected 61
percent of the money.‖ 472 Not surprisingly, the concentration of subsidized landowners is
even higher in the states of US House and Senate Committee of Agriculture and
Agriculture Appropriations chairs.473 SSA is facing a similar situation where large
agribusiness now owns large tracts of the arable land, but without having gone through
the process of purchasing it from the local population. In the U.S., farmers were
originally given the land, and sold it off over a period of generations, as the owners
moved to the city for a life less rigorous. In SSA, the local population were tribal with
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little interest in owning large tracts of land enabling the large conglomerates to purchase
it directly from the local governments.
This has created a vicious circle. Large agribusiness in SSA export their produce
because the local population cannot afford to purchase it, while U.S. farmers overproduce
and then dump the excess on SSA countries at below cost. What does one do when
production of a product exceeds demand? Unlike manufacturing, in the agricultural
industry it is dumped. If the entity is a manufacturing company, most produce according
to demand. When demand wanes to a level where it is no longer profitable, they switch to
a product that is more in demand. If the industry happens to be agriculture, the rules are
quite different. Dumping reflects a distorted market where production is supported
independently of demand. When there is no longer a market for the surplus agricultural
crops, they are discounted, subsidized by the government, and sold on the market below
cost leading to depressed international agricultural prices. This dumping destroys the
market, especially for small farmers in rural areas of developing countries, where 70% of
the world‘s poor live. One of the main causes for continued dumping of food on
international markets are support payments to producers in countries that allow
production without controlling supply.474
Although the world may eventually need this growing capacity, that time has not
yet come. Herbert Oberhaensli from The Nestle Corporation stated that ―the production
of food would have to double by 2025 to provide enough calories to the world‘s
population given demographic trends.‖475 He reports that we the world‘s farmers are
currently producing enough food to support the world population if that food could be
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transferred to the right places. Oberhaensli‘s prediction is sobering. If his estimate is
accurate, the world will catch production around 2020, and the need for increased
production means that productivity per acre will have to grow, together with land use and
water efficiency as well as an improved world wide distribution program.
The most important question of today is: does the dumping on the international
market beneficial or harmful. Does it drive rural farmers away from the farms that will be
needed in the future, does it save their lives or does it do a little of both? There is
evidence that poverty depresses rural areas and causes more migration to cities leaving
fewer farmers to till the land. In 1950, only 18 % of the population of developing
countries resided in cities; by the year 2000 the figure jumped to 40 percent and estimates
are that it will be at 9 percent 2020.476 The number of poor people dependent on outside
food sources is expected to grow from 90 million to around 400 million between 1999
and 2015. It is estimated that 27 percent of the SSA population does not have enough to
eat daily, an number almost twice as high as those in developing nations. SSA is plagued
with HIV and AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and yet, nearly three million of its people
die from hunger annually, that is more than all of the infectious diseases combined.
Commission for Africa 2005, claim that industrial and urban growth will have little effect
on these numbers. Only agriculture reform will have a positive effect a starving
population. Projections are that Africa will increase its food consumption by 100 percent
between 2000 and 2020 or about 4 percent annually. As the population increases, SSA
would under normal circumstances, become one of the fastest growing markets over that
20 year span. As it stands today, it will become the fastest growing recipient of
humanitarian aid at the rate $50 billion in 2004 and also increasing at 4 percent annually.
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The rest of the world will have to make a choice between helping these countries to

reorganize their agricultural infrastructure now, or to support them through humanitarian
aid for the next millennium. A startling revelation by the ODA is that international aid to
SSA countries has been steadily falling below the 1980s level. Between the years of 1990
and 2001it fell nearly 60 percent from $1.3 billion to $524 million.478
Currently, the dumped products supports the hungry more than it harms the
farmers. The Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) calculates the percentage
of the export price that is dumped below the cost of production by analyzing U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) cost of production data from 1990 to 2001 for five-major U.S.
export crops. The IATP reported that during the period studied ―levels of dumping
hovered around 40% for wheat, between 25% and 30% for corn, and levels have risen
steadily over the past four years for soybeans. These percentages mean that wheat, for
example, is selling for 40% less than it costs to produce. For cotton, the level of dumping
for 2001 rose to a remarkable 57% and for rice it had stabilized at around 20%.‖479
The conclusion on the effects of reduction of price supports is mixed. At the
outset of a world with reduced agriculture dumping, in many cases, developing country
export revenues might not be as great as projected since exporters may not be able to
meet the proliferation of sanitary, phyto-sanitary and technical standards than can act as
non-tariff barriers to trade. Stoll, at a minimum, some structured limits or guidelines on
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dumping would offer more protection against the cultural and social instability that
occurs when farmers are forced to migrate to the city in search of work.480
The WTO has inserted itself into the dumping situation and has become an
advocate for those LDC countries that claim they have been unfairly treated in the area of
agricultural trade agreements, and in particular product dumping. The WTO has a strong
legal system that deals regularly with the rights of both developed countries and LDCs by
prosecuting anti-competitive behavior, such as the recent US civil case against Cargill
and ADM for $4 billion in damages resulting from price fixing in high fructose corn
syrup.481 The opposition believes that the WTO is missing the point altogether. Reduced
agriculture support by the developed nations will not solve LDC problems, nor will the
implementation of internal agricultural supports, until these countries create an
atmosphere where an open economy can flourish. The civil unrest that is prevalent in
these countries, the lack of laws that ensures land ownership, and in many cases, the
presence of corrupt bureaucracy have become agents of continued poverty that have
prevailed from generation to generation. The reduction of agricultural supports by
developed nations will have little effect on LDC farmers who grow only enough grain to
live on, nor will internal price supports help farmers who have only enough land to
support a family. Greater access to markets will be of little use for countries that are
unable to take advantage of this opportunity due to domestic situations that create road
blocks to progress. Market access and the reduction of developed nations agricultural
supports is not the total answer for these nations. They are not a substitute for removing
internal obstacles that interfere with public investment nor will they overcome the lack of
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public infrastructure. More important than market access is the Aid for Trade program
which invests in roads, ports, education and social reform.482 In a 2009 report before the
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it stated that developed
countries must eventually help the worlds poorest countries out of their financial crisis, as
their economic growth is at a standstill while their population continues to increase. Food
aid and open markets are not enough to turn these nations around. Developed countries
must invest in the agricultural infrastructure of these nations or make plans to support
them indefinitely.483
Developing Nations
Farmers as well as others who live within the EU‘s boundaries enjoy a
comfortable lifestyle, some claim, at the expense of poor countries in Eastern Europe,
Africa and Latin America and certainly at the expense of local consumers and
taxpayers.484 The CAP, in particular, and the U.S. Farm Bills have used quotas and
tariffs of several hundred percent to effectively block the importation of many foreign
foodstuffs and often nations reciprocate by not allowing imports of U.S. and EU
products. The result of these reciprocal actions are often a huge surplus of agri-products
accumulation in the US and Europe that must be either used, sold, stored or destroyed.
The latest example was China and their reaction to import tariffs on American tires and
other products imported into the United States from China. Producers sell to exporters
who then sell to poor countries with the help of U.S. export subsidies. For many years
now, there have been calls for change, especially with the Cairns group of big agricultural
exporters such as Brazil, Argentina, Canada and the United States pressing for increased
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free trade reforms. One of the major issues is that the past actions of the U.S. has deflated
its credibility. Its‘ free trade rhetoric is seldom taken seriously. Likewise, the EU‘s
protectionism in the past was the most destructive for developing countries, but U.S.
protectionism caught up quickly, which in turn gave the EU an excuse not to change their
position. With the US Congress‘ passage of the latest, Farm Bill in 2006, American
agricultural policies look a lot like the ineffective and outdated CAP.
According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, (UNCTD) EU
protectionism deprives developing countries of nearly $700 billion in export income a
year when it sells cheap grain to countries that have no food shortages. That is almost 14
times more than poor countries receive in foreign aid. The UN calls EU protectionism a
continuing tragedy, causing unnecessary hunger and disease.485 Advocates, including the
UN, continually berate the EU and the U.S. for selling at prices below the market, but
downplay the part that the receiving countries play in the transactions. The very same
countries that are complaining are the ones who are purchasing these inexpensive
agricultural products at bargain prices.486
While it may be true that these price supports prevent LDCs from exporting a
portion of their crops and loosing income in the process, the real losers are the developed
nation‘s consumers. Some estimate that protectionism costs their citizens almost $1
billion every day. The actual cost to consumers, and the potential global gains from
agricultural trade liberalization may not be as significant as anti-support advocates would
lead us to believe. Most of the costs of agricultural policies are borne by the countries
which implement them but are included in the advocates for reform‘s overall savings
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numbers. However, the real gains accrue to the populations in the countries which
undertake the reforms.487 A good example is Sub-Saharan Africa and the least developed
countries who are potential losers because very few of them are net exporters of products
which compete with those protected by the developed nations. Anti dumping enforcement
will result in higher prices which implies potential trade loss, assuming that these
countries have anything to trade. The real losers from trade reform are among the poorest
countries who will loose inexpensive food products. One thing is for certain, one plan
will not be beneficial to all. If and when reforms are implemented, measures to safeguard
each LDCs interests in the reform process will be necessary.488
There is not total agreement on which types of price support eliminations would
be most beneficial. Some believe reducing tariff barriers to improve market access has
the greatest positive impact on developing countries in the aggregate. They believe that
those countries will benefit far more from lower tariff barriers by rich countries than from
lowering other forms of farm support. On the other hand, net importing countries with
limited domestic production potential benefit if rich countries subsidies their exports
because retail prices for them are lower. However, export subsidies on certain products
can be very disruptive in particular markets that have export potential ( produce more
than they consume or sell locally). On the one hand farmers in LDCs might benefit from
higher prices, while consumers in the same countries‘ will suffer from higher prices.
The impact on poverty will depend on the extent to which world price changes are
transmitted into the domestic food markets of developing countries and on the number of
the population that depends on agriculture exports for survival. Although agriculture in
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LDC countries accounts for only one half of a percent of world wide agricultural
production, it still accounts for nearly 20 percent of their GDP. It also employs about 50
percent of the population.489 This would lead one to the conclusion that blanket
agricultural policy reform might mitigate but not eliminate the instability of world market
prices. All are in agreement, however, that one program will not work for every country.
Each nation must have a plan that fits into its place on the economic ladder.490 In 2001,
during the period when the WTO was implementing the amber box, green box blue box
concept, the developing countries introduced a Development box that would allow LDC
countries to introduce their own agricultural support programs in contrast to a blanket
approach of that would eliminate all international support programs. Although the
development box was never official, some of the language did find its way into the Doha
Round mandate on agriculture that provided for special treatment provisions for those
nations whose first interest was in food security. 491 This could have an important impact
on LDCs. Although the Doha Round had agreed that LDCs could keep in place import
tariffs and agricultural supports in order to protect their unstable markets, the
Development box would allow them to impose new restrictions while the rest of the
WTO member nations would be required to eliminate their support programs.
Recent developments in agricultural demand may cause some of these problems
to be self correcting. Both corn and wheat are experiencing their highest prices since
1990. The rise in prices is being felt in the international market as the costs of corn,
cooking oil, and other items commonly purchased from the U.S. and used in food aid
programs have increased sharply. Although the US is still the largest donor of food
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worldwide, the volume of aid provided through Food for Peace dropped by more than
half between 2000 and 2007, to 2.4 million metric tons, in response to a 35 % increase in
the cost of agricultural commodities between 2005 and 2007.492 Reasons for the price
climb include growing demand for grain in China, Russia, Latin America, and South
America, which has reduced global stockpiles, as well as a surge of interest in the use of
corn and other food crops to produce bio-fuels, particularly ethanol which has recently
lost some of its luster. In addition, rising transportation costs have made it more
expensive to ship U.S. agricultural products to other countries pushing the price of food
aid upward, driving prices even higher. If the gross amount of food aid is to continue at
former levels, then the dollar amount of aid must increase at the same rate as the increase
in price. In today‘s economy that is not likely.493
A recent study reported by Kirwin claims that most developing countries are netfood and cereal-grain importers, therefore only a small number of countries actually loose
money as a result of dumping. Consequently, these countries benefit from lower foodcommodity prices (dumping) created by developed country agricultural subsidies.494
There is also research to the effect that incomes in developing countries actually increase
as US agricultural subsidies increase. The idea being that once the barrier of not enough
food to eat has been breached, only then can the population concentrate on the issues of
trade and economic progress. The analysis reveals that net food importers are driving this
result and net-food exporters are unaffected by U.S. and CAP agricultural subsidies.
Taken together these results suggest that, in the short run, unconditional trade
liberalization might harm consumers in less developed countries more than it will benefit
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export producers.495 Naturally, the contrasting evidence has widened the two schools of
thought and demands that even more data be collected. Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, and
others still maintain that eliminating rich country agricultural support will result in a
substantial gain for the poorest population in developing economies, while others, most
notably Arvind Panagariya (2005), have argued that the poor population is generally a
net-importer of the US subsidized commodities, and thus they benefit from the subsidy
induced lower prices.496 Sachs and Stiglitz hold that eliminating U.S. subsidies
immediately would benefit developing countries, but net importers of the subsidized
commodities stand to lose once subsidies are removed and commodity prices increase.
This will affect103 developing countries that are net importers of three categories of
agricultural goods: cereals, food, and all agricultural goods.497
The jury is still out on the effect of trade liberalization. For example, Beghin has
used a simulation model to estimate that developing countries would gain $60 billion per
year from the removal of rich country agricultural subsidies. Other simulation models
listed earlier, predict about the same amount of harm.498
The World Trade Organization
In 1995, the WTO succeeded GATT which originated in 1947. One of the stated
goals in the preamble of the agreement establishing the WTO was ―achieving full
employment and sustainable development.‖ Over a period of time the membership refocused on the ideological pursuit of liberalizing trade as a vehicle to achieve those
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goals.499 The WTO brings together 153 member states and 30 observers seeking
membership, and representing over 95% of world trade. Each with different levels of
development issues broader than just trade. Never the less, by the late 1990‘s trade
liberalization became its driving force. Many of these developing countries were
experiencing extreme poverty, and often attributed their situation to trade liberalization
reforms even though most were economically challenged long before the WTO came on
to the scene.
Eventually, a popular movement arose that began challenging the alleged benefits
of trade liberalization. After public demonstrations by the poor countries that the WTO
were attempting to introduce to market liberation, at the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference
in Seattle in December 1999, it was clear that any new trade round would have to include
a more country specific plan. While further trade liberalization in agriculture,
manufactured goods and services were maintained as the objectives of the new round of
negotiations, developing countries emphasized the need to reform the existing rules that
they claimed placed them at a disadvantage. A key demand was the reform of the
Agreement on Agriculture which would include new rules that would restrict developed
countries from dumping their agricultural goods onto developing countries markets.500
―The Doha round has opened the world‘s eyes to the fact that international trade could
help millions of poor farmers and workers, but rich country farm policies are working
directly against that,‖ said Celine Charveriat of Oxfam‘s Make Trade Fair campaign.
According to Charveriat, the EU and U.S. farm policies are now wholly discredited and it
is widely recognized that they must be reformed or face legal challenges. An example
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given was Brazil‘s successful cases against the US on cotton and sugar.501 Ms Charveriat
was either uninformed of the dangers of eliminating low priced grain to LDCs, or chose
to defend Oxfam‘s policy in spite of it.
Oxfam claims that the Doha round missed the point and was used primarily to
improve the rules that allow rich countries to capture nearly 70% of world trade flows
while poor and developing countries representing 81% of the world‘s people, many of
them living in extreme poverty got 30%. The entire continent of Africa received only 2.6
%. The Oxfam theory is that the EU and U.S. failed to see that times had changed since
the Uruguay Round in November 1982, and that developing countries are now key
players. All of this may be true, however, prior to the WTO, the LDCs were not players
at all in the world market, and their situation has not improved. One of the reasons that
they have only 30% if the market today may be because they have little to sell or because
economically, they have not yet reached the level of manufacturing that would enable
them to compete at this level.502
Developed countries, and in particular the U.S. have been accused of playing the
divide and rule game in their contract negotiations. As a result, developing countries
organized into a strategic block in Cancun and refused to negotiate until the table was
level. The strategy of working as a coalition is now firmly entrenched and although they
speak as one, they still fail to understand that their interests are not necessarily common
interests, and any arguments that they make must be country specific in nature if they are
to be effective.
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WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, in an effort to bring both sides together, has
continued to push for deadlines that would force the parties to make decisions and
concessions in order to keep the negotiations active. In July, 2006, after little sign of
change in members‘ positions, Lamy suspended the talks, called for a time-out and a
period of reflection. By November, 2006, Pascal Lamy had quietly resumed the
negotiations which remain deadlocked as of September 2009. During the 2006 Doha
round of negotiations, the WTO experienced an increased unpopularity among members
on both sides in its drive towards further trade liberalization. Throughout the developing
world, including India, South Africa, Brazil and Indonesia, millions of small scale
farmers, trade unions and civil society groups took to the streets in opposition to the
WTO and the Doha Agenda. On the other side of the table, the French and Dutch ―no‖
vote against the EU Constitution, was a vote, in part, against a greater push for trade
liberalization that might reduce their trade position. While in the U.S. trade liberalization,
as promoted by the Bush administration, became increasingly unpopular with the large
agribusiness vote. It is possible that some of the new Democrats that were elected to
Congress were elected because of their opposition to the direction of Bush‘s trade
agenda. During the open sessions it became apparent that those that stand to gain from
the Doha Agenda as it is written are exporters from industrialized countries and a small
group of exporters from developing countries.503
Few today refute the need for stronger multilateral trade rules and the need to
reform the existing system. But after years of negotiations, it is becoming more evident
that the current proposal will not achieve this goal. The dominant issue on the negotiating
table continues to be market access for both industrialized and developing nations with
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the implementation of a development ladder that will allow LDCs to merge into the
international market over a period of years as they continue to grow stronger
economically. It may be time to rethink the current Doha approach to trade reforms. The
United Nations Conference on Trade Developments‘, (UNCTAD) Trade and
Development Report 2006, for example, stated: ―The fast pace of trade liberalization
caused trade deficits to become larger.‖ The report argues for ―widening the scope of
national policy instruments beyond those that were deemed acceptable under the
development paradigm of the past 25 years,‖ and states, that ―international policies
should be designed in a way that allows greater scope and flexibility for the application
of domestic instruments to address the most serious obstacles to growth and
development.‖504
Nearly fifteen years of negotiations has exposed a host of other objectives,
broader than market access, which LDCs are pursuing at the WTO. The G33 (a group of
more than 40 developing and less developed countries) are placing a stronger emphasis
on the need to address food and livelihood security and rural development for their smallscale producers. This is the first time that they have acknowledged that there are two
distinct problems, neither of which can be solved with blanket rules that would abolish all
international agricultural price supports. These LDC countries need strong, effective and
simple rules to prevent dumping in some countries, but not all. The current WTO rules
against dumping are blanket in scope, not always applicable to the individual needs or
national problems that exist in each country. These specific requirements make the rules
difficult to implement, and often impossible to litigate. Even when the case is strong, in
the past small countries have often been reluctant to challenge a trading power as
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powerful as the U.S. It is time to focus on developing trade rules that allow for just and
equitable trade applicable to each nation. Each country needs its own balance between
protecting certain sectors of its economy and opening of others.505 The June 7, 2006
proposal to the WTO by the African Group of 41on managing trade in agricultural
commodities was the first proposal of its kind to address poverty and improved living
standards in rural areas in the context of the Doha Agenda. The proposal emphasizes the
need to ensure stable prices and a competitive market place for commodity producers and
an improved method for the distribution of international relief fund products that provide
for poverty stricken nations.506
The proposal by the African Group identifies four areas for inclusion in the Doha
negotiations:

1) The elimination of tariff escalation where it discourages development. Tariff
escalation describes a tariff structure in which tariffs increase as products are
transformed from their raw state into a processed good (referred to as value
added). For example, tariffs on raw cotton are typically lower than tariffs on
clothing. Tariff escalation allows developed countries to import raw materials at
low cost from developing countries for their own industries but protects
developed country industry from value-added imports, which discourages
industrial development in developing countries.
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2) The adoption of international systems to manage the supply of commodities so
as to stabilize prices. For commodities like grain, coffee or cocoa, world prices
are severely distorted by the structural oversupply of the commodities on
international markets. Oversupply has depressed prices with devastating effects
for small-scale coffee and cocoa producers.
3) To allow the use of export taxes and export restrictions to stabilize commodity
prices. Major suppliers of commodities to world markets, or a number of suppliers
acting in concert, can thereby avoid sharp declines in the world price when
supplies increase. This also allows countries to slow exports if they want to retain
commodities for their own food security. And it offers countries another option
for increasing government revenue.
4) To negotiate more concrete disciplines to eliminate non-tariff barriers that
affect commodity trade. Non-tariff barriers can include health and safety
standards and packaging requirements that are essential to any country‘s trade
regulation. However, other non-tariff barriers can be used as a way to keep out
imports, unfairly discriminating against producers and exporters from poorer
countries. A better system at the multilateral level is needed to ensure that any
standards put in place are the result of a participatory process, ideally one that
provides funding to commodity producers to raise the quality of their goods.‖507
The proposal from the Africa Group is a watershed in trade negotiations with
developed nations. By calling for systems of supply management, the proposal suggests
alternatives to tackle the root causes of dumping. Unfortunately, supply management has
been the major culprit in the past. The upside is the implication that any agreement that
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might me reached would have to be managed by an international entity such as the UN or
the WTO. The admission that solving the problems of this magnitude are beyond the
capacity of any one individual or multilateral organization is a definite step in the right
direction. The African proposal calls for the participation of the UN Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Commodity Organization (ICO) with
the WTO as the governing body to coordinate and oversee the ongoing governance of the
agreement as they continue to reach acceptable solutions.508
Reform
The link between the degree of support given to farming in OECD countries and
the difficulties faced by developing country farmers has come into sharp focus. There is
no doubt that OECD farm programs have a significant impact on the structure of world
markets. The consequences of future policies have recently become clearer in the context
of the Doha Round of negotiations in the WTO.509
The 1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture finally brought agricultural
commodities under the multilateral trading system. This was the first step towards
reforming agricultural trade when the WTO committed developed countries to 15 to 36
percent reductions in three types of price supports over a five year period while
developing countries pledged smaller cuts over a longer time period. It would be the
beginning of both progress and stalemates over the next 10 years.510
The Doha Development Round of the WTO, launched in 2001, explicitly
mandated improvement in welfare and the reduction of poverty in all countries. Both
worthwhile goals with broad parameters. After years of negotiations, it is still unclear
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when and if the Doha Round will ever yield meaningful results on either point. Although
developed countries have agreed to eliminate export subsidies by 2013, the EU and U.S.,
under pressure from powerful agricultural lobbies, are reluctant to make significant
concessions on domestic support and literally shut down further negotiations in
December of 2008.511 Throughout the negotiations, developed countries have continued
to spend nearly $300 billion in support of their farmers, or approximately 1.3 percent of
gross domestic product. In comparison, official development assistance to developing
countries was only $80 billion in 2004.512
The current Farm Nutrition, and Bio-energy Act of 2006still reflects the subsidies
for grain crops, sugar and cotton that were introduced as a response to the Great
Depression, although most have been decoupled from production. Almost seventy-five
years later these commodity supports are still in place, even though the characteristics of
U.S. agriculture have changed dramatically over the course of nearly four generations.
The shape of those policies no longer reflects the needs of agriculture as a whole or the
role of agriculture in the economy. Today, only about 1% of the labor force works on
farms, compared to as much as 40% in some areas when the commodity programs were
first implemented. With this in mind, one would expect a degree of reform in the
introduction of each succeeding bill. The current farm bill is divided into ―titles‖ that
have not been seen before, indicating its broad scope. Three titles are of particular
relevance to developing countries. Commodity support programs are specified in Title I
and include provisions for the major ―program crops‖ such as corn, wheat, soybeans,
cotton, and rice, as well as for sugar and dairy products. Title III deals with trade issues,
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including food aid. Title IX concerns the provision of energy from farm products.513 Two
additional factors are in play in the current Farm Bill that once again bring to the
forefront the importance of foreign policy in U.S. farm and food legislation. The first is
the debate over food aid. As the US continues to be the major supplier of food aid, a vital
source of grain for many poverty stricken countries, any change in policy in this area is
potentially dangerous. The second is the growing demand for corn for ethanol that added
a short lived new dimension to the link between US markets and the conditions faced by
the developing world.514
US food aid policies are still criticized for their effects on developing country
markets. In the past, there has been considerable debate about the benefits of food aid
delivered in cash rather than in kind. The current U.S. farm bill specifically states that aid
must be in product and not in cash. Some argue that cash food aid can provide a more
timely delivery of more acceptable commodities, and can also promote economic
development when such purchases are made in developing country markets eliminating
the issue of freezing out the products of local growers, while others argue that history has
proven that cash often simply disappears.515 This is a significant issue, as the U.S.
provides 50 % or more of all international food aid. In fiscal year 2006, U.S. food aid
totaled over three million metric tons, equivalent to $2.2 billion. The big difference
between U.S. aid and all other countries aid is that U.S. food aid is required to be
supplied in-kind. In other words, it must be provided in U.S. commodities as opposed to
cash. The latest U.S. Farm Bill established a minimum donation level of 2.5 million
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metric tons of product. All other nations provide assistance in the form of cash.516 The
major reason that the U.S. has not transitioned to cash food aid is due to the political
pressure from farm belt constituents to continue to use U.S. commodities in these
programs, (in other words, it gets rid of the surplus crops created by farm subsidies).
International food aid programs for the poor sound good to the public and have always
benefited from strong bipartisan political backing from agricultural groups and U.S.,
maritime interests. It is also a federal requirement that 75% of food aid is to be shipped
on U.S. vessels. The shipping of grain requires many vessels, cash does not. There is
another factor involved that receives little attention, and that is the Private Voluntary
Organizations (PVOs) who receive and distribute U.S. food aid to needy countries. Many
of these PVOs receive much of their income from the distribution of food aid, in the
countries in which they are working.517 While both developing and developed countries
have a strong interest in getting food to those that need it, the issues involved are
politically sensitive and engage powerful special interest groups who will not willingly
give up their golden goose. These parties are often more interested in their own personal
agenda than the overall welfare of the people that they serve.
The 2007 Farm Bill has a number of provisions in the energy title pertaining to
the projected demand for ethanol. It was anticipated that this new undertaking would
keep the price of corn and a number of other grains at high levels for years to come.
Although the estimated demand for ethanol has waned, it still offers improved
opportunities for developing countries who produce corn, soybeans, and other crops that
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can be used for energy production while, unfortunately, limiting the supply of free grain
to those that depend on it.
Those advocates for reform who were hoping for major changes in the 2007 Farm
Bill were disappointed. The new bill passed through the House with little change from
the 2002 version. The Senate version authorized nearly $10 billion in new subsidies,
price guarantees and disaster aid over the next 10 years. In addition, there is a $5.1 billion
disaster trust fund, and a revenue insurance program that will cost another $4.7 billion.
Senator Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) said ―The farm program is agriculture‘s answer to 1930s
socialism.‖518 The only real change in the 2007 farm bill is that farmers have the
potential to receive even more subsidies than before although they may have new names
attached to them. The upside is that nearly all subsidies directly attached to production
have been eliminated. In any event, the Senate bill, which amounted to $286 billion,
failed to pass on November 16, 2007, and was be pushed into 2008 for further debate,
where it eventually passed on May 20, 2008.
Sugar
The US sugar policy is conducted through quotas and tariffs and along with
cotton, is still the most protected of all U.S. crops. By insulating U.S. sugar producers
from the world market, these subsidies are designed to stimulate domestic production,
even though they create an estimated $900 million a year in net losses to the U.S.
economy.519 Surprisingly, the U.S. is not a large exporter of sugar, however, its market
access restrictions are estimated to depress world prices by more than three percent. In
addition to the price depression, these barriers to the U.S. market are detrimental to those
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developing countries where sugar is a commodity in which they have a comparative
advantage.520 In spite of U.S. apathy on the subject, there is a bright spot on the
international sugar market. The EU, faced with the extremely difficult task of reducing
agricultural support payments while at the same time taking on the powerful large agricorporate powerhouses, surprisingly chose the most protected product to initiate their first
progressive change in international trade. In 2005, the EU agreed to cut guaranteed sugar
prices by 36% in the largest overall reform in 40 years.521 The decision came after a
majority of EU governments accepted a compromise presented by the EU agriculture
commissioner, Mariann Fischer Boel, who suggested increased compensation to sugarproducing farmers and companies to offset the resultant loss of income. Part of the
compensation to be provided includes a 5.6 billion fund to be dispensed over a four year
period just to compensate sugar refinery closings. Although the WTO and the rest of the
international community had brought great pressure on the EU to change, its abrupt
acquiescence, and the degree of change took them by surprise. For nearly forty years,
sugar has been the EU‘s most regulated and protected sector that that kept prices at more
than three times the level of the international market.522
What makes this even more surprising is that the EU‘s sugar program has been
scheduled for reform every five years for the last 40 years without actually making any
changes. Some of the most powerful agricultural companies in Europe which were
instrumental in delaying reform proposals were caught off guard. The principal causes for
reforming the sugar program at this time were not entirely voluntary on the part of the
EU, and were threefold in nature: 1) the CAP reforms of 2003/04 that left sugar as the
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only major commodity unreformed, provided a mechanism to compensate farmers for
income losses due to reform measures; 2) the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) agreement,
in which the EU-25 agreed to phase out tariffs by 2009 on imported raw sugar from 48 of
the least developed countries; and probably the most important factor of all 3) a WTO
Panel ruling that found the EU sugar regime in violation of WTO export commitments.
The EU also lost the appeal of its case.523
The basic features of the EU Agriculture Commission are:
• Sugar price is reduced by 36% from €631.9 to €404.4 per metric ton (mt) over a
4-year phase-in period beginning in 2006-07.
• Minimum sugar beet price is reduced by 39.5 % to €26.3/mt over the phase-in
period.
• Sugar production quotas are not reduced except through a voluntary 4-year
restructuring program where quota can be sold and retired. Payments for quota are
€ 730/mt for 2006/07 and 2007/08; € 625/mt for 2008/09 and € 520/mt for
2009/10.
• Restructuring is financed by quota levies on producers and processors who do
not sell quota. Total value of the restructuring fund is projected at €5.704 billion.
• Compensation is available to farmers at an average of 64.2% of the price cut.
The aid is included in the Single Farm Payment and is linked to payments for
compliance with environmental and land management standards.
• Establishment of a prohibitive super levy to be applied to over-quota.
Elements of European Union sugar reform proposal made on November 24, 2005
• A 36 % support price cut over four years beginning in 2006-07 to ensure
sustainable market balance, -20% in year one, -25% in year two, -30% in year
three and -36 % in year four.
• Compensation to farmers at an average of 64.2% of the price cut. Inclusion of
this aid in the Single Farm Payment and linking of payments to respect
environmental and land management standards.
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• In those countries giving up at least 50% of their quota, the possibility of an
additional coupled payment of 30% of the income loss for a maximum of five
years, plus possible limited national aid.
• Validity of the new regime, including extension of the sugar quota system, until
2014-15. No review clause.
• Merging of A and B quota into a single production quota. There are no quota
cuts. Any quota reduction results from sales of quota into a voluntary
restructuring buy-up scheme.
• Abolition of the intervention system after a four-year phase-out period and the
replacement of the intervention price by a reference price. During the transition,
the intervention price will be 80% of the reference price of the following year.
Only 600,000 metric tons can be sold into intervention each year.
• Introduction of a private storage system as a safety net in case the market price
falls below the reference price.
• Voluntary restructuring scheme lasting four years for EU sugar factories, and
isoglucose and insulin syrup producers, consisting of a payment to encourage
factory closure and the renunciation of quota as well to cope with the social and
environmental impact of the restructuring process. This payment will be €730/mt
in years one and two, falling to €625 in year three, and €520 in the final year.
There is the possibility to use some of this fund to compensate beet producers
affected by the closure of factories.
• An additional diversification fund for Member States where quota retirement is
larger than expected.
• Both these payments will be financed by a levy on holders of quota, lasting three
years. The first year levy is equal to €126.4/mt; second year levy, €173.8/mt; and
third year levy, €113.0/mt. The isoglucose levy is fixed at 50 percent of these
rates.
• Sugar beets qualify for set-aside payments when grown as a non-food crop and
also are eligible for the energy crop aid of €45/hectare.
• To maintain a certain production in the current C-sugar producing countries, an
additional amount of 1.1 million mt will be made available against a one-off
payment corresponding to the amount of restructuring aid per metric ton in the
first year. • Sugar for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and for the
production of bio- ethanol will be excluded from production quotas.
• Increase of Isoglucose quota of 300,000 mt for the existing producer companies
phased in over three years with an increase of 100,000 mt each year.
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• Possibility to purchase extra isoglucose quota in Italy (60,000 mt), Sweden
(35,000 mt) and Lithuania (8,000 mt) at the restructuring aid price.524
How does all of this affect the LDCs? EU Sugar beet producers, anticipate that a
third of the 300,000 beet growers in Europe will abandon the industry, and that 80 of 320
sugar factories will be shut down, which is exactly the plan. The long term effect will be
to open up new opportunities for countries that are more competitive in their production
and distribution.525 The immediate effect of this agreement will be to allow the duty free
entry of raw sugar imports into the EU sometime in 2009. Many of the LDCs are high
producers of sugar, but have been barred from exporting it to the EU, one of the worlds
largest consumers. As one would expect, there are detractors to the program, as it will
completely revolutionize the sugar industry and eliminate a large portion of the
subsidized EU sugar producers and processors. Some claim that it will decimate their
industry. The EU has promised to deal with that issue and has already put safety nets into
place. Ireland, Italy and other hard hit EU nations have been offered even more aid for
their farmers, and will be compensated for as much as 100% of their losses for a period of
time to be determined at a later date.526
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
As stated in the Introduction and Chapter II, the purpose of this dissertation was
three-fold:
1) Agricultural price support programs were introduced in both the United States and
Europe during the Great Depression and again after WWII to subsidize small farm
income. Small farmers at that time were not earning enough to support their
families or to maintain their farms. Existing evidence suggests that these programs
became redundant as the number of small farmers declined to roughly 10 percent of
the original group, and the personal incomes of those that remained rose to the level
of the national average. The original agricultural support programs are no longer
relevant to today‘s small farmer. That evidence makes it clear that if these programs
were suspended today, the vast majority of the remaining small farmers in these
developed countries would not be harmed.
2) Today‘s agricultural price supports have little to do with local agrarian needs, and
remain in place due to large corporate influence, and public apathy. Change and
reform are unnecessarily protracted and lengthy as a result of the personal self
indulgence of politicians and industry giants. The benefits of modern day price
supports no longer flow to small farmers as originally intended, but to the large
agribusiness community which would continue to prosper in their absence.
3)

To determine if the continued dumping of excess agricultural products on the
markets of less developed countries at prices below what these products can be
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grown locally is detrimental to the farmers of these nations, inhibits their
economic growth and perpetuates poverty in many LDC countries.
The first chapter provided the justification for the project and a description of it.
In that chapter the research discussed the concerns about the continuation of funding for a
program that is no longer relevant. A review of the available literature suggests that there
was a genuine need for agricultural price supports in both the United States and Europe
following the great depression and World War II (WWII). These programs were initiated
in order to rescue the large farm communities of the developed nations during a period
when small farming could not support a family and farms were failing, creating even
higher unemployment than the national average and threatened these nations‘ future food
supplies. The existing literature on the subject also demonstrates that at some point in
time, these programs became redundant as the economy began its healing process and the
small farmers began to decrease in number as more farm families moved to urban areas
for higher wages and better working conditions. This dissertation found that although the
need for small farm agricultural subsidies steadily decreased over the years, the funding
continued and in many cases increased during that same period of time.
Chapters I and II outlined the contents of the dissertation and presented the main
arguments. The final determination, given the information derived from the literature
review, was that, first; one of the major causes of the break in small farm dependence on
agricultural subsidies was urbanization. As this urban transformation took place, the
number of small farms shrank and the need for farm subsidies became redundant. When
the small farms in the United States and the EU were reduced from 50 percent to less
than five percent of the total population, the need for agricultural support payments was
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reduced in kind. The total amount of government support payments continued unchecked
when in fact they should have been reduced or eliminated. Second, the modernization of
the farm industry with its reduced demand for manual labor and improved farm
production has resulted in improved profits and less dependence on farm subsidies. Farm
subsidies should have been reduced or eliminated as the need for them declined. Third,
corporate farming has taken over the industry. As farming became more profitable, large
corporate farms became more desirable to entrepreneurs and corporate investors who
then purchased up the small farms in the country, which in turn eliminated the original
concept of small farm subsidies. Fourth, income redistribution has enabled the small
farmer to earn an income comparable with the national average. The need for less labor
and improved growing techniques have placed more profit in the hands of the small
farmer, eliminating the need for supplemental government support programs. Fifth,
political interference has prevented these agricultural policies from taking their logical
course. Large agribusiness lobbyists and politicians with personal agendas have altered
the normal avenue of rescission that these outdated agricultural support programs should
have taken. The validity of these arguments has been confirmed by the research and case
studies that follow in chapters three four and five.
This study has found that agricultural price supports in the developed countries of
the United States and the EU are in fact outdated and redundant. They are self
perpetuating and continue at the leisure of large agribusiness to the detriment of the
consumer and, in some cases, of the LDCs as well. In sum, the case studies in chapter
three, four and five qualified my arguments, affirmed hypotheses one and two in total and
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partly confirmed hypothesis three with some caveats which I will address later in the
chapter.
As outlined in the main argument, Chapter III began by providing some historical
background of the agricultural support programs in the United States and the EU, and
then examined the similarities of the two in a cross case study scenario. The research
reaffirmed the argument that the giant share of the money from these programs no longer
goes to small farmers but to large agribusiness interests. With the largest 10 percent of
farms receiving three quarters of the funds, there is little doubt that today‘s small farmers
no longer meet the original criteria of need. The implication of the research is that the EU
is no better. The largest amount of the funds in the EU go to those countries that no
longer need the support while a small number of Eastern European countries that could
use the funds get little. Both of these facts verify my argument that somewhere in the past
40 years the small farmer reached a peak where they no longer needed price supports. At
that point of equilibrium, the funds began to transfer to another entity.
Ironically, this cross case study identified the real loser in this scenario to be the
developed countries consumer and local industry that are forced to pay higher prices.
Although this was not a part of the central theme of the hypotheses, it emphasizes the
harm that these programs impart as a result of political partiality and public apathy. The
findings here imply that both the United States Congress and the EU have made only half
hearted attempts to eliminate these supports. The findings also reveal the contradiction in
each government‘s law makers who are sworn to protect the best interests of their
citizens, but in reality, show fealty only to their constituency as they pass laws that are
beneficial to a few and harmful to many. The implications of this research are that
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throughout the term of these subsidies, political parties have used them as a lever to get
votes and to preserve party power.
In answer to the question: could the remaining small farmers survive if all
agricultural supports were suspended, this research finds that the answer is yes. The
findings here reveal that this is not unexplored territory. NAFTA countries, primarily
Canada and Mexico, as well as Australia and New Zealand have either reduced or
eliminated agricultural price supports with positive results. This research brings to light
the fact that the remaining number of small farmers in developed countries is so small
and insignificant to each country‘s GNP that they could easily be subsidized, retrained, or
relocated for a fraction of the amount being paid in subsidies. On the bright side, the
findings of this chapter show that subsidies are actually being reduced in developed
countries, albeit at a rate that might be unacceptable to the consumer if they were actually
aware of the cost to them personally. The United States has decoupled most crops from
production and has suggested that other nations do the same, while the EU CAP and
Agenda 2000 reform, have also made some gains although those gains remain
insignificant. The findings here imply that the expansion of globalization and the
communication revolution have provided new oversight on government spending which
in turn has brought more pressure on politicians to make responsible fiscal decisions.
After investigating the difficulty that the United States and the EU have incurred
in their attempts to come to grips with both the question of the validity of continuing
these programs, and the complications that prevent beneficial change, the WTO, and its
efforts to bring the nations of the world together, was introduced into the formula.
Chapter IV recognizes all of the pitfalls in Chapter III and chronicles the WTO‘s efforts
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bring the nations of the world together in a effort to maximize open market trading
through the elimination of national and regional agricultural support programs.
The examination process begin with the past success rate of the WTO as it
brought the countries of the world together in other areas of trade. In the areas of
industry, manufacturing, and intellectual property the WTO has been able to bring its
member nations together to sign multilateral agreements when these same countries were
not able to do so on their own. This case study outlined the progress of the WTO in its
attempts to bring the countries of the world to an agreement on a set of agricultural rules,
using the same set of negotiating principles that had worked in other areas. It was
observed that the WTO applied the all for one and one for all rule to the negotiations,
which implied that one set of rules should apply to all countries, and the all or nothing
rule, which was designed to prevent nations from accepting only part of any agreement
that might be reached. This chapter found that both rules hamstrung the WTO
negotiations and actually inhibited both sides from reaching an agreement. The WTO
faced a dilemma similar to that of the United States and the EU in that the majority of
member nations agreed that agricultural support programs were outdated and too
expensive to continue, yet were unable to agree on how to dismember them. The research
also discovered that while the developed nations were concerned about the expense of
these programs, the poorer countries were more concerned about how the excess
production was affecting the market prices in their countries.
The findings revealed that the common ground between the have and have not
countries was; outside political influence and personal greed. The politicians rely on the
agricultural block for re-election and, consequently, refrain from making decisions that
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are best for the larger population of their countries, and personal greed thwarts the
negotiating process as each country attempts to gain the better part of the agreement
while neither side wants to be the one to concede. One of the revelations of this case
study was that the WTO and those rich nations who argue for trade liberalization in kind
with developing countries completely fail to understand the poverty and character of
millions of poor farmers in developing countries who live in remote areas with very little
or no infrastructure, lack access to education, own little or no land, lack entrée to credit
and market information, and generally are at the mercy of those countries that possess
these attributes at the negotiating table. Dealing with agricultural reform is quite different
from negotiating a contract for the production of steel, if for no other reason than that the
parties dealing in agriculture are so vastly unequal. The objective of this case study was
to determine the position of the WTO and LDCs on the reduction of agricultural price
supports. What it revealed was that the WTO did not fully understand the consequences
of eliminating price support programs that provide inexpensive farm products to LDCs,
nor had it adequately researched the prospect of attempting to formulate a plan that would
apply to all. The LDCs, on the other hand, had little to say on the subject in previous
negotiations, and when they organized into a negotiating block they found that their
organized presence actually created a stalemate when it came time to produce a plan that
would be beneficial to all.
In answer to the questions: would the curtailing of dumping excess products be
beneficial or harmful to LDC farmers, Chapter V presented a case study on the plight of
LDC farmers with regard to price supports and crop dumping. As stated in the
introductory chapter and reiterated in Chapter II, the third hypothesis of this dissertation
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is that the dumping of agricultural products on the markets of LDCs, at prices lower than
these products can be locally grown, is detrimental to these nations‘ farmers. The
research revealed that this hypothesis is true for many but not all LDC countries and that
there is no solution that will work for all. There are three groups of LDC countries. The
first group is composed of those that do not grow enough product to support their
population‘s food requirements. For these states, inexpensive agricultural products
dumped on their market at below the cost of production are a god-send. Without them,
many would starve, and poverty would prevail. The second group is composed of those
that grow enough product to survive with some excess that is sold locally. For this group,
low cost food products will have only a marginal effect on local farmers, as they have
little to sell. It will have a positive effect on the rest of the country because it frees up
capitol for investment in other areas. The third group is composed of those that produce
more than they consume or sell locally. For these countries, farm products dumped at
below the cost to produce have a detrimental effect on their economy; therefore these
nations openly campaign for curtailment of dumping programs.
In this chapter the research also examined the effect of multilateral agreements on
price support and tariff reductions, and reached the conclusion that LDCs in all three
categories are in a similar position as the United States and the EU states were at the
onset of their price support programs. The local farmers do not make enough to live, and
cannot support their farms without government support programs. Not only can they not
discontinue the programs that they have, they actually need more of them.
This chapter also attempted to answer concerns about the continued dumping of
the excess agricultural products on the markets of these LDCs, and came to the
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conclusion that there is no single clear cut answer. Yes, these low cost products are
detrimental to some of these countries, and no, it is not detrimental to others. The
hypothesis is therefore inconclusive as it is written, and will require a more concise
investigative approach to the problem in order to arrive at a viable solution in the future.
Conclusions Derived from the Variables
The variables in this study were accurate in providing information on the direction
in which the small farmers were heading in terms of numbers, and on their dependence
on the agricultural support programs. Before the value of continuing these programs
could be determined, research had to first establish that there was still a need for them.
The first independent variable urbanization tells us that there are several factors
involved in population movement that have a direct affect on the necessity to continue
farm subsidies. As family members left the farm for better paying jobs and employment
that required less manual labor, small farm expenses went down and the gross profit of
farming went up, which, in turn, reduced the need for government subsidies. The research
also revealed that as more and more farm families moved to the city, the owners of small
farms declined ten fold between 1930 and 2008, creating a reduced demand for farm
assistance by nearly 90 percent.
The second independent variable modernization of farm machinery also helped to
drive the movement of less need for assistance for small farmers. As demand for products
grew, under support program urgency, it came to light that the farm industry responded
by producing more efficient farm machinery and better farm management techniques,
thus enabling the small farmer to once more increase his/her profits and enhance their
chances to become independent of farm subsidies. Ironically, the agricultural support
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programs drove small farmers to increase production which in turn produced more
efficient farm practices that eventually eliminated the need for the very programs that
started it all.
The third independent variable corporate farming proved to be the most
significant factor for this study. The research established early on that the reduction of the
number of small farms, in itself, was enough to establish a reduction in need to a degree
that would warrant the elimination of these subsidy programs. The role of corporate
farming in today‘s developed countries dominates the industry and has reduced the role
of the small farmer to an observer. The conclusion from this variable is that the profits
from farming have become so attractive to large corporations and entrepreneurs that they
have systematically bought out 90 percent of the small farms across the country. The
research has shown that these corporate farmers will do well without the farm subsidies
that were never designed for them. Given that small farms have declined in number, and
the remainder has become profitable, the original goal of the agriculture support
programs has been achieved.
The fourth independent variable, income re-distribution, attempted to address the
concerns about how, and if, the agricultural support programs increased small farm
income to an acceptable level, and, if so, to determine if there is still a need for that
support. The conclusion reached from Chapter III is that small farmers‘ incomes reached
the level of the general population several generations ago, and have since exceeded that
number. This dissertation found this variable to be a major factor in the argument against
the continuation of agricultural supports in that the original goal of these programs was to
bring the small farmer back into the mainstream of the general population and to provide
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them with the vehicle to make at least an average income by working on their small farm
if that is what they chose to do.
In summary, throughout the previous chapters the research has provided both
theoretical arguments and a degree of empirical evidence to support the arguments that
agricultural support programs are redundant, extremely expensive to the consumer and in
many cases harmful to LDCs. All of these contentions are verified by the research, with
some caveats which were addressed earlier.
Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations to this study. As with all dissertations this also
suffers from a number of weaknesses. First, the time frame in which these programs
became inappropriate is not perfectly clear. The support programs continued as if
reaching the original goal had made little progress; therefore, a definite date on when
small farms became profitable, and farm support programs became redundant, is not
easily determined. Furthermore, without a definite date of equilibrium, such a large time
frame makes it difficult to measure when small farmers stopped relying on these
programs for survival, and when they realized that these support programs provided an
avenue for over production and high profits. Although the research firmly concludes that
these programs in developed nations are certainly no longer necessary, it is not clear
exactly when large agribusiness replaced the small farmer as the major source of
production or when the preponderance of the available funds found their way to the large
corporate entities. Other indicators of concern, particularly in the EU countries, is the fact
that some of the original countries continue to draw the giants share of the funds while
other countries that may still need these support payments receive little. Although, at first
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blush, it appears that these EU support programs are redundant and that the funding
should be curtailed, the fact that some Eastern European nations are not receiving proper
funding for their fledging programs creates a modicum of doubt in that conclusion,
therefore creating a problematic result.
Another limitation of this study is the extraneous variable, political influence.
Since the factors of need, income redistribution, and urbanization all lead to the logical
conclusion that these support programs should have been repealed years ago, why have
those in government not redistributed these funds to other more important projects? The
validity of this study was constantly sidetracked by the intervention of political issues
that prevented it from reaching logical conclusions.
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